Hidden Services |
Welcome to Tor Metrics, the primary place to learn interesting
facts about the Tor network, the largest deployed anonymity network to
If something can be measured safely, you'll find it here.
And if you can think of something that is missing, please help us add it
How can something be measured safely in an anonymity
We wrote a
paper where we describe how we measure potentially sensitive data in
the Tor network.
Whenever we want to measure new data, there is a rigorous process of
document, discussing it on the
list, and asking for code review on the
As a core principle, we only use data for metrics that have
been made publicly available.
How can I contribute?
Depends on what you'd like to contribute.
We welcome contributions ranging from links to interesting visualizations
over data sets from your experiments or analyses
to code patches that add new graphs, tables, or data-processing scripts.
But be sure to read up the details before preparing your contribution.
So, what's here to see?
Oh, you're still on this page?
Please use the navigation bar to go the metrics you're interested in.
If you don't know where to start, you might want to begin with the
Enjoy your stay!
This material is supported in part by the National Science
Foundation under Grant No. CNS-0959138. Any opinions,
finding, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this
material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the National Science Foundation.
"Tor" and the "Onion Logo" are registered trademarks of The Tor Project, Inc.
Data on this site is freely available under a
copyright declaration: To the extent possible under law, the Tor
Project has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights
in the data. Graphs are licensed under a
Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License.
General ideas for this design prototype:
- Becoming more open to contributions: It should be as easy as possible
to add new metrics, in particular without having to think about potential
design issues like extending the site navigation.
- Being less strict about categorizing metrics: Most metrics shall be
found unter two or more categories, so that categories don't have to be
chosen under the aspect of cleanly subdiving metrics into distinct subsets but
into aspects or perspectives of the network that people might care about.
- Moving every graph or table to its own page: There shall be
standardized pages for graphs, tables, or other metrics that are easier to
comprehend and to link to than long pages containing half a dozen graphs.
With the current graphs and tables, there would be 23 such pages, but that number
could easily grow to 50 in the future.
- Adding new pages for raw data: Most graphs and tables currently
contain a link to a CSV file containing raw data.
The data format is described in a text file contained in the Git
The better approach would be to create a new page for each CSV file
produced by Tor Metrics and include the data format on that page.
This would be the third page type: "data".
There would be 6 such pages right now.
- Adding links: we should be able to add
visualizations created by other people in the community, but without
forcing them to write code for Tor Metrics and without us committing
to maintain their code. We should be able to add links to these visualizations as
new pages, too.
This would be the fourth page type: "link".
- Adding one-off experiments and analyses: we sometimes run one-off
experiments or analyses, but don't intend to keep the data-processing
scripts running or make visualizations customizable. Still, these results
can be quite useful for others. We should be able to add new pages
for these experiments and analyses.
We could add new metrics page types "experiment" and "analysis" in addition to
"graph", "table", "data", and "link".
Tooltip texts for navigation entries:
How many clients connect to the network every day, where do they come
from, and what transports are they using?
How many relays contribute their resources to the network, and how many
of them permit exiting to the Internet?
How many bridges exist to help censored users to connect to the
- Pluggable Transports:
How many people use pluggable transports to overcome their
heavily censored Internet connection?
- Hidden Services:
How many relays participate in the distributed directory that hidden
services use to announce themselves?
How much bandwidth do relays advertise, and how much of that is
How long does it take to download a megabyte of data over Tor, and how
How diverse is the network in terms of countries or autonomous
How are all these facts obtained in an anonymity network without
hurting user privacy?