
THE TOR PROJECT

OON


Vasilis Ververis (andz@torproject.org)

GPG Fingerprint: 8FD5 CF5F 39FC 03EB B382 7470 5FBF 70B1 D126 0162 Public Key: https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x5FBF70B1D1260162







Mission: be the global resource for technology, advocacy, research and education in the ongoing pursuit of freedom of speech, privacy rights online, and censorship circumvention.




What is Tor?

- Online anonymity
 - FL/OSS
 - Open (volunteer based) network
- Community: researchers, developers, users, relay operators, [...]
- U.S. 501(c)(3) non-profit organization








Estimated 2,500,000+ Tor users (daily)




HOW INTERNET WORKS?











Every PC, server, device, refrigerator,... requires a unique identifier - "IP address"




- Internet is not the WWW (World Wide Web)
- Internet is the infrastructure
- Web is a service of this infrastructure





On the Internet we are sending (a lot) of private data:

- Source/destination IP address
 - Geographical location



- WWW (World Wide Web):
 - Web Browser
 - Operating system
 - Addons/Extensions





Other services: e-mail, telephone, chat (IRC, IM), file sharing,...




UNDERSTANDING YOUR THREAD MODEL:


I use encryption (HTTPS, ...) my ISP cannot see my traffic! Maybe it cannot see your traffic (in cleartext), *but* it tracks:

- Websites visited
- Locations logs
- IP address logs
- ..archived for x time: Data retention


VPN / Proxy Providers



VPN / Proxy Providers: (often) single point of failure



VPN / Proxy Providers: (often) single point of bypass








Tor





Tor












HOW TOR WORKS





A Alice criptografa o seu pedido online para o Bob três vezes, e envia-o para o primeiro servidor


O primeiro servidor remove a primeira camada de criptografia, mas não vê consegue saber que o pedido é dirigido ao Bob.

O segundo servidor Source: Tor prochure remove outra camada de criptografia e reencaminha o pedido.

> O terceiro servidor remove a última camada de criptografia e entrega o pedido ao Bob, mas não consegue saber que o pedido veio da Alice.


> O Bob não sabe que o pedido online foi feito pela Alice, a menos que ela mesma o diga.














Tor's safety comes from diversity

- Diversity of relays
- Diversity of users

Transparency for Tor is key


- FL/OSS
- Public design documents and specifications


But what about the bad people?

- (remember) the millions of daily users
- Still a two-edged sword?
- Good people need Tor much more than bad people need it

Onion services

- Self authenticated
- End-to-end encrypted
- Built-in NAT punching
- Limit surface area
- No need to "exit" from Tor






- About 3% of Tor's traffic has to do with onion services at all
- Onion services are still in the "neat toy" stage
- Terbium labs (and others) found ~7000 useful onion sites





1 Million People use Facebook over Tor



People who choose to communicate over Tor do so for a variety of reasons related to privacy, security and safety. As we've written previously it's important to us to provide methods for people to use our services securely – particularly if they lack reliable methods to do so.

This is why in the last two years we built the Facebook onion site and onionmobile site, helped standardise the ".onion" domain name, and implemented Tor connectivity for our Android mobile app by enabling connections through Orbot.





... and many others






Package repository


http://vwakviie2ienjx6t.onion/




apt-get install apt-tor-transport



















Detect censorship and signs of network tampering

Shares observations and data about the nature, methods, and prevalence of censorship and network tampering around the world, through the use of open methodologies and FLOSS tools

OPEN DATA MODEL


- Network measurement data (reports) submitted by volunteers
- Complete dataset (from 2012) available to use/download


EVIDENCE OF INTERNET CENSORSHIP


- Transparency: What is blocked, where and how?
 What is the health of the network that we are using?
- Legality: Can the blocking of specific types of sites and services be legally justified?
 - Story-telling & Advocacy: What is the impact of censorship on human rights?













- Blocking of websites
- Blocking of instant messaging apps
- Blocking of censorship circumvention tools (Tor, VPN, Psiphon, Lantern)
- Detection of *middle boxes* proxy technologies that could be responsible for censorship and/or surveillance
- Speed and network performance tests (NDT)









asurement

Web Connectivity 2017-03-23 06:24:01 UTC

 $20170323T062328Z_AS7303_UYQj7sql3cX8qzQXjRGZ4QCHf6lCnALEmLqcOjoFxpyIshSmI4$

t runtime: 1.82408 seconds

je.

Network: Telecom Argentina S.A., AR (AS7303)

Name: ooniprobe-android

Version: 1.1.2



This measurement contains data that could be a sign of network tampering or censorship.

site

https://thepiratebay.se

n for blocking: dns

measurements for URL



asurement

Web Connectivity 2017-03-03 03:48:36 UTC

20170303T034153Z_AS8048_3ndo86P4sVdRgJ7N9CPMX5ft97YeHCbpCkofTTKol42forLpfN

st runtime: 4.69504 seconds

-

Network: CANTV Servicios, Venezuela, VE (AS8048) Name: ooniprobe Version: 2.0.1



This measurement contains data that could be a sign of network tampering or censorship.

site

http://ntn24.com

n for blocking: dns

measurements for URL

WHATSAPP BLOCKED IN BRAZIL

```
# OONI Probe Report for http_requests (0.2.5)
# Mon May 2 23:17:02 2016
probe_asn: AS26615
probe_cc: BR
software_name: ooniprobe
software_version: 1.4.2
test_helpers: {}
test_name: http_requests
test_start_time: '2016-05-02 21:17:02'
test version: 0.2.5
agent: agent
body_length_match: null
```

OONI RESULTS (1/4)

- March 2017: Thailand blocked news and censorship circumvention tool websites
- December 2016: Malaysia block pages and censorship
- December 2016: Ethiopia DPI used to block media websites during major political protests

OONI RESULTS (2/4)

- December 2016: Belarus blocked Tor
- October 2016: Zambia blocked websites during general elections
 - May 2016: Uganda blocking of social media

OONI RESULTS (3/4)


- May 2016: Brazil blocked WhatsApp
- June 2015: Greece and EEEP blocklists
- July 2013: Zambia, a country under Deep Packet
 Inspection

OONI RESULTS (4/4)

- May 2013: Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan Internet filtering and DPI
- April 2012: Hadara Palestine Internet agency Hadara restricts access to certain content for users in Bethlehem
 - March 2012: T-Mobile USA Web Guard Parental controls blocked number of websites (Newgrounds, Cosmopolitan Magazine, and the Tor Project

OONI STATISTICS





- Millions of network measurements collected from 200+ countries
- 2766+ unique ASNs

HELP


INTERNET HAS A LOT OF ENEMIES



HELP REVEAL INTERNET CENSORSHIP

Install ooniprobe

Raspberry Pi



To install ooniprobe on Raspberry pi devices see our lepidopter install guide





OS X and Linux



To install ooniprobe on unix based systems read our installation guide



- Available for: Linux, Mac OS, Raspberry Pi, IOS, Android
- Source code:

https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-probe

HOW CAN YOU HELP TOR?

- Run a relay (or a bridge)
- Teach your friends about Tor, and privacy in general
- Help fix -- and fix -- bugs
- Work on open research problems (petsymposium.org)

Protect your privacy



https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html/