Tor  0.4.6.0-alpha-dev
connection_or.c
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1 /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
2  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
3  * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
4  * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
5 /* See LICENSE for licensing information */
6 
7 /**
8  * \file connection_or.c
9  * \brief Functions to handle OR connections, TLS handshaking, and
10  * cells on the network.
11  *
12  * An or_connection_t is a subtype of connection_t (as implemented in
13  * connection.c) that uses a TLS connection to send and receive cells on the
14  * Tor network. (By sending and receiving cells connection_or.c, it cooperates
15  * with channeltls.c to implement a the channel interface of channel.c.)
16  *
17  * Every OR connection has an underlying tortls_t object (as implemented in
18  * tortls.c) which it uses as its TLS stream. It is responsible for
19  * sending and receiving cells over that TLS.
20  *
21  * This module also implements the client side of the v3 (and greater) Tor
22  * link handshake.
23  **/
24 #include "core/or/or.h"
25 #include "feature/client/bridges.h"
26 #include "lib/buf/buffers.h"
27 /*
28  * Define this so we get channel internal functions, since we're implementing
29  * part of a subclass (channel_tls_t).
30  */
31 #define CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE
32 #define CONNECTION_OR_PRIVATE
33 #define ORCONN_EVENT_PRIVATE
34 #include "core/or/channel.h"
35 #include "core/or/channeltls.h"
36 #include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
37 #include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
38 #include "core/or/circuitstats.h"
39 #include "core/or/command.h"
40 #include "app/config/config.h"
42 #include "core/or/connection_or.h"
48 #include "lib/geoip/geoip.h"
49 #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
50 #include "trunnel/netinfo.h"
54 #include "core/proto/proto_cell.h"
55 #include "core/or/reasons.h"
56 #include "core/or/relay.h"
58 #include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
59 #include "feature/relay/router.h"
65 #include "core/or/scheduler.h"
67 #include "core/or/channelpadding.h"
69 
70 #include "core/or/cell_st.h"
71 #include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h"
75 #include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
77 #include "core/or/var_cell_st.h"
79 
80 #include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
81 
82 #include "core/or/orconn_event.h"
83 
88  int started_here,
89  char *digest_rcvd_out);
90 
91 static void connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn);
92 
93 static unsigned int
95 static void connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn);
96 
98  int started_here);
99 
100 /**************************************************************/
101 
102 /**
103  * Cast a `connection_t *` to an `or_connection_t *`.
104  *
105  * Exit with an assertion failure if the input is not an `or_connnection_t`.
106  **/
109 {
110  tor_assert(c->magic == OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
111  return DOWNCAST(or_connection_t, c);
112 }
113 
114 /**
115  * Cast a `const connection_t *` to a `const or_connection_t *`.
116  *
117  * Exit with an assertion failure if the input is not an `or_connnection_t`.
118  **/
119 const or_connection_t *
121 {
122  return TO_OR_CONN((connection_t *)c);
123 }
124 
125 /** Clear clear conn->identity_digest and update other data
126  * structures as appropriate.*/
127 void
129 {
130  tor_assert(conn);
131  memset(conn->identity_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
132 }
133 
134 /** Clear all identities in OR conns.*/
135 void
137 {
139  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn,
140  {
141  if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {
142  connection_or_clear_identity(TO_OR_CONN(conn));
143  }
144  });
145 }
146 
147 /** Change conn->identity_digest to digest, and add conn into
148  * the appropriate digest maps.
149  *
150  * NOTE that this function only allows two kinds of transitions: from
151  * unset identity to set identity, and from idempotent re-settings
152  * of the same identity. It's not allowed to clear an identity or to
153  * change an identity. Return 0 on success, and -1 if the transition
154  * is not allowed.
155  **/
156 static void
158  const char *rsa_digest,
159  const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
160 {
161  channel_t *chan = NULL;
162  tor_assert(conn);
163  tor_assert(rsa_digest);
164 
165  if (conn->chan)
166  chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
167 
168  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Set identity digest for %s at %p: %s %s.",
170  conn,
171  hex_str(rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
172  ed25519_fmt(ed_id));
173  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, " (Previously: %s %s)",
175  chan ? ed25519_fmt(&chan->ed25519_identity) : "<null>");
176 
177  const int rsa_id_was_set = ! tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest);
178  const int ed_id_was_set =
180  const int rsa_changed =
181  tor_memneq(conn->identity_digest, rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
182  const int ed_changed = ed_id_was_set &&
183  (!ed_id || !ed25519_pubkey_eq(ed_id, &chan->ed25519_identity));
184 
185  tor_assert(!rsa_changed || !rsa_id_was_set);
186  tor_assert(!ed_changed || !ed_id_was_set);
187 
188  if (!rsa_changed && !ed_changed)
189  return;
190 
191  /* If the identity was set previously, remove the old mapping. */
192  if (rsa_id_was_set) {
194  if (chan)
196  }
197 
198  memcpy(conn->identity_digest, rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
199 
200  /* If we're initializing the IDs to zero, don't add a mapping yet. */
201  if (tor_digest_is_zero(rsa_digest) &&
202  (!ed_id || ed25519_public_key_is_zero(ed_id)))
203  return;
204 
205  /* Deal with channels */
206  if (chan)
207  channel_set_identity_digest(chan, rsa_digest, ed_id);
208 }
209 
210 /**
211  * Return the Ed25519 identity of the peer for this connection (if any).
212  *
213  * Note that this ID may not be the _actual_ identity for the peer if
214  * authentication is not complete.
215  **/
216 const struct ed25519_public_key_t *
218 {
219  if (conn && conn->chan) {
220  const channel_t *chan = NULL;
221  chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
223  return &chan->ed25519_identity;
224  }
225  }
226 
227  return NULL;
228 }
229 
230 /**************************************************************/
231 
232 /** Map from a string describing what a non-open OR connection was doing when
233  * failed, to an intptr_t describing the count of connections that failed that
234  * way. Note that the count is stored _as_ the pointer.
235  */
236 static strmap_t *broken_connection_counts;
237 
238 /** If true, do not record information in <b>broken_connection_counts</b>. */
240 
241 /** Record that an OR connection failed in <b>state</b>. */
242 static void
243 note_broken_connection(const char *state)
244 {
245  void *ptr;
246  intptr_t val;
248  return;
249 
251  broken_connection_counts = strmap_new();
252 
253  ptr = strmap_get(broken_connection_counts, state);
254  val = (intptr_t)ptr;
255  val++;
256  ptr = (void*)val;
257  strmap_set(broken_connection_counts, state, ptr);
258 }
259 
260 /** Forget all recorded states for failed connections. If
261  * <b>stop_recording</b> is true, don't record any more. */
262 void
263 clear_broken_connection_map(int stop_recording)
264 {
266  strmap_free(broken_connection_counts, NULL);
268  if (stop_recording)
270 }
271 
272 /** Write a detailed description the state of <b>orconn</b> into the
273  * <b>buflen</b>-byte buffer at <b>buf</b>. This description includes not
274  * only the OR-conn level state but also the TLS state. It's useful for
275  * diagnosing broken handshakes. */
276 static void
278  char *buf, size_t buflen)
279 {
280  connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(orconn);
281  const char *conn_state;
282  char tls_state[256];
283 
284  tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR || conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR);
285 
286  conn_state = conn_state_to_string(conn->type, conn->state);
287  tor_tls_get_state_description(orconn->tls, tls_state, sizeof(tls_state));
288 
289  tor_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s with SSL state %s", conn_state, tls_state);
290 }
291 
292 /** Record the current state of <b>orconn</b> as the state of a broken
293  * connection. */
294 static void
296 {
297  char buf[256];
299  return;
300  connection_or_get_state_description(orconn, buf, sizeof(buf));
301  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Connection died in state '%s'", buf);
303 }
304 
305 /** Helper type used to sort connection states and find the most frequent. */
306 typedef struct broken_state_count_t {
307  intptr_t count;
308  const char *state;
310 
311 /** Helper function used to sort broken_state_count_t by frequency. */
312 static int
313 broken_state_count_compare(const void **a_ptr, const void **b_ptr)
314 {
315  const broken_state_count_t *a = *a_ptr, *b = *b_ptr;
316  if (b->count < a->count)
317  return -1;
318  else if (b->count == a->count)
319  return 0;
320  else
321  return 1;
322 }
323 
324 /** Upper limit on the number of different states to report for connection
325  * failure. */
326 #define MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT 10
327 
328 /** Report a list of the top states for failed OR connections at log level
329  * <b>severity</b>, in log domain <b>domain</b>. */
330 void
331 connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain)
332 {
333  int total = 0;
334  smartlist_t *items;
335 
337  return;
338 
339  items = smartlist_new();
340  STRMAP_FOREACH(broken_connection_counts, state, void *, countptr) {
341  broken_state_count_t *c = tor_malloc(sizeof(broken_state_count_t));
342  c->count = (intptr_t)countptr;
343  total += (int)c->count;
344  c->state = state;
345  smartlist_add(items, c);
346  } STRMAP_FOREACH_END;
347 
349 
350  tor_log(severity, domain, "%d connections have failed%s", total,
351  smartlist_len(items) > MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT ? ". Top reasons:" : ":");
352 
353  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(items, const broken_state_count_t *, c) {
354  if (c_sl_idx > MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT)
355  break;
356  tor_log(severity, domain,
357  " %d connections died in state %s", (int)c->count, c->state);
358  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(c);
359 
361  smartlist_free(items);
362 }
363 
364 /**
365  * Helper function to publish an OR connection status event
366  *
367  * Publishes a messages to subscribers of ORCONN messages, and sends
368  * the control event.
369  **/
370 void
372  int reason)
373 {
374  orconn_status_msg_t *msg = tor_malloc(sizeof(*msg));
375 
376  msg->gid = conn->base_.global_identifier;
377  msg->status = tp;
378  msg->reason = reason;
379  orconn_status_publish(msg);
380  control_event_or_conn_status(conn, tp, reason);
381 }
382 
383 /**
384  * Helper function to publish a state change message
385  *
386  * connection_or_change_state() calls this to notify subscribers about
387  * a change of an OR connection state.
388  **/
389 static void
390 connection_or_state_publish(const or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)
391 {
392  orconn_state_msg_t *msg = tor_malloc(sizeof(*msg));
393 
394  msg->gid = conn->base_.global_identifier;
395  if (conn->is_pt) {
396  /* Do extra decoding because conn->proxy_type indicates the proxy
397  * protocol that tor uses to talk with the transport plugin,
398  * instead of PROXY_PLUGGABLE. */
399  tor_assert_nonfatal(conn->proxy_type != PROXY_NONE);
400  msg->proxy_type = PROXY_PLUGGABLE;
401  } else {
402  msg->proxy_type = conn->proxy_type;
403  }
404  msg->state = state;
405  if (conn->chan) {
406  msg->chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->global_identifier;
407  } else {
408  msg->chan = 0;
409  }
410  orconn_state_publish(msg);
411 }
412 
413 /** Call this to change or_connection_t states, so the owning channel_tls_t can
414  * be notified.
415  */
416 
417 MOCK_IMPL(void,
419 {
420  tor_assert(conn);
421 
422  conn->base_.state = state;
423 
424  connection_or_state_publish(conn, state);
425  if (conn->chan)
427 }
428 
429 /** Return the number of circuits using an or_connection_t; this used to
430  * be an or_connection_t field, but it got moved to channel_t and we
431  * shouldn't maintain two copies. */
432 
433 MOCK_IMPL(int,
435 {
436  tor_assert(conn);
437 
438  if (conn->chan) {
439  return channel_num_circuits(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
440  } else return 0;
441 }
442 
443 /**************************************************************/
444 
445 /** Pack the cell_t host-order structure <b>src</b> into network-order
446  * in the buffer <b>dest</b>. See tor-spec.txt for details about the
447  * wire format.
448  *
449  * Note that this function doesn't touch <b>dst</b>->next: the caller
450  * should set it or clear it as appropriate.
451  */
452 void
453 cell_pack(packed_cell_t *dst, const cell_t *src, int wide_circ_ids)
454 {
455  char *dest = dst->body;
456  if (wide_circ_ids) {
457  set_uint32(dest, htonl(src->circ_id));
458  dest += 4;
459  } else {
460  /* Clear the last two bytes of dest, in case we can accidentally
461  * send them to the network somehow. */
462  memset(dest+CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE-2, 0, 2);
463  set_uint16(dest, htons(src->circ_id));
464  dest += 2;
465  }
466  set_uint8(dest, src->command);
467  memcpy(dest+1, src->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
468 }
469 
470 /** Unpack the network-order buffer <b>src</b> into a host-order
471  * cell_t structure <b>dest</b>.
472  */
473 static void
474 cell_unpack(cell_t *dest, const char *src, int wide_circ_ids)
475 {
476  if (wide_circ_ids) {
477  dest->circ_id = ntohl(get_uint32(src));
478  src += 4;
479  } else {
480  dest->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(src));
481  src += 2;
482  }
483  dest->command = get_uint8(src);
484  memcpy(dest->payload, src+1, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
485 }
486 
487 /** Write the header of <b>cell</b> into the first VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE
488  * bytes of <b>hdr_out</b>. Returns number of bytes used. */
489 int
490 var_cell_pack_header(const var_cell_t *cell, char *hdr_out, int wide_circ_ids)
491 {
492  int r;
493  if (wide_circ_ids) {
494  set_uint32(hdr_out, htonl(cell->circ_id));
495  hdr_out += 4;
497  } else {
498  set_uint16(hdr_out, htons(cell->circ_id));
499  hdr_out += 2;
500  r = VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE - 2;
501  }
502  set_uint8(hdr_out, cell->command);
503  set_uint16(hdr_out+1, htons(cell->payload_len));
504  return r;
505 }
506 
507 /** Allocate and return a new var_cell_t with <b>payload_len</b> bytes of
508  * payload space. */
509 var_cell_t *
510 var_cell_new(uint16_t payload_len)
511 {
512  size_t size = offsetof(var_cell_t, payload) + payload_len;
513  var_cell_t *cell = tor_malloc_zero(size);
514  cell->payload_len = payload_len;
515  cell->command = 0;
516  cell->circ_id = 0;
517  return cell;
518 }
519 
520 /**
521  * Copy a var_cell_t
522  */
523 
524 var_cell_t *
526 {
527  var_cell_t *copy = NULL;
528  size_t size = 0;
529 
530  if (src != NULL) {
531  size = offsetof(var_cell_t, payload) + src->payload_len;
532  copy = tor_malloc_zero(size);
533  copy->payload_len = src->payload_len;
534  copy->command = src->command;
535  copy->circ_id = src->circ_id;
536  memcpy(copy->payload, src->payload, copy->payload_len);
537  }
538 
539  return copy;
540 }
541 
542 /** Release all space held by <b>cell</b>. */
543 void
545 {
546  tor_free(cell);
547 }
548 
549 /** We've received an EOF from <b>conn</b>. Mark it for close and return. */
550 int
552 {
553  tor_assert(conn);
554 
555  log_info(LD_OR,"OR connection reached EOF. Closing.");
557 
558  return 0;
559 }
560 
561 /** Handle any new bytes that have come in on connection <b>conn</b>.
562  * If conn is in 'open' state, hand it to
563  * connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf()
564  * (else do nothing).
565  */
566 int
568 {
569  int ret = 0;
570  tor_assert(conn);
571 
572  switch (conn->base_.state) {
575 
576  /* start TLS after handshake completion, or deal with error */
577  if (ret == 1) {
578  tor_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->proxy_state == PROXY_CONNECTED);
579  if (buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf) != 0) {
580  log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Found leftover (%d bytes) "
581  "when transitioning from PROXY_HANDSHAKING state on %s: "
582  "closing.",
583  (int)buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf),
586  return -1;
587  }
588  if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0)
589  ret = -1;
590  /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
591  if (conn->chan)
592  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
593  }
594  if (ret < 0) {
596  }
597 
598  return ret;
600  case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
604  default:
605  break; /* don't do anything */
606  }
607 
608  /* This check makes sure that we don't have any data on the inbuf if we're
609  * doing our TLS handshake: if we did, they were probably put there by a
610  * SOCKS proxy trying to trick us into accepting unauthenticated data.
611  */
612  if (buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf) != 0) {
613  log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Accumulated data (%d bytes) "
614  "on non-open %s; closing.",
615  (int)buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf),
618  ret = -1;
619  }
620 
621  return ret;
622 }
623 
624 /** Called whenever we have flushed some data on an or_conn: add more data
625  * from active circuits. */
626 int
628 {
629  size_t datalen;
630 
631  /* Update the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
632  if (conn->chan)
633  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
634 
635  /* If we're under the low water mark, add cells until we're just over the
636  * high water mark. */
637  datalen = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
638  if (datalen < OR_CONN_LOWWATER) {
639  /* Let the scheduler know */
640  scheduler_channel_wants_writes(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
641  }
642 
643  return 0;
644 }
645 
646 /** This is for channeltls.c to ask how many cells we could accept if
647  * they were available. */
648 ssize_t
650 {
651  size_t datalen, cell_network_size;
652  ssize_t n = 0;
653 
654  tor_assert(conn);
655 
656  /*
657  * If we're under the high water mark, we're potentially
658  * writeable; note this is different from the calculation above
659  * used to trigger when to start writing after we've stopped.
660  */
661  datalen = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
662  if (datalen < OR_CONN_HIGHWATER) {
663  cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
664  n = CEIL_DIV(OR_CONN_HIGHWATER - datalen, cell_network_size);
665  }
666 
667  return n;
668 }
669 
670 /** Connection <b>conn</b> has finished writing and has no bytes left on
671  * its outbuf.
672  *
673  * Otherwise it's in state "open": stop writing and return.
674  *
675  * If <b>conn</b> is broken, mark it for close and return -1, else
676  * return 0.
677  */
678 int
680 {
681  tor_assert(conn);
682  assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn),0);
683 
684  switch (conn->base_.state) {
686  /* PROXY_HAPROXY gets connected by receiving an ack. */
687  if (conn->proxy_type == PROXY_HAPROXY) {
688  tor_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->proxy_state == PROXY_HAPROXY_WAIT_FOR_FLUSH);
689  IF_BUG_ONCE(buf_datalen(TO_CONN(conn)->inbuf) != 0) {
690  /* This should be impossible; we're not even reading. */
692  return -1;
693  }
694  TO_CONN(conn)->proxy_state = PROXY_CONNECTED;
695 
696  if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0) {
697  /* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
699  return -1;
700  }
701  break;
702  }
703  break;
704  case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
707  break;
708  default:
709  log_err(LD_BUG,"Called in unexpected state %d.", conn->base_.state);
711  return -1;
712  }
713 
714  /* Update the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
715  if (conn->chan)
716  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
717 
718  return 0;
719 }
720 
721 /** Connected handler for OR connections: begin the TLS handshake.
722  */
723 int
725 {
726  const int proxy_type = or_conn->proxy_type;
727  connection_t *conn;
728 
729  tor_assert(or_conn);
730  conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
732 
733  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"connect finished for %s",
734  connection_describe(conn));
735 
736  if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) {
737  /* start proxy handshake */
738  if (connection_proxy_connect(conn, proxy_type) < 0) {
739  connection_or_close_for_error(or_conn, 0);
740  return -1;
741  }
742 
745 
746  return 0;
747  }
748 
749  if (connection_tls_start_handshake(or_conn, 0) < 0) {
750  /* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
751  connection_or_close_for_error(or_conn, 0);
752  return -1;
753  }
754  return 0;
755 }
756 
757 /** Called when we're about to finally unlink and free an OR connection:
758  * perform necessary accounting and cleanup */
759 void
761 {
762  connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
763 
764  /* Tell the controlling channel we're closed */
765  if (or_conn->chan) {
766  channel_closed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
767  /*
768  * NULL this out because the channel might hang around a little
769  * longer before channel_run_cleanup() gets it.
770  */
771  or_conn->chan->conn = NULL;
772  or_conn->chan = NULL;
773  }
774 
775  /* Remember why we're closing this connection. */
776  if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
777  /* now mark things down as needed */
779  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
781  /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */
782  entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
783  if (conn->state >= OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) {
784  int reason = tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error);
785  connection_or_event_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
786  reason);
787  if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) {
788  const char *warning = NULL;
789  if (reason == END_OR_CONN_REASON_TLS_ERROR && or_conn->tls) {
790  warning = tor_tls_get_last_error_msg(or_conn->tls);
791  }
792  if (warning == NULL) {
793  warning = orconn_end_reason_to_control_string(reason);
794  }
795  control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(warning, reason, or_conn);
796  }
797  }
798  }
799  } else if (conn->hold_open_until_flushed) {
800  /* We only set hold_open_until_flushed when we're intentionally
801  * closing a connection. */
802  connection_or_event_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED,
804  } else if (!tor_digest_is_zero(or_conn->identity_digest)) {
805  connection_or_event_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED,
807  }
808 }
809 
810 /** Return 1 if identity digest <b>id_digest</b> is known to be a
811  * currently or recently running relay. Otherwise return 0. */
812 int
814 {
815  if (router_get_consensus_status_by_id(id_digest))
816  return 1; /* It's in the consensus: "yes" */
817  if (router_get_by_id_digest(id_digest))
818  return 1; /* Not in the consensus, but we have a descriptor for
819  * it. Probably it was in a recent consensus. "Yes". */
820  return 0;
821 }
822 
823 /** Set the per-conn read and write limits for <b>conn</b>. If it's a known
824  * relay, we will rely on the global read and write buckets, so give it
825  * per-conn limits that are big enough they'll never matter. But if it's
826  * not a known relay, first check if we set PerConnBwRate/Burst, then
827  * check if the consensus sets them, else default to 'big enough'.
828  *
829  * If <b>reset</b> is true, set the bucket to be full. Otherwise, just
830  * clip the bucket if it happens to be <em>too</em> full.
831  */
832 static void
834  const or_options_t *options)
835 {
836  int rate, burst; /* per-connection rate limiting params */
838  /* It's in the consensus, or we have a descriptor for it meaning it
839  * was probably in a recent consensus. It's a recognized relay:
840  * give it full bandwidth. */
841  rate = (int)options->BandwidthRate;
842  burst = (int)options->BandwidthBurst;
843  } else {
844  /* Not a recognized relay. Squeeze it down based on the suggested
845  * bandwidth parameters in the consensus, but allow local config
846  * options to override. */
847  rate = options->PerConnBWRate ? (int)options->PerConnBWRate :
848  networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "perconnbwrate",
849  (int)options->BandwidthRate, 1, INT32_MAX);
850  burst = options->PerConnBWBurst ? (int)options->PerConnBWBurst :
851  networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "perconnbwburst",
852  (int)options->BandwidthBurst, 1, INT32_MAX);
853  }
854 
855  token_bucket_rw_adjust(&conn->bucket, rate, burst);
856  if (reset) {
858  }
859 }
860 
861 /** Either our set of relays or our per-conn rate limits have changed.
862  * Go through all the OR connections and update their token buckets to make
863  * sure they don't exceed their maximum values. */
864 void
866  const or_options_t *options)
867 {
868  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn,
869  {
870  if (connection_speaks_cells(conn))
872  });
873 }
874 
875 /* Mark <b>or_conn</b> as canonical if <b>is_canonical</b> is set, and
876  * non-canonical otherwise. Adjust idle_timeout accordingly.
877  */
878 void
879 connection_or_set_canonical(or_connection_t *or_conn,
880  int is_canonical)
881 {
882  if (bool_eq(is_canonical, or_conn->is_canonical) &&
883  or_conn->idle_timeout != 0) {
884  /* Don't recalculate an existing idle_timeout unless the canonical
885  * status changed. */
886  return;
887  }
888 
889  or_conn->is_canonical = !! is_canonical; /* force to a 1-bit boolean */
891  TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan), is_canonical);
892 
893  log_info(LD_CIRC,
894  "Channel %"PRIu64 " chose an idle timeout of %d.",
895  or_conn->chan ?
896  (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan)->global_identifier):0,
897  or_conn->idle_timeout);
898 }
899 
900 /** If we don't necessarily know the router we're connecting to, but we
901  * have an addr/port/id_digest, then fill in as much as we can. Start
902  * by checking to see if this describes a router we know.
903  * <b>started_here</b> is 1 if we are the initiator of <b>conn</b> and
904  * 0 if it's an incoming connection. */
905 void
907  const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
908  const char *id_digest,
909  const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id,
910  int started_here)
911 {
912  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "init conn from address %s: %s, %s (%d)",
913  fmt_addr(addr),
914  hex_str((const char*)id_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
915  ed25519_fmt(ed_id),
916  started_here);
917 
918  connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn, id_digest, ed_id);
920 
921  conn->base_.port = port;
922  tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, addr);
923  if (! conn->base_.address) {
924  conn->base_.address = tor_strdup(fmt_addr(addr));
925  }
926 
927  connection_or_check_canonicity(conn, started_here);
928 }
929 
930 /** Check whether the identity of <b>conn</b> matches a known node. If it
931  * does, check whether the address of conn matches the expected address, and
932  * update the connection's is_canonical flag, nickname, and address fields as
933  * appropriate. */
934 static void
936 {
937  (void) started_here;
938 
939  const char *id_digest = conn->identity_digest;
940  const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id = NULL;
941  if (conn->chan)
942  ed_id = & TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->ed25519_identity;
943 
944  const node_t *r = node_get_by_id(id_digest);
945  if (r &&
947  ! node_ed25519_id_matches(r, ed_id)) {
948  /* If this node is capable of proving an ed25519 ID,
949  * we can't call this a canonical connection unless both IDs match. */
950  r = NULL;
951  }
952 
953  if (r) {
954  tor_addr_port_t node_ipv4_ap;
955  tor_addr_port_t node_ipv6_ap;
956  node_get_prim_orport(r, &node_ipv4_ap);
957  node_get_pref_ipv6_orport(r, &node_ipv6_ap);
958  if (tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ipv4_ap.addr) ||
959  tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ipv6_ap.addr)) {
960  connection_or_set_canonical(conn, 1);
961  }
962  /* Choose the correct canonical address and port. */
963  tor_addr_port_t *node_ap;
964  if (tor_addr_family(&conn->base_.addr) == AF_INET) {
965  node_ap = &node_ipv4_ap;
966  } else {
967  node_ap = &node_ipv6_ap;
968  }
969  /* Remember the canonical addr/port so our log messages will make
970  sense. */
971  tor_addr_port_copy(&conn->canonical_orport, node_ap);
972  tor_free(conn->nickname);
973  conn->nickname = tor_strdup(node_get_nickname(r));
974  } else {
975  tor_free(conn->nickname);
976  conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
977  conn->nickname[0] = '$';
979  conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
980  }
981 
982  /*
983  * We have to tell channeltls.c to update the channel marks (local, in
984  * particular), since we may have changed the address.
985  */
986 
987  if (conn->chan) {
989  }
990 }
991 
992 /** These just pass all the is_bad_for_new_circs manipulation on to
993  * channel_t */
994 
995 static unsigned int
997 {
998  tor_assert(or_conn);
999 
1000  if (or_conn->chan)
1001  return channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
1002  else return 0;
1003 }
1004 
1005 static void
1006 connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn)
1007 {
1008  tor_assert(or_conn);
1009 
1010  if (or_conn->chan)
1011  channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
1012 }
1013 
1014 /** How old do we let a connection to an OR get before deciding it's
1015  * too old for new circuits? */
1016 #define TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD (60*60*24*7)
1017 
1018 /** Expire an or_connection if it is too old. Helper for
1019  * connection_or_group_set_badness_ and fast path for
1020  * channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness.
1021  *
1022  * Returns 1 if the connection was already expired, else 0.
1023  */
1024 int
1026  or_connection_t *or_conn,
1027  int force)
1028 {
1029  /* XXXX this function should also be about channels? */
1030  if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
1032  return 1;
1033 
1034  if (force ||
1036  < now) {
1037  log_info(LD_OR,
1038  "Marking %s as too old for new circuits "
1039  "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old).",
1040  connection_describe(TO_CONN(or_conn)),
1041  or_conn->base_.s,
1042  (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created));
1043  connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
1044  }
1045 
1046  return 0;
1047 }
1048 
1049 /** Given a list of all the or_connections with a given
1050  * identity, set elements of that list as is_bad_for_new_circs as
1051  * appropriate. Helper for connection_or_set_bad_connections().
1052  *
1053  * Specifically, we set the is_bad_for_new_circs flag on:
1054  * - all connections if <b>force</b> is true.
1055  * - all connections that are too old.
1056  * - all open non-canonical connections for which a canonical connection
1057  * exists to the same router.
1058  * - all open canonical connections for which a 'better' canonical
1059  * connection exists to the same router.
1060  * - all open non-canonical connections for which a 'better' non-canonical
1061  * connection exists to the same router at the same address.
1062  *
1063  * See channel_is_better() in channel.c for our idea of what makes one OR
1064  * connection better than another.
1065  */
1066 void
1068 {
1069  /* XXXX this function should be entirely about channels, not OR
1070  * XXXX connections. */
1071 
1072  or_connection_t *best = NULL;
1073  int n_old = 0, n_inprogress = 0, n_canonical = 0, n_other = 0;
1074  time_t now = time(NULL);
1075 
1076  /* Pass 1: expire everything that's old, and see what the status of
1077  * everything else is. */
1078  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
1079  if (connection_or_single_set_badness_(now, or_conn, force))
1080  continue;
1081 
1082  if (connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn)) {
1083  ++n_old;
1084  } else if (or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
1085  ++n_inprogress;
1086  } else if (or_conn->is_canonical) {
1087  ++n_canonical;
1088  } else {
1089  ++n_other;
1090  }
1091  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
1092 
1093  /* Pass 2: We know how about how good the best connection is.
1094  * expire everything that's worse, and find the very best if we can. */
1095  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
1096  if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
1098  continue; /* This one doesn't need to be marked bad. */
1099  if (or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
1100  continue; /* Don't mark anything bad until we have seen what happens
1101  * when the connection finishes. */
1102  if (n_canonical && !or_conn->is_canonical) {
1103  /* We have at least one open canonical connection to this router,
1104  * and this one is open but not canonical. Mark it bad. */
1105  log_info(LD_OR,
1106  "Marking %s unsuitable for new circuits: "
1107  "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). It is not "
1108  "canonical, and we have another connection to that OR that is.",
1109  connection_describe(TO_CONN(or_conn)),
1110  or_conn->base_.s,
1111  (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created));
1112  connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
1113  continue;
1114  }
1115 
1116  if (!best ||
1117  channel_is_better(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan),
1118  TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(best->chan))) {
1119  best = or_conn;
1120  }
1121  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
1122 
1123  if (!best)
1124  return;
1125 
1126  /* Pass 3: One connection to OR is best. If it's canonical, mark as bad
1127  * every other open connection. If it's non-canonical, mark as bad
1128  * every other open connection to the same address.
1129  *
1130  * XXXX This isn't optimal; if we have connections to an OR at multiple
1131  * addresses, we'd like to pick the best _for each address_, and mark as
1132  * bad every open connection that isn't best for its address. But this
1133  * can only occur in cases where the other OR is old (so we have no
1134  * canonical connection to it), or where all the connections to the OR are
1135  * at noncanonical addresses and we have no good direct connection (which
1136  * means we aren't at risk of attaching circuits to it anyway). As
1137  * 0.1.2.x dies out, the first case will go away, and the second one is
1138  * "mostly harmless", so a fix can wait until somebody is bored.
1139  */
1140  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
1141  if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
1143  or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
1144  continue;
1145  if (or_conn != best &&
1146  channel_is_better(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(best->chan),
1147  TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan))) {
1148  /* This isn't the best conn, _and_ the best conn is better than it */
1149  if (best->is_canonical) {
1150  log_info(LD_OR,
1151  "Marking %s as unsuitable for new circuits: "
1152  "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). "
1153  "We have a better canonical one "
1154  "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT"; %d secs old).",
1155  connection_describe(TO_CONN(or_conn)),
1156  or_conn->base_.s,
1157  (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
1158  best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
1159  connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
1160  } else if (tor_addr_eq(&TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr,
1161  &TO_CONN(best)->addr)) {
1162  log_info(LD_OR,
1163  "Marking %s unsuitable for new circuits: "
1164  "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). We have a better "
1165  "one with the "
1166  "same address (fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT"; %d secs old).",
1167  connection_describe(TO_CONN(or_conn)),
1168  or_conn->base_.s,
1169  (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
1170  best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
1171  connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
1172  }
1173  }
1174  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
1175 }
1176 
1177 /* Lifetime of a connection failure. After that, we'll retry. This is in
1178  * seconds. */
1179 #define OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_LIFETIME 60
1180 /* The interval to use with when to clean up the failure cache. */
1181 #define OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL 60
1182 
1183 /* When is the next time we have to cleanup the failure map. We keep this
1184  * because we clean it opportunistically. */
1185 static time_t or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts = 0;
1186 
1187 /* OR connection failure entry data structure. It is kept in the connection
1188  * failure map defined below and indexed by OR identity digest, address and
1189  * port.
1190  *
1191  * We need to identify a connection failure with these three values because we
1192  * want to avoid to wrongfully block a relay if someone is trying to
1193  * extend to a known identity digest but with the wrong IP/port. For instance,
1194  * it can happen if a relay changed its port but the client still has an old
1195  * descriptor with the old port. We want to stop connecting to that
1196  * IP/port/identity all together, not only the relay identity. */
1198  HT_ENTRY(or_connect_failure_entry_t) node;
1199  /* Identity digest of the connection where it is connecting to. */
1200  uint8_t identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
1201  /* This is the connection address from the base connection_t. After the
1202  * connection is checked for canonicity, the base address should represent
1203  * what we know instead of where we are connecting to. This is what we need
1204  * so we can correlate known relays within the consensus. */
1205  tor_addr_t addr;
1206  uint16_t port;
1207  /* Last time we were unable to connect. */
1208  time_t last_failed_connect_ts;
1210 
1211 /* Map where we keep connection failure entries. They are indexed by addr,
1212  * port and identity digest. */
1213 static HT_HEAD(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t)
1214  or_connect_failures_map = HT_INITIALIZER();
1215 
1216 /* Helper: Hashtable equal function. Return 1 if equal else 0. */
1217 static int
1218 or_connect_failure_ht_eq(const or_connect_failure_entry_t *a,
1219  const or_connect_failure_entry_t *b)
1220 {
1221  return fast_memeq(a->identity_digest, b->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) &&
1222  tor_addr_eq(&a->addr, &b->addr) &&
1223  a->port == b->port;
1224 }
1225 
1226 /* Helper: Return the hash for the hashtable of the given entry. For this
1227  * table, it is a combination of address, port and identity digest. */
1228 static unsigned int
1229 or_connect_failure_ht_hash(const or_connect_failure_entry_t *entry)
1230 {
1231  size_t offset = 0, addr_size;
1232  const void *addr_ptr;
1233  /* Largest size is IPv6 and IPv4 is smaller so it is fine. */
1234  uint8_t data[16 + sizeof(uint16_t) + DIGEST_LEN];
1235 
1236  /* Get the right address bytes depending on the family. */
1237  switch (tor_addr_family(&entry->addr)) {
1238  case AF_INET:
1239  addr_size = 4;
1240  addr_ptr = &entry->addr.addr.in_addr.s_addr;
1241  break;
1242  case AF_INET6:
1243  addr_size = 16;
1244  addr_ptr = &entry->addr.addr.in6_addr.s6_addr;
1245  break;
1246  default:
1248  return 0;
1249  }
1250 
1251  memcpy(data, addr_ptr, addr_size);
1252  offset += addr_size;
1253  memcpy(data + offset, entry->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
1254  offset += DIGEST_LEN;
1255  set_uint16(data + offset, entry->port);
1256  offset += sizeof(uint16_t);
1257 
1258  return (unsigned int) siphash24g(data, offset);
1259 }
1260 
1261 HT_PROTOTYPE(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t, node,
1262  or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq);
1263 
1264 HT_GENERATE2(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t, node,
1265  or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq,
1267 
1268 /* Initialize a given connect failure entry with the given identity_digest,
1269  * addr and port. All field are optional except ocf. */
1270 static void
1271 or_connect_failure_init(const char *identity_digest, const tor_addr_t *addr,
1272  uint16_t port, or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf)
1273 {
1274  tor_assert(ocf);
1275  if (identity_digest) {
1276  memcpy(ocf->identity_digest, identity_digest,
1277  sizeof(ocf->identity_digest));
1278  }
1279  if (addr) {
1280  tor_addr_copy(&ocf->addr, addr);
1281  }
1282  ocf->port = port;
1283 }
1284 
1285 /* Return a newly allocated connection failure entry. It is initialized with
1286  * the given or_conn data. This can't fail. */
1288 or_connect_failure_new(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
1289 {
1290  or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ocf));
1291  or_connect_failure_init(or_conn->identity_digest, &TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr,
1292  TO_CONN(or_conn)->port, ocf);
1293  return ocf;
1294 }
1295 
1296 /* Return a connection failure entry matching the given or_conn. NULL is
1297  * returned if not found. */
1299 or_connect_failure_find(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
1300 {
1302  tor_assert(or_conn);
1303  or_connect_failure_init(or_conn->identity_digest, &TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr,
1304  TO_CONN(or_conn)->port, &lookup);
1305  return HT_FIND(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, &lookup);
1306 }
1307 
1308 /* Note down in the connection failure cache that a failure occurred on the
1309  * given or_conn. */
1310 STATIC void
1311 note_or_connect_failed(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
1312 {
1313  or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf = NULL;
1314 
1315  tor_assert(or_conn);
1316 
1317  ocf = or_connect_failure_find(or_conn);
1318  if (ocf == NULL) {
1319  ocf = or_connect_failure_new(or_conn);
1320  HT_INSERT(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ocf);
1321  }
1322  ocf->last_failed_connect_ts = approx_time();
1323 }
1324 
1325 /* Cleanup the connection failure cache and remove all entries below the
1326  * given cutoff. */
1327 static void
1328 or_connect_failure_map_cleanup(time_t cutoff)
1329 {
1330  or_connect_failure_entry_t **ptr, **next, *entry;
1331 
1332  for (ptr = HT_START(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map);
1333  ptr != NULL; ptr = next) {
1334  entry = *ptr;
1335  if (entry->last_failed_connect_ts <= cutoff) {
1336  next = HT_NEXT_RMV(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ptr);
1337  tor_free(entry);
1338  } else {
1339  next = HT_NEXT(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ptr);
1340  }
1341  }
1342 }
1343 
1344 /* Return true iff the given OR connection can connect to its destination that
1345  * is the triplet identity_digest, address and port.
1346  *
1347  * The or_conn MUST have gone through connection_or_check_canonicity() so the
1348  * base address is properly set to what we know or doesn't know. */
1349 STATIC int
1350 should_connect_to_relay(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
1351 {
1352  time_t now, cutoff;
1353  time_t connect_failed_since_ts = 0;
1355 
1356  tor_assert(or_conn);
1357 
1358  now = approx_time();
1359  cutoff = now - OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_LIFETIME;
1360 
1361  /* Opportunistically try to cleanup the failure cache. We do that at regular
1362  * interval so it doesn't grow too big. */
1363  if (or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts <= now) {
1364  or_connect_failure_map_cleanup(cutoff);
1365  or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts =
1366  now + OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL;
1367  }
1368 
1369  /* Look if we have failed previously to the same destination as this
1370  * OR connection. */
1371  ocf = or_connect_failure_find(or_conn);
1372  if (ocf) {
1373  connect_failed_since_ts = ocf->last_failed_connect_ts;
1374  }
1375  /* If we do have an unable to connect timestamp and it is below cutoff, we
1376  * can connect. Or we have never failed before so let it connect. */
1377  if (connect_failed_since_ts > cutoff) {
1378  goto no_connect;
1379  }
1380 
1381  /* Ok we can connect! */
1382  return 1;
1383  no_connect:
1384  return 0;
1385 }
1386 
1387 /** <b>conn</b> is in the 'connecting' state, and it failed to complete
1388  * a TCP connection. Send notifications appropriately.
1389  *
1390  * <b>reason</b> specifies the or_conn_end_reason for the failure;
1391  * <b>msg</b> specifies the strerror-style error message.
1392  */
1393 void
1395  int reason, const char *msg)
1396 {
1397  connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, reason);
1399  control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(msg, reason, conn);
1400  note_or_connect_failed(conn);
1401 }
1402 
1403 /** <b>conn</b> got an error in connection_handle_read_impl() or
1404  * connection_handle_write_impl() and is going to die soon.
1405  *
1406  * <b>reason</b> specifies the or_conn_end_reason for the failure;
1407  * <b>msg</b> specifies the strerror-style error message.
1408  */
1409 void
1411  int reason, const char *msg)
1412 {
1413  channel_t *chan;
1414 
1415  tor_assert(conn);
1416 
1417  /* If we're connecting, call connect_failed() too */
1418  if (TO_CONN(conn)->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING)
1419  connection_or_connect_failed(conn, reason, msg);
1420 
1421  /* Tell the controlling channel if we have one */
1422  if (conn->chan) {
1423  chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
1424  /* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
1425  if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
1427  }
1428  }
1429 
1430  /* No need to mark for error because connection.c is about to do that */
1431 }
1432 
1433 /** Launch a new OR connection to <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> and expect to
1434  * handshake with an OR with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>. Optionally,
1435  * pass in a pointer to a channel using this connection.
1436  *
1437  * If <b>id_digest</b> is me, do nothing. If we're already connected to it,
1438  * return that connection. If the connect() is in progress, set the
1439  * new conn's state to 'connecting' and return it. If connect() succeeds,
1440  * call connection_tls_start_handshake() on it.
1441  *
1442  * This function is called from router_retry_connections(), for
1443  * ORs connecting to ORs, and circuit_establish_circuit(), for
1444  * OPs connecting to ORs.
1445  *
1446  * Return the launched conn, or NULL if it failed.
1447  */
1448 
1450 connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port,
1451  const char *id_digest,
1452  const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id,
1453  channel_tls_t *chan))
1454 {
1455  or_connection_t *conn;
1456  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
1457  int socket_error = 0;
1458  tor_addr_t addr;
1459 
1460  int r;
1461  tor_addr_t proxy_addr;
1462  uint16_t proxy_port;
1463  int proxy_type, is_pt = 0;
1464 
1465  tor_assert(_addr);
1466  tor_assert(id_digest);
1467  tor_addr_copy(&addr, _addr);
1468 
1469  if (server_mode(options) && router_digest_is_me(id_digest)) {
1470  log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself. Refusing.");
1471  return NULL;
1472  }
1473  if (server_mode(options) && router_ed25519_id_is_me(ed_id)) {
1474  log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself by Ed25519 "
1475  "identity. Refusing.");
1476  return NULL;
1477  }
1478 
1480 
1481  /*
1482  * Set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember for channels
1483  *
1484  * This stuff needs to happen before connection_or_init_conn_from_address()
1485  * so connection_or_set_identity_digest() and such know where to look to
1486  * keep the channel up to date.
1487  */
1488  conn->chan = chan;
1489  chan->conn = conn;
1490  connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &addr, port, id_digest, ed_id, 1);
1491 
1492  /* We have a proper OR connection setup, now check if we can connect to it
1493  * that is we haven't had a failure earlier. This is to avoid to try to
1494  * constantly connect to relays that we think are not reachable. */
1495  if (!should_connect_to_relay(conn)) {
1496  log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Can't connect to %s because we "
1497  "failed earlier. Refusing.",
1499  connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
1500  return NULL;
1501  }
1502 
1503  conn->is_outgoing = 1;
1504 
1505  /* If we are using a proxy server, find it and use it. */
1506  r = get_proxy_addrport(&proxy_addr, &proxy_port, &proxy_type, &is_pt,
1507  TO_CONN(conn));
1508  if (r == 0) {
1509  conn->proxy_type = proxy_type;
1510  if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) {
1511  tor_addr_copy(&addr, &proxy_addr);
1512  port = proxy_port;
1513  conn->base_.proxy_state = PROXY_INFANT;
1514  conn->is_pt = is_pt;
1515  }
1517  connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0);
1518  } else {
1519  /* This duplication of state change calls is necessary in case we
1520  * run into an error condition below */
1522  connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0);
1523 
1524  /* get_proxy_addrport() might fail if we have a Bridge line that
1525  references a transport, but no ClientTransportPlugin lines
1526  defining its transport proxy. If this is the case, let's try to
1527  output a useful log message to the user. */
1528  const char *transport_name =
1530  TO_CONN(conn)->port);
1531 
1532  if (transport_name) {
1533  log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We were supposed to connect to bridge '%s' "
1534  "using pluggable transport '%s', but we can't find a pluggable "
1535  "transport proxy supporting '%s'. This can happen if you "
1536  "haven't provided a ClientTransportPlugin line, or if "
1537  "your pluggable transport proxy stopped running.",
1539  transport_name, transport_name);
1540 
1542  "Can't connect to bridge",
1543  END_OR_CONN_REASON_PT_MISSING,
1544  conn);
1545 
1546  } else {
1547  log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Tried to connect to %s through a proxy, but "
1548  "the proxy address could not be found.",
1550  }
1551 
1552  connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
1553  return NULL;
1554  }
1555 
1556  switch (connection_connect(TO_CONN(conn), conn->base_.address,
1557  &addr, port, &socket_error)) {
1558  case -1:
1559  /* We failed to establish a connection probably because of a local
1560  * error. No need to blame the guard in this case. Notify the networking
1561  * system of this failure. */
1563  errno_to_orconn_end_reason(socket_error),
1564  tor_socket_strerror(socket_error));
1565  connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
1566  return NULL;
1567  case 0:
1569  /* writable indicates finish, readable indicates broken link,
1570  error indicates broken link on windows */
1571  return conn;
1572  /* case 1: fall through */
1573  }
1574 
1575  if (connection_or_finished_connecting(conn) < 0) {
1576  /* already marked for close */
1577  return NULL;
1578  }
1579  return conn;
1580 }
1581 
1582 /** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to
1583  * the closing state.
1584  *
1585  * It's safe to call this and connection_or_close_for_error() any time, and
1586  * channel layer will treat it as a connection closing for reasons outside
1587  * its control, like the remote end closing it. It can also be a local
1588  * reason that's specific to connection_t/or_connection_t rather than
1589  * the channel mechanism, such as expiration of old connections in
1590  * run_connection_housekeeping(). If you want to close a channel_t
1591  * from somewhere that logically works in terms of generic channels
1592  * rather than connections, use channel_mark_for_close(); see also
1593  * the comment on that function in channel.c.
1594  */
1595 
1596 void
1598 {
1599  channel_t *chan = NULL;
1600 
1601  tor_assert(orconn);
1602  if (flush) connection_mark_and_flush_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
1603  else connection_mark_for_close_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
1604  if (orconn->chan) {
1605  chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(orconn->chan);
1606  /* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
1607  if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
1609  }
1610  }
1611 }
1612 
1613 /** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to
1614  * the error state.
1615  */
1616 
1617 MOCK_IMPL(void,
1619 {
1620  channel_t *chan = NULL;
1621 
1622  tor_assert(orconn);
1623  if (flush) connection_mark_and_flush_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
1624  else connection_mark_for_close_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
1625  if (orconn->chan) {
1626  chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(orconn->chan);
1627  /* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
1628  if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
1630  }
1631  }
1632 }
1633 
1634 /** Begin the tls handshake with <b>conn</b>. <b>receiving</b> is 0 if
1635  * we initiated the connection, else it's 1.
1636  *
1637  * Assign a new tls object to conn->tls, begin reading on <b>conn</b>, and
1638  * pass <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_continue_handshake().
1639  *
1640  * Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
1641  */
1642 MOCK_IMPL(int,
1644 {
1645  channel_listener_t *chan_listener;
1646  channel_t *chan;
1647 
1648  /* Incoming connections will need a new channel passed to the
1649  * channel_tls_listener */
1650  if (receiving) {
1651  /* It shouldn't already be set */
1652  tor_assert(!(conn->chan));
1653  chan_listener = channel_tls_get_listener();
1654  if (!chan_listener) {
1655  chan_listener = channel_tls_start_listener();
1656  command_setup_listener(chan_listener);
1657  }
1658  chan = channel_tls_handle_incoming(conn);
1659  channel_listener_queue_incoming(chan_listener, chan);
1660  }
1661 
1663  tor_assert(!conn->tls);
1664  conn->tls = tor_tls_new(conn->base_.s, receiving);
1665  if (!conn->tls) {
1666  log_warn(LD_BUG,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing.");
1667  return -1;
1668  }
1671 
1673  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"starting TLS handshake on fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT,
1674  conn->base_.s);
1675 
1676  if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(conn) < 0)
1677  return -1;
1678 
1679  return 0;
1680 }
1681 
1682 /** Block all future attempts to renegotiate on 'conn' */
1683 void
1685 {
1686  tor_tls_t *tls = conn->tls;
1687  if (!tls)
1688  return;
1689  tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, NULL, NULL);
1691 }
1692 
1693 /** Invoked on the server side from inside tor_tls_read() when the server
1694  * gets a successful TLS renegotiation from the client. */
1695 static void
1697 {
1698  or_connection_t *conn = _conn;
1699  (void)tls;
1700 
1701  /* Don't invoke this again. */
1703 
1704  if (connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn) < 0) {
1705  /* XXXX_TLS double-check that it's ok to do this from inside read. */
1706  /* XXXX_TLS double-check that this verifies certificates. */
1708  }
1709 }
1710 
1711 /** Move forward with the tls handshake. If it finishes, hand
1712  * <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_finish_handshake().
1713  *
1714  * Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
1715  */
1716 int
1718 {
1719  int result;
1720  check_no_tls_errors();
1721 
1723  // log_notice(LD_OR, "Continue handshake with %p", conn->tls);
1724  result = tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls);
1725  // log_notice(LD_OR, "Result: %d", result);
1726 
1727  switch (result) {
1729  conn->tls_error = result;
1730  log_info(LD_OR,"tls error [%s]. breaking connection.",
1731  tor_tls_err_to_string(result));
1732  return -1;
1733  case TOR_TLS_DONE:
1734  if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
1735  if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) {
1738  } else {
1739  /* v2/v3 handshake, but we are not a client. */
1740  log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (server-side). "
1741  "Expecting renegotiation or VERSIONS cell");
1744  conn);
1749  return 0;
1750  }
1751  }
1753  return connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn);
1754  case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE:
1756  log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted write");
1757  return 0;
1758  case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: /* handshaking conns are *always* reading */
1759  log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted read");
1760  return 0;
1761  case TOR_TLS_CLOSE:
1762  conn->tls_error = result;
1763  log_info(LD_OR,"tls closed. breaking connection.");
1764  return -1;
1765  }
1766  return 0;
1767 }
1768 
1769 /** Return 1 if we initiated this connection, or 0 if it started
1770  * out as an incoming connection.
1771  */
1772 int
1774 {
1775  tor_assert(conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_OR ||
1776  conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR);
1777  if (!conn->tls)
1778  return 1; /* it's still in proxy states or something */
1779  if (conn->handshake_state)
1780  return conn->handshake_state->started_here;
1781  return !tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls);
1782 }
1783 
1784 /** <b>Conn</b> just completed its handshake. Return 0 if all is well, and
1785  * return -1 if they are lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong.
1786  *
1787  * If we initiated this connection (<b>started_here</b> is true), make sure
1788  * the other side sent a correctly formed certificate. If I initiated the
1789  * connection, make sure it's the right relay by checking the certificate.
1790  *
1791  * Otherwise (if we _didn't_ initiate this connection), it's okay for
1792  * the certificate to be weird or absent.
1793  *
1794  * If we return 0, and the certificate is as expected, write a hash of the
1795  * identity key into <b>digest_rcvd_out</b>, which must have DIGEST_LEN
1796  * space in it.
1797  * If the certificate is invalid or missing on an incoming connection,
1798  * we return 0 and set <b>digest_rcvd_out</b> to DIGEST_LEN NUL bytes.
1799  * (If we return -1, the contents of this buffer are undefined.)
1800  *
1801  * As side effects,
1802  * 1) Set conn->circ_id_type according to tor-spec.txt.
1803  * 2) If we're an authdirserver and we initiated the connection: drop all
1804  * descriptors that claim to be on that IP/port but that aren't
1805  * this relay; and note that this relay is reachable.
1806  * 3) If this is a bridge and we didn't configure its identity
1807  * fingerprint, remember the keyid we just learned.
1808  */
1809 static int
1811  int started_here,
1812  char *digest_rcvd_out)
1813 {
1814  crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
1815  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
1816  int severity = server_mode(options) ? LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN : LOG_WARN;
1817  const char *conn_type = started_here ? "outgoing" : "incoming";
1818  int has_cert = 0;
1819 
1820  check_no_tls_errors();
1821  has_cert = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn->tls);
1822  if (started_here && !has_cert) {
1823  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s, but it didn't "
1824  "send a cert! Closing.",
1826  return -1;
1827  } else if (!has_cert) {
1828  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Got incoming connection with no certificate. "
1829  "That's ok.");
1830  }
1831  check_no_tls_errors();
1832 
1833  if (has_cert) {
1834  int v = tor_tls_verify(started_here?severity:LOG_INFO,
1835  conn->tls, &identity_rcvd);
1836  if (started_here && v<0) {
1837  log_fn(severity,LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s: It"
1838  " has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
1840  return -1;
1841  } else if (v<0) {
1842  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Incoming connection gave us an invalid cert "
1843  "chain; ignoring.");
1844  } else {
1845  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,
1846  "The certificate seems to be valid on %s connection "
1847  "with %s", conn_type,
1849  }
1850  check_no_tls_errors();
1851  }
1852 
1853  if (identity_rcvd) {
1854  if (crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd_out) < 0) {
1855  crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
1856  return -1;
1857  }
1858  } else {
1859  memset(digest_rcvd_out, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
1860  }
1861 
1862  tor_assert(conn->chan);
1863  channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan), identity_rcvd, 1);
1864 
1865  crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
1866 
1867  if (started_here) {
1868  /* A TLS handshake can't teach us an Ed25519 ID, so we set it to NULL
1869  * here. */
1870  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Calling client_learned_peer_id from "
1871  "check_valid_tls_handshake");
1873  (const uint8_t*)digest_rcvd_out,
1874  NULL);
1875  }
1876 
1877  return 0;
1878 }
1879 
1880 /** Called when we (as a connection initiator) have definitively,
1881  * authenticatedly, learned that ID of the Tor instance on the other
1882  * side of <b>conn</b> is <b>rsa_peer_id</b> and optionally <b>ed_peer_id</b>.
1883  * For v1 and v2 handshakes,
1884  * this is right after we get a certificate chain in a TLS handshake
1885  * or renegotiation. For v3+ handshakes, this is right after we get a
1886  * certificate chain in a CERTS cell.
1887  *
1888  * If we did not know the ID before, record the one we got.
1889  *
1890  * If we wanted an ID, but we didn't get the one we expected, log a message
1891  * and return -1.
1892  * On relays:
1893  * - log a protocol warning whenever the fingerprints don't match;
1894  * On clients:
1895  * - if a relay's fingerprint doesn't match, log a warning;
1896  * - if we don't have updated relay fingerprints from a recent consensus, and
1897  * a fallback directory mirror's hard-coded fingerprint has changed, log an
1898  * info explaining that we will try another fallback.
1899  *
1900  * If we're testing reachability, remember what we learned.
1901  *
1902  * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
1903  */
1904 int
1906  const uint8_t *rsa_peer_id,
1907  const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_peer_id)
1908 {
1909  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
1910  channel_tls_t *chan_tls = conn->chan;
1911  channel_t *chan = channel_tls_to_base(chan_tls);
1912  int changed_identity = 0;
1913  tor_assert(chan);
1914 
1915  const int expected_rsa_key =
1917  const int expected_ed_key =
1919 
1920  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "learned peer id for %s at %p: %s, %s",
1922  conn,
1923  hex_str((const char*)rsa_peer_id, DIGEST_LEN),
1924  ed25519_fmt(ed_peer_id));
1925 
1926  if (! expected_rsa_key && ! expected_ed_key) {
1927  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "(we had no ID in mind when we made this "
1928  "connection.");
1930  (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
1931  tor_free(conn->nickname);
1932  conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
1933  conn->nickname[0] = '$';
1935  conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
1936  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Connected to router at %s without knowing "
1937  "its key. Hoping for the best.",
1939  /* if it's a bridge and we didn't know its identity fingerprint, now
1940  * we do -- remember it for future attempts. */
1941  learned_router_identity(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port,
1942  (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
1943  changed_identity = 1;
1944  }
1945 
1946  const int rsa_mismatch = expected_rsa_key &&
1947  tor_memneq(rsa_peer_id, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
1948  /* It only counts as an ed25519 mismatch if we wanted an ed25519 identity
1949  * and didn't get it. It's okay if we get one that we didn't ask for. */
1950  const int ed25519_mismatch =
1951  expected_ed_key &&
1952  (ed_peer_id == NULL ||
1953  ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&chan->ed25519_identity, ed_peer_id));
1954 
1955  if (rsa_mismatch || ed25519_mismatch) {
1956  /* I was aiming for a particular digest. I didn't get it! */
1957  char seen_rsa[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
1958  char expected_rsa[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
1959  char seen_ed[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
1960  char expected_ed[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
1961  base16_encode(seen_rsa, sizeof(seen_rsa),
1962  (const char*)rsa_peer_id, DIGEST_LEN);
1963  base16_encode(expected_rsa, sizeof(expected_rsa), conn->identity_digest,
1964  DIGEST_LEN);
1965  if (ed_peer_id) {
1966  ed25519_public_to_base64(seen_ed, ed_peer_id);
1967  } else {
1968  strlcpy(seen_ed, "no ed25519 key", sizeof(seen_ed));
1969  }
1971  ed25519_public_to_base64(expected_ed, &chan->ed25519_identity);
1972  } else {
1973  strlcpy(expected_ed, "no ed25519 key", sizeof(expected_ed));
1974  }
1975  const int using_hardcoded_fingerprints =
1978  const int is_fallback_fingerprint = router_digest_is_fallback_dir(
1979  conn->identity_digest);
1980  const int is_authority_fingerprint = router_digest_is_trusted_dir(
1981  conn->identity_digest);
1982  const int non_anonymous_mode = rend_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options);
1983  int severity;
1984  const char *extra_log = "";
1985 
1986  /* Relays and Single Onion Services make direct connections using
1987  * untrusted authentication keys. */
1988  if (server_mode(options) || non_anonymous_mode) {
1989  severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN;
1990  } else {
1991  if (using_hardcoded_fingerprints) {
1992  /* We need to do the checks in this order, because the list of
1993  * fallbacks includes the list of authorities */
1994  if (is_authority_fingerprint) {
1995  severity = LOG_WARN;
1996  } else if (is_fallback_fingerprint) {
1997  /* we expect a small number of fallbacks to change from their
1998  * hard-coded fingerprints over the life of a release */
1999  severity = LOG_INFO;
2000  extra_log = " Tor will try a different fallback.";
2001  } else {
2002  /* it's a bridge, it's either a misconfiguration, or unexpected */
2003  severity = LOG_WARN;
2004  }
2005  } else {
2006  /* a relay has changed its fingerprint from the one in the consensus */
2007  severity = LOG_WARN;
2008  }
2009  }
2010 
2011  log_fn(severity, LD_HANDSHAKE,
2012  "Tried connecting to router at %s, but RSA + ed25519 identity "
2013  "keys were not as expected: wanted %s + %s but got %s + %s.%s",
2015  expected_rsa, expected_ed, seen_rsa, seen_ed, extra_log);
2016 
2017  /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */
2018  entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2019  connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
2020  END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY);
2021  if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options))
2023  "Unexpected identity in router certificate",
2024  END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY,
2025  conn);
2026  return -1;
2027  }
2028 
2029  if (!expected_ed_key && ed_peer_id) {
2030  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "(We had no Ed25519 ID in mind when we made this "
2031  "connection.)");
2033  (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
2034  changed_identity = 1;
2035  }
2036 
2037  if (changed_identity) {
2038  /* If we learned an identity for this connection, then we might have
2039  * just discovered it to be canonical. */
2041  if (conn->tls)
2044  }
2045 
2046  if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) {
2047  // We don't want to use canonical_orport here -- we want the address
2048  // that we really used.
2049  dirserv_orconn_tls_done(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port,
2050  (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
2051  }
2052 
2053  return 0;
2054 }
2055 
2056 /** Return when we last used this channel for client activity (origin
2057  * circuits). This is called from connection.c, since client_used is now one
2058  * of the timestamps in channel_t */
2059 
2060 time_t
2062 {
2063  tor_assert(conn);
2064 
2065  if (conn->chan) {
2066  return channel_when_last_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2067  } else return 0;
2068 }
2069 
2070 /** The v1/v2 TLS handshake is finished.
2071  *
2072  * Make sure we are happy with the peer we just handshaked with.
2073  *
2074  * If they initiated the connection, make sure they're not already connected,
2075  * then initialize conn from the information in router.
2076  *
2077  * If all is successful, call circuit_n_conn_done() to handle events
2078  * that have been pending on the <tls handshake completion. Also set the
2079  * directory to be dirty (only matters if I'm an authdirserver).
2080  *
2081  * If this is a v2 TLS handshake, send a versions cell.
2082  */
2083 static int
2085 {
2086  char digest_rcvd[DIGEST_LEN];
2087  int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn);
2088 
2089  tor_assert(!started_here);
2090 
2091  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"%s tls handshake on %s done, using "
2092  "ciphersuite %s. verifying.",
2093  started_here?"outgoing":"incoming",
2095  tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(conn->tls));
2096 
2097  if (connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(conn, started_here,
2098  digest_rcvd) < 0)
2099  return -1;
2100 
2102 
2103  if (tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
2104  conn->link_proto = 1;
2105  connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &conn->base_.addr,
2106  conn->base_.port, digest_rcvd,
2107  NULL, 0);
2109  rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto(1, started_here);
2110  return connection_or_set_state_open(conn);
2111  } else {
2113  if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, started_here) < 0)
2114  return -1;
2115  connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &conn->base_.addr,
2116  conn->base_.port, digest_rcvd,
2117  NULL, 0);
2118  return connection_or_send_versions(conn, 0);
2119  }
2120 }
2121 
2122 /**
2123  * Called as client when initial TLS handshake is done, and we notice
2124  * that we got a v3-handshake signalling certificate from the server.
2125  * Set up structures, do bookkeeping, and send the versions cell.
2126  * Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
2127  */
2128 static int
2130 {
2132 
2134 
2136  if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, 1) < 0)
2137  return -1;
2138 
2139  return connection_or_send_versions(conn, 1);
2140 }
2141 
2142 /** Allocate a new connection handshake state for the connection
2143  * <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
2144 int
2146 {
2148  if (conn->handshake_state) {
2149  log_warn(LD_BUG, "Duplicate call to connection_init_or_handshake_state!");
2150  return 0;
2151  }
2152  s = conn->handshake_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
2153  s->started_here = started_here ? 1 : 0;
2154  s->digest_sent_data = 1;
2155  s->digest_received_data = 1;
2156  if (! started_here && get_current_link_cert_cert()) {
2157  s->own_link_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_current_link_cert_cert());
2158  }
2160  s->certs->started_here = s->started_here;
2161  return 0;
2162 }
2163 
2164 /** Free all storage held by <b>state</b>. */
2165 void
2167 {
2168  if (!state)
2169  return;
2171  crypto_digest_free(state->digest_received);
2172  or_handshake_certs_free(state->certs);
2173  tor_cert_free(state->own_link_cert);
2174  memwipe(state, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
2175  tor_free(state);
2176 }
2177 
2178 /**
2179  * Remember that <b>cell</b> has been transmitted (if <b>incoming</b> is
2180  * false) or received (if <b>incoming</b> is true) during a V3 handshake using
2181  * <b>state</b>.
2182  *
2183  * (We don't record the cell, but we keep a digest of everything sent or
2184  * received during the v3 handshake, and the client signs it in an
2185  * authenticate cell.)
2186  */
2187 void
2189  or_handshake_state_t *state,
2190  const cell_t *cell,
2191  int incoming)
2192 {
2193  size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
2194  crypto_digest_t *d, **dptr;
2195  packed_cell_t packed;
2196  if (incoming) {
2197  if (!state->digest_received_data)
2198  return;
2199  } else {
2200  if (!state->digest_sent_data)
2201  return;
2202  }
2203  if (!incoming) {
2204  log_warn(LD_BUG, "We shouldn't be sending any non-variable-length cells "
2205  "while making a handshake digest. But we think we are sending "
2206  "one with type %d.", (int)cell->command);
2207  }
2208  dptr = incoming ? &state->digest_received : &state->digest_sent;
2209  if (! *dptr)
2210  *dptr = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
2211 
2212  d = *dptr;
2213  /* Re-packing like this is a little inefficient, but we don't have to do
2214  this very often at all. */
2215  cell_pack(&packed, cell, conn->wide_circ_ids);
2216  crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, packed.body, cell_network_size);
2217  memwipe(&packed, 0, sizeof(packed));
2218 }
2219 
2220 /** Remember that a variable-length <b>cell</b> has been transmitted (if
2221  * <b>incoming</b> is false) or received (if <b>incoming</b> is true) during a
2222  * V3 handshake using <b>state</b>.
2223  *
2224  * (We don't record the cell, but we keep a digest of everything sent or
2225  * received during the v3 handshake, and the client signs it in an
2226  * authenticate cell.)
2227  */
2228 void
2230  or_handshake_state_t *state,
2231  const var_cell_t *cell,
2232  int incoming)
2233 {
2234  crypto_digest_t *d, **dptr;
2235  int n;
2236  char buf[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
2237  if (incoming) {
2238  if (!state->digest_received_data)
2239  return;
2240  } else {
2241  if (!state->digest_sent_data)
2242  return;
2243  }
2244  dptr = incoming ? &state->digest_received : &state->digest_sent;
2245  if (! *dptr)
2246  *dptr = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
2247 
2248  d = *dptr;
2249 
2250  n = var_cell_pack_header(cell, buf, conn->wide_circ_ids);
2251  crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, buf, n);
2252  crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, (const char *)cell->payload, cell->payload_len);
2253 
2254  memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
2255 }
2256 
2257 /** Set <b>conn</b>'s state to OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN, and tell other subsystems
2258  * as appropriate. Called when we are done with all TLS and OR handshaking.
2259  */
2260 int
2262 {
2264  connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED, 0);
2265 
2266  /* Link protocol 3 appeared in Tor 0.2.3.6-alpha, so any connection
2267  * that uses an earlier link protocol should not be treated as a relay. */
2268  if (conn->link_proto < 3) {
2269  channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2270  }
2271 
2272  or_handshake_state_free(conn->handshake_state);
2273  conn->handshake_state = NULL;
2275 
2276  return 0;
2277 }
2278 
2279 /** Pack <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto <b>conn</b>'s outbuf.
2280  * For cells that use or affect a circuit, this should only be called by
2281  * connection_or_flush_from_first_active_circuit().
2282  */
2283 void
2285 {
2286  packed_cell_t networkcell;
2287  size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
2288 
2289  tor_assert(cell);
2290  tor_assert(conn);
2291 
2292  cell_pack(&networkcell, cell, conn->wide_circ_ids);
2293 
2294  /* We need to count padding cells from this non-packed code path
2295  * since they are sent via chan->write_cell() (which is not packed) */
2297  if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING)
2299 
2300  connection_buf_add(networkcell.body, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn));
2301 
2302  /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
2303  if (conn->chan) {
2304  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2305 
2306  if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->padding_enabled) {
2308  if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING)
2310  }
2311  }
2312 
2313  if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
2314  or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 0);
2315 }
2316 
2317 /** Pack a variable-length <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto
2318  * <b>conn</b>'s outbuf. Right now, this <em>DOES NOT</em> support cells that
2319  * affect a circuit.
2320  */
2321 MOCK_IMPL(void,
2324 {
2325  int n;
2326  char hdr[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
2327  tor_assert(cell);
2328  tor_assert(conn);
2329  n = var_cell_pack_header(cell, hdr, conn->wide_circ_ids);
2330  connection_buf_add(hdr, n, TO_CONN(conn));
2331  connection_buf_add((char*)cell->payload,
2332  cell->payload_len, TO_CONN(conn));
2333  if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
2335 
2337  /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
2338  if (conn->chan)
2339  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2340 }
2341 
2342 /** See whether there's a variable-length cell waiting on <b>or_conn</b>'s
2343  * inbuf. Return values as for fetch_var_cell_from_buf(). */
2344 static int
2346 {
2347  connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
2348  return fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn->inbuf, out, or_conn->link_proto);
2349 }
2350 
2351 /** Process cells from <b>conn</b>'s inbuf.
2352  *
2353  * Loop: while inbuf contains a cell, pull it off the inbuf, unpack it,
2354  * and hand it to command_process_cell().
2355  *
2356  * Always return 0.
2357  */
2358 static int
2360 {
2361  var_cell_t *var_cell;
2362 
2363  /*
2364  * Note on memory management for incoming cells: below the channel layer,
2365  * we shouldn't need to consider its internal queueing/copying logic. It
2366  * is safe to pass cells to it on the stack or on the heap, but in the
2367  * latter case we must be sure we free them later.
2368  *
2369  * The incoming cell queue code in channel.c will (in the common case)
2370  * decide it can pass them to the upper layer immediately, in which case
2371  * those functions may run directly on the cell pointers we pass here, or
2372  * it may decide to queue them, in which case it will allocate its own
2373  * buffer and copy the cell.
2374  */
2375 
2376  while (1) {
2377  log_debug(LD_OR,
2378  TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT": starting, inbuf_datalen %d "
2379  "(%d pending in tls object).",
2380  conn->base_.s,(int)connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn)),
2382  if (connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn, &var_cell)) {
2383  if (!var_cell)
2384  return 0; /* not yet. */
2385 
2386  /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
2387  if (conn->chan)
2388  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2389 
2391  channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell, conn);
2392  var_cell_free(var_cell);
2393  } else {
2394  const int wide_circ_ids = conn->wide_circ_ids;
2395  size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
2396  char buf[CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE];
2397  cell_t cell;
2398  if (connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn))
2399  < cell_network_size) /* whole response available? */
2400  return 0; /* not yet */
2401 
2402  /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
2403  if (conn->chan)
2404  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2405 
2407  connection_buf_get_bytes(buf, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn));
2408 
2409  /* retrieve cell info from buf (create the host-order struct from the
2410  * network-order string) */
2411  cell_unpack(&cell, buf, wide_circ_ids);
2412 
2413  channel_tls_handle_cell(&cell, conn);
2414  }
2415  }
2416 }
2417 
2418 /** Array of recognized link protocol versions. */
2419 static const uint16_t or_protocol_versions[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 };
2420 /** Number of versions in <b>or_protocol_versions</b>. */
2421 static const int n_or_protocol_versions =
2422  (int)( sizeof(or_protocol_versions)/sizeof(uint16_t) );
2423 
2424 /** Return true iff <b>v</b> is a link protocol version that this Tor
2425  * implementation believes it can support. */
2426 int
2428 {
2429  int i;
2430  for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
2431  if (or_protocol_versions[i] == v)
2432  return 1;
2433  }
2434  return 0;
2435 }
2436 
2437 /** Send a VERSIONS cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other host about the
2438  * link protocol versions that this Tor can support.
2439  *
2440  * If <b>v3_plus</b>, this is part of a V3 protocol handshake, so only
2441  * allow protocol version v3 or later. If not <b>v3_plus</b>, this is
2442  * not part of a v3 protocol handshake, so don't allow protocol v3 or
2443  * later.
2444  **/
2445 int
2447 {
2448  var_cell_t *cell;
2449  int i;
2450  int n_versions = 0;
2451  const int min_version = v3_plus ? 3 : 0;
2452  const int max_version = v3_plus ? UINT16_MAX : 2;
2453  tor_assert(conn->handshake_state &&
2456  cell->command = CELL_VERSIONS;
2457  for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
2458  uint16_t v = or_protocol_versions[i];
2459  if (v < min_version || v > max_version)
2460  continue;
2461  set_uint16(cell->payload+(2*n_versions), htons(v));
2462  ++n_versions;
2463  }
2464  cell->payload_len = n_versions * 2;
2465 
2467  conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at = time(NULL);
2468 
2469  var_cell_free(cell);
2470  return 0;
2471 }
2472 
2473 static netinfo_addr_t *
2474 netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(const tor_addr_t *tor_addr)
2475 {
2476  sa_family_t addr_family = tor_addr_family(tor_addr);
2477 
2478  if (BUG(addr_family != AF_INET && addr_family != AF_INET6))
2479  return NULL;
2480 
2481  netinfo_addr_t *netinfo_addr = netinfo_addr_new();
2482 
2483  if (addr_family == AF_INET) {
2484  netinfo_addr_set_addr_type(netinfo_addr, NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV4);
2485  netinfo_addr_set_len(netinfo_addr, 4);
2486  netinfo_addr_set_addr_ipv4(netinfo_addr, tor_addr_to_ipv4h(tor_addr));
2487  } else if (addr_family == AF_INET6) {
2488  netinfo_addr_set_addr_type(netinfo_addr, NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV6);
2489  netinfo_addr_set_len(netinfo_addr, 16);
2490  uint8_t *ipv6_buf = netinfo_addr_getarray_addr_ipv6(netinfo_addr);
2491  const uint8_t *in6_addr = tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(tor_addr);
2492  memcpy(ipv6_buf, in6_addr, 16);
2493  }
2494 
2495  return netinfo_addr;
2496 }
2497 
2498 /** Send a NETINFO cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other server what we know
2499  * about their address, our address, and the current time. */
2500 MOCK_IMPL(int,
2502 {
2503  cell_t cell;
2504  time_t now = time(NULL);
2505  const routerinfo_t *me;
2506  int r = -1;
2507 
2508  tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
2509 
2510  if (conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) {
2511  log_warn(LD_BUG, "Attempted to send an extra netinfo cell on a connection "
2512  "where we already sent one.");
2513  return 0;
2514  }
2515 
2516  memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
2517  cell.command = CELL_NETINFO;
2518 
2519  netinfo_cell_t *netinfo_cell = netinfo_cell_new();
2520 
2521  /* Timestamp, if we're a relay. */
2522  if (public_server_mode(get_options()) || ! conn->is_outgoing)
2523  netinfo_cell_set_timestamp(netinfo_cell, (uint32_t)now);
2524 
2525  /* Their address. */
2526  const tor_addr_t *remote_tor_addr = &TO_CONN(conn)->addr;
2527  /* We can safely use TO_CONN(conn)->addr here, since we no longer replace
2528  * it with a canonical address. */
2529  netinfo_addr_t *their_addr = netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(remote_tor_addr);
2530 
2531  netinfo_cell_set_other_addr(netinfo_cell, their_addr);
2532 
2533  /* My address -- only include it if I'm a public relay, or if I'm a
2534  * bridge and this is an incoming connection. If I'm a bridge and this
2535  * is an outgoing connection, act like a normal client and omit it. */
2536  if ((public_server_mode(get_options()) || !conn->is_outgoing) &&
2537  (me = router_get_my_routerinfo())) {
2538  uint8_t n_my_addrs = 1 + !tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr);
2539  netinfo_cell_set_n_my_addrs(netinfo_cell, n_my_addrs);
2540 
2541  netinfo_cell_add_my_addrs(netinfo_cell,
2542  netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(&me->ipv4_addr));
2543 
2544  if (!tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr)) {
2545  netinfo_cell_add_my_addrs(netinfo_cell,
2546  netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(&me->ipv6_addr));
2547  }
2548  }
2549 
2550  const char *errmsg = NULL;
2551  if ((errmsg = netinfo_cell_check(netinfo_cell))) {
2552  log_warn(LD_OR, "Failed to validate NETINFO cell with error: %s",
2553  errmsg);
2554  goto cleanup;
2555  }
2556 
2557  if (netinfo_cell_encode(cell.payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
2558  netinfo_cell) < 0) {
2559  log_warn(LD_OR, "Failed generating NETINFO cell");
2560  goto cleanup;
2561  }
2562 
2563  conn->handshake_state->digest_sent_data = 0;
2564  conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo = 1;
2565  connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn);
2566 
2567  r = 0;
2568  cleanup:
2569  netinfo_cell_free(netinfo_cell);
2570 
2571  return r;
2572 }
log_fn
#define log_fn(severity, domain, args,...)
Definition: log.h:283
connection_or_client_used
time_t connection_or_client_used(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2061
CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE
#define CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE
Definition: or.h:580
DOWNCAST
#define DOWNCAST(to, ptr)
Definition: or.h:109
or_connection_t::bucket
token_bucket_rw_t bucket
Definition: or_connection_st.h:103
routermode.h
Header file for routermode.c.
CONST_TO_OR_CONN
const or_connection_t * CONST_TO_OR_CONN(const connection_t *c)
Definition: connection_or.c:120
tor_free
#define tor_free(p)
Definition: malloc.h:52
get_circuit_build_times_mutable
circuit_build_times_t * get_circuit_build_times_mutable(void)
Definition: circuitstats.c:86
routerinfo_t
Definition: routerinfo_st.h:20
connection_stop_writing
void connection_stop_writing(connection_t *conn)
Definition: mainloop.c:666
connection_or_send_netinfo
int connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2501
fetch_var_cell_from_buf
int fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto)
Definition: proto_cell.c:57
channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn
void channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan, or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)
Definition: channeltls.c:963
orconn_status_msg_t::status
int status
Definition: orconn_event.h:92
tor_free_
void tor_free_(void *mem)
Definition: malloc.c:227
connection_or_finished_connecting
int connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *or_conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:724
tor_addr_family
static sa_family_t tor_addr_family(const tor_addr_t *a)
Definition: address.h:187
hex_str
const char * hex_str(const char *from, size_t fromlen)
Definition: binascii.c:34
or_handshake_state_t::digest_sent
crypto_digest_t * digest_sent
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:72
connection_or_send_versions
int connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus)
Definition: connection_or.c:2446
or_options_t::BandwidthRate
uint64_t BandwidthRate
Definition: or_options_st.h:416
OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING
#define OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING
Definition: orconn_event.h:31
or_handshake_state_free_
void or_handshake_state_free_(or_handshake_state_t *state)
Definition: connection_or.c:2166
or_connection_t::handshake_state
or_handshake_state_t * handshake_state
Definition: or_connection_st.h:98
memwipe
void memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz)
Definition: crypto_util.c:55
tor_tls_get_pending_bytes
int tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:657
OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING
#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING
Definition: orconn_event.h:43
channel_timestamp_active
void channel_timestamp_active(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:3122
tor_addr_t
Definition: address.h:69
ED25519_BASE64_LEN
#define ED25519_BASE64_LEN
Definition: x25519_sizes.h:43
orconn_state_msg_t::gid
uint64_t gid
Definition: orconn_event.h:76
approx_time
time_t approx_time(void)
Definition: approx_time.c:32
connection_t::address
char * address
Definition: connection_st.h:166
MOCK_IMPL
#define MOCK_IMPL(rv, funcname, arglist)
Definition: testsupport.h:133
connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake
static int connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here, char *digest_rcvd_out)
Definition: connection_or.c:1810
var_cell_pack_header
int var_cell_pack_header(const var_cell_t *cell, char *hdr_out, int wide_circ_ids)
Definition: connection_or.c:490
tor_tls_get_state_description
void tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:346
channel_tls_handle_cell
void channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: channeltls.c:1066
connection_or_reached_eof
int connection_or_reached_eof(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:551
channel_mark_client
void channel_mark_client(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:2906
tor_assert
#define tor_assert(expr)
Definition: util_bug.h:102
routerkeys.h
Header for routerkeys.c.
microdesc.h
Header file for microdesc.c.
LD_BUG
#define LD_BUG
Definition: log.h:86
ed25519_pubkey_eq
int ed25519_pubkey_eq(const ed25519_public_key_t *key1, const ed25519_public_key_t *key2)
Definition: crypto_ed25519.c:642
router.h
Header file for router.c.
CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR
#define CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR
Definition: connection.h:71
connection_or_change_state
void connection_or_change_state(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)
Definition: connection_or.c:418
connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb
static void connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:1696
command_setup_listener
void command_setup_listener(channel_listener_t *listener)
Definition: command.c:703
connection_or_state_publish
static void connection_or_state_publish(const or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)
Definition: connection_or.c:390
router_digest_is_me
int router_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
Definition: router.c:1723
channel.h
Header file for channel.c.
control_event_or_conn_status
int control_event_or_conn_status(or_connection_t *conn, or_conn_status_event_t tp, int reason)
Definition: control_events.c:922
or_handshake_state_t::started_here
unsigned int started_here
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:23
LD_GENERAL
#define LD_GENERAL
Definition: log.h:62
clear_broken_connection_map
void clear_broken_connection_map(int stop_recording)
Definition: connection_or.c:263
PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL
@ PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL
Definition: rephist.h:137
connection_or_clear_identity
void connection_or_clear_identity(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:128
CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY
#define CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY
Definition: tortls.h:62
base16_encode
void base16_encode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen)
Definition: binascii.c:478
conn_state_to_string
const char * conn_state_to_string(int type, int state)
Definition: connection.c:303
tor_fragile_assert
#define tor_fragile_assert()
Definition: util_bug.h:270
channel_is_better
int channel_is_better(channel_t *a, channel_t *b)
Definition: channel.c:2337
connection_init_or_handshake_state
int connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
Definition: connection_or.c:2145
learned_router_identity
void learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
Definition: bridges.c:403
channel_when_last_client
time_t channel_when_last_client(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:3242
router_get_my_routerinfo
const routerinfo_t * router_get_my_routerinfo(void)
Definition: router.c:1785
set_uint8
static void set_uint8(void *cp, uint8_t v)
Definition: bytes.h:31
channel_tls_get_listener
channel_listener_t * channel_tls_get_listener(void)
Definition: channeltls.c:254
cell_unpack
static void cell_unpack(cell_t *dest, const char *src, int wide_circ_ids)
Definition: connection_or.c:474
OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING
#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING
Definition: orconn_event.h:36
reachability.h
Header file for reachability.c.
tor_reallocarray_
void * tor_reallocarray_(void *ptr, size_t sz1, size_t sz2)
Definition: malloc.c:146
or_connection_t::is_canonical
unsigned int is_canonical
Definition: or_connection_st.h:71
connection_or_client_learned_peer_id
int connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn, const uint8_t *rsa_peer_id, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_peer_id)
Definition: connection_or.c:1905
channel_close_from_lower_layer
void channel_close_from_lower_layer(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:1216
is_or_protocol_version_known
int is_or_protocol_version_known(uint16_t v)
Definition: connection_or.c:2427
node_get_by_id
const node_t * node_get_by_id(const char *identity_digest)
Definition: nodelist.c:223
smartlist_add
void smartlist_add(smartlist_t *sl, void *element)
Definition: smartlist_core.c:117
tor_addr_port_copy
void tor_addr_port_copy(tor_addr_port_t *dest, const tor_addr_port_t *source)
Definition: address.c:2121
router_digest_is_fallback_dir
int router_digest_is_fallback_dir(const char *digest)
Definition: dirlist.c:189
tor_tls_get_last_error_msg
const char * tor_tls_get_last_error_msg(const tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:397
channel_tls_update_marks
void channel_tls_update_marks(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: channeltls.c:1356
tor_cert_dup
tor_cert_t * tor_cert_dup(const tor_cert_t *cert)
Definition: torcert.c:294
ed25519_public_key_is_zero
int ed25519_public_key_is_zero(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
Definition: crypto_ed25519.c:227
channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs
void channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:2878
or_handshake_state_record_cell
void or_handshake_state_record_cell(or_connection_t *conn, or_handshake_state_t *state, const cell_t *cell, int incoming)
Definition: connection_or.c:2188
connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs
static unsigned int connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:996
READ_EVENT
@ READ_EVENT
Definition: mainloop.h:37
tor_tls_peer_has_cert
int tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:532
connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper
static void connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(or_connection_t *conn, int reset, const or_options_t *options)
Definition: connection_or.c:833
connection_or_get_alleged_ed25519_id
const struct ed25519_public_key_t * connection_or_get_alleged_ed25519_id(const or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:217
or_options_t::PerConnBWRate
uint64_t PerConnBWRate
Definition: or_options_st.h:426
var_cell_copy
var_cell_t * var_cell_copy(const var_cell_t *src)
Definition: connection_or.c:525
connection_or_finished_flushing
int connection_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:679
tor_tls_used_v1_handshake
int tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:720
connection_or_process_inbuf
int connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:567
or_connection_t::is_pt
unsigned int is_pt
Definition: or_connection_st.h:90
crypto_digest_add_bytes
void crypto_digest_add_bytes(crypto_digest_t *digest, const char *data, size_t len)
Definition: crypto_digest_nss.c:308
connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf
void connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(const var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2323
orconn_status_msg_t::reason
int reason
Definition: orconn_event.h:93
var_cell_free_
void var_cell_free_(var_cell_t *cell)
Definition: connection_or.c:544
smartlist_new
smartlist_t * smartlist_new(void)
Definition: smartlist_core.c:26
reasons.h
Header file for reasons.c.
or_connection_t::link_proto
uint16_t link_proto
Definition: or_connection_st.h:92
note_broken_connection
static void note_broken_connection(const char *state)
Definition: connection_or.c:243
crypto_digest_t
Definition: crypto_digest_nss.c:166
or_connection_t
Definition: or_connection_st.h:22
tor_snprintf
int tor_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format,...)
Definition: printf.c:27
routerinfo_t::ipv6_addr
tor_addr_t ipv6_addr
Definition: routerinfo_st.h:30
connection_t::port
uint16_t port
Definition: connection_st.h:146
connection_start_reading
void connection_start_reading(connection_t *conn)
Definition: mainloop.c:633
CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE
#define CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE
Definition: or.h:577
connection_proxy_connect
int connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type)
Definition: connection.c:2731
ed25519_public_to_base64
void ed25519_public_to_base64(char *output, const ed25519_public_key_t *pkey)
Definition: crypto_format.c:227
SMARTLIST_FOREACH
#define SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, type, var, cmd)
Definition: smartlist_foreach.h:112
networkstatus.h
Header file for networkstatus.c.
rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto
void rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto(unsigned link_proto, int started_here)
Definition: rephist.c:2078
scheduler.h
Header file for scheduler*.c.
orconn_status_msg_t
Definition: orconn_event.h:90
connection_or_flushed_some
int connection_or_flushed_some(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:627
cell_t
Definition: cell_st.h:17
router_get_by_id_digest
const routerinfo_t * router_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest)
Definition: routerlist.c:776
node_ed25519_id_matches
int node_ed25519_id_matches(const node_t *node, const ed25519_public_key_t *id)
Definition: nodelist.c:1115
or_connection_t::chan
channel_tls_t * chan
Definition: or_connection_st.h:50
ed25519_fmt
const char * ed25519_fmt(const ed25519_public_key_t *pkey)
Definition: crypto_format.c:193
in6_addr
Definition: inaddr_st.h:51
dirlist.h
Header file for dirlist.c.
crypto_util.h
Common functions for cryptographic routines.
connection_or_clear_identity_map
void connection_or_clear_identity_map(void)
Definition: connection_or.c:136
LD_CIRC
#define LD_CIRC
Definition: log.h:82
buf_datalen
size_t buf_datalen(const buf_t *buf)
Definition: buffers.c:394
or_handshake_state_t::digest_sent_data
unsigned int digest_sent_data
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:56
connection_tls_continue_handshake
int connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:1717
circuitlist.h
Header file for circuitlist.c.
mainloop.h
Header file for mainloop.c.
tor_tls_t
Definition: tortls_st.h:41
DIGEST_LEN
#define DIGEST_LEN
Definition: digest_sizes.h:20
orconn_state_msg_t::state
uint8_t state
Definition: orconn_event.h:79
MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT
#define MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT
Definition: connection_or.c:326
OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN
#define OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN
Definition: orconn_event.h:53
connection_or_event_status
void connection_or_event_status(or_connection_t *conn, or_conn_status_event_t tp, int reason)
Definition: connection_or.c:371
errno_to_orconn_end_reason
int errno_to_orconn_end_reason(int e)
Definition: reasons.c:291
crypto_format.h
Header for crypto_format.c.
packed_cell_t
Definition: cell_queue_st.h:18
bridges.h
Header file for circuitbuild.c.
or_connection_new
or_connection_t * or_connection_new(int type, int socket_family)
Definition: connection.c:577
PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL
@ PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL
Definition: rephist.h:135
geoip.h
Header file for geoip.c.
command.h
Header file for command.c.
or_connection_t::idle_timeout
uint16_t idle_timeout
Definition: or_connection_st.h:94
connection_t::hold_open_until_flushed
unsigned int hold_open_until_flushed
Definition: connection_st.h:61
routerinfo_t::ipv4_addr
tor_addr_t ipv4_addr
Definition: routerinfo_st.h:25
connection_or_block_renegotiation
void connection_or_block_renegotiation(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:1684
tortls.h
Headers for tortls.c.
tor_addr_port_t
Definition: address.h:81
tor_memneq
#define tor_memneq(a, b, sz)
Definition: di_ops.h:21
tor_addr_to_ipv4h
static uint32_t tor_addr_to_ipv4h(const tor_addr_t *a)
Definition: address.h:160
entrynodes.h
Header file for circuitbuild.c.
TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD
#define TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD
Definition: connection_or.c:1016
tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached
#define tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached()
Definition: util_bug.h:176
node_t
Definition: node_st.h:34
LD_OR
#define LD_OR
Definition: log.h:92
connection_describe_peer
const char * connection_describe_peer(const connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection.c:529
channelpadding_get_channel_idle_timeout
unsigned int channelpadding_get_channel_idle_timeout(const channel_t *chan, int is_canonical)
Definition: channelpadding.c:595
circuit_build_times_network_is_live
void circuit_build_times_network_is_live(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
Definition: circuitstats.c:1418
torcert.h
Header for torcert.c.
CONN_TYPE_OR
#define CONN_TYPE_OR
Definition: connection.h:44
crypto_pk_get_digest
int crypto_pk_get_digest(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char *digest_out)
Definition: crypto_rsa.c:356
VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE
#define VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE
Definition: or.h:583
find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport
const char * find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port)
Definition: bridges.c:597
tor_digest_is_zero
int tor_digest_is_zero(const char *digest)
Definition: util_string.c:96
ed25519_public_key_t
Definition: crypto_ed25519.h:23
broken_state_count_compare
static int broken_state_count_compare(const void **a_ptr, const void **b_ptr)
Definition: connection_or.c:313
networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus
networkstatus_t * networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(time_t now, int flavor)
Definition: networkstatus.c:1477
or_handshake_state_t::sent_versions_at
time_t sent_versions_at
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:21
usable_consensus_flavor
int usable_consensus_flavor(void)
Definition: microdesc.c:1086
connection_t::inbuf
struct buf_t * inbuf
Definition: connection_st.h:101
orconn_state_msg_t::proxy_type
int proxy_type
Definition: orconn_event.h:78
OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING
#define OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING
Definition: orconn_event.h:33
authmode.h
Header file for directory authority mode.
get_connection_array
smartlist_t * get_connection_array(void)
Definition: mainloop.c:453
tor_tls_err_to_string
const char * tor_tls_err_to_string(int err)
Definition: tortls.c:155
or_connection_t::is_outgoing
unsigned int is_outgoing
Definition: or_connection_st.h:74
or_handshake_certs_t::started_here
int started_here
Definition: or_handshake_certs_st.h:21
connection_or_single_set_badness_
int connection_or_single_set_badness_(time_t now, or_connection_t *or_conn, int force)
Definition: connection_or.c:1025
connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here
int connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:1773
or_connection_t::tls_error
int tls_error
Definition: or_connection_st.h:45
connection_t::marked_for_close
uint16_t marked_for_close
Definition: connection_st.h:149
connection_or_num_cells_writeable
ssize_t connection_or_num_cells_writeable(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:649
connection_tls_start_handshake
int connection_tls_start_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving)
Definition: connection_or.c:1643
nodelist.h
Header file for nodelist.c.
broken_state_count_t
Definition: connection_or.c:306
connection_or_set_state_open
int connection_or_set_state_open(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2261
routerlist.h
Header file for routerlist.c.
var_cell_t::payload_len
uint16_t payload_len
Definition: var_cell_st.h:22
relay_handshake.h
Header for feature/relay/relay_handshake.c.
or_handshake_certs_new
or_handshake_certs_t * or_handshake_certs_new(void)
Definition: torcert.c:471
router_get_consensus_status_by_id
const routerstatus_t * router_get_consensus_status_by_id(const char *digest)
Definition: networkstatus.c:843
assert_connection_ok
void assert_connection_ok(connection_t *conn, time_t now)
Definition: connection.c:5559
channel_listener_queue_incoming
void channel_listener_queue_incoming(channel_listener_t *listener, channel_t *incoming)
Definition: channel.c:1925
connection_t::addr
tor_addr_t addr
Definition: connection_st.h:145
routerinfo_st.h
Router descriptor structure.
circuitstats.h
Header file for circuitstats.c.
token_bucket_rw_reset
void token_bucket_rw_reset(token_bucket_rw_t *bucket, uint32_t now_ts)
Definition: token_bucket.c:167
connection_start_writing
void connection_start_writing(connection_t *conn)
Definition: mainloop.c:689
buffers.h
Header file for buffers.c.
connection_or_notify_error
void connection_or_notify_error(or_connection_t *conn, int reason, const char *msg)
Definition: connection_or.c:1410
cell_t::command
uint8_t command
Definition: cell_st.h:19
cell_t::payload
uint8_t payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE]
Definition: cell_st.h:21
channel_t
Definition: channel.h:181
PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL
@ PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL
Definition: rephist.h:133
HT_HEAD
typedef HT_HEAD(hs_service_ht, hs_service_t) hs_service_ht
tor_tls_is_server
int tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls.c:379
OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2
#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2
Definition: orconn_event.h:47
connection_tls_finish_handshake
static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2084
channel_tls_start_listener
channel_listener_t * channel_tls_start_listener(void)
Definition: channeltls.c:266
channel_t::ed25519_identity
struct ed25519_public_key_t ed25519_identity
Definition: channel.h:388
crypto_digest256_new
crypto_digest_t * crypto_digest256_new(digest_algorithm_t algorithm)
Definition: crypto_digest_nss.c:272
connection_t
Definition: connection_st.h:45
connection_t::type
unsigned int type
Definition: connection_st.h:50
rep_hist_padding_count_write
void rep_hist_padding_count_write(padding_type_t type)
Definition: rephist.c:2108
connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake
static int connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2129
or_handshake_certs_st.h
OR handshake certs structure.
packed_cell_t::body
char body[CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE]
Definition: cell_queue_st.h:21
ext_orport.h
Header for ext_orport.c.
LOG_INFO
#define LOG_INFO
Definition: log.h:45
dirserv_orconn_tls_done
void dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t or_port, const char *digest_rcvd, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id_rcvd)
Definition: reachability.c:40
fmt_addr
#define fmt_addr(a)
Definition: address.h:239
connection_free_
void connection_free_(connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection.c:963
node_get_pref_ipv6_orport
void node_get_pref_ipv6_orport(const node_t *node, tor_addr_port_t *ap_out)
Definition: nodelist.c:1777
connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf
static int connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(or_connection_t *or_conn, var_cell_t **out)
Definition: connection_or.c:2345
control_events.h
Header file for control_events.c.
get_options
const or_options_t * get_options(void)
Definition: config.c:932
bool_eq
#define bool_eq(a, b)
Definition: logic.h:16
or_state_st.h
The or_state_t structure, which represents Tor's state file.
n_or_protocol_versions
static const int n_or_protocol_versions
Definition: connection_or.c:2421
or_options_t::PerConnBWBurst
uint64_t PerConnBWBurst
Definition: or_options_st.h:427
var_cell_st.h
Variable-length cell structure.
circuitbuild.h
Header file for circuitbuild.c.
connection_watch_events
void connection_watch_events(connection_t *conn, watchable_events_t events)
Definition: mainloop.c:495
tor_tls_set_logged_address
void tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address)
Definition: tortls.c:369
connection_or_note_state_when_broken
static void connection_or_note_state_when_broken(or_connection_t *orconn)
Definition: connection_or.c:295
get_uint32
static uint32_t get_uint32(const void *cp)
Definition: bytes.h:54
OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3
#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3
Definition: orconn_event.h:51
crypto_digest_free
#define crypto_digest_free(d)
Definition: crypto_digest.h:130
connection_or_close_for_error
void connection_or_close_for_error(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush)
Definition: connection_or.c:1618
scheduler_channel_wants_writes
void scheduler_channel_wants_writes(channel_t *chan)
Definition: scheduler.c:673
connection_connect
int connection_connect(connection_t *conn, const char *address, const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, int *socket_error)
Definition: connection.c:2377
get_proxy_addrport
int get_proxy_addrport(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t *port, int *proxy_type, int *is_pt_out, const connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection.c:5704
connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf
static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2359
channel_clear_identity_digest
void channel_clear_identity_digest(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:1302
set_uint32
static void set_uint32(void *cp, uint32_t v)
Definition: bytes.h:87
or_connection_t::proxy_type
unsigned int proxy_type
Definition: or_connection_st.h:75
IF_BUG_ONCE
#define IF_BUG_ONCE(cond)
Definition: util_bug.h:246
channel_tls_handle_incoming
channel_t * channel_tls_handle_incoming(or_connection_t *orconn)
Definition: channeltls.c:329
or_connect_failure_entry_t
Definition: connection_or.c:1197
OR_CONN_HIGHWATER
#define OR_CONN_HIGHWATER
Definition: or.h:721
connection_describe
const char * connection_describe(const connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection.c:544
connection_or_check_canonicity
static void connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
Definition: connection_or.c:935
relay.h
Header file for relay.c.
channel_is_bad_for_new_circs
int channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:2865
connection.h
Header file for connection.c.
connection_buf_get_bytes
int connection_buf_get_bytes(char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection.c:4197
channeltls.h
Header file for channeltls.c.
connection_read_proxy_handshake
int connection_read_proxy_handshake(connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection.c:2884
connection_or_write_cell_to_buf
void connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2284
connection_or_report_broken_states
void connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain)
Definition: connection_or.c:331
node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication
bool node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(const node_t *node, bool compatible_with_us)
Definition: nodelist.c:1155
connection_or_about_to_close
void connection_or_about_to_close(or_connection_t *or_conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:760
monotime_coarse_get_stamp
uint32_t monotime_coarse_get_stamp(void)
Definition: compat_time.c:844
OR_CONN_LOWWATER
#define OR_CONN_LOWWATER
Definition: or.h:725
or_handshake_state_t
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:18
server_mode
int server_mode(const or_options_t *options)
Definition: routermode.c:34
LD_HANDSHAKE
#define LD_HANDSHAKE
Definition: log.h:101
connection_or_init_conn_from_address
void connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn, const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *id_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, int started_here)
Definition: connection_or.c:906
tor_addr_is_null
int tor_addr_is_null(const tor_addr_t *addr)
Definition: address.c:780
or_handshake_state_t::certs
or_handshake_certs_t * certs
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:79
connection_or_update_token_buckets
void connection_or_update_token_buckets(smartlist_t *conns, const or_options_t *options)
Definition: connection_or.c:865
var_cell_t::circ_id
circid_t circ_id
Definition: var_cell_st.h:20
channel_listener_t
Definition: channel.h:461
or_connection_st.h
OR connection structure.
or_connection_t::canonical_orport
tor_addr_port_t canonical_orport
Definition: or_connection_st.h:64
tor_tls_new
tor_tls_t * tor_tls_new(tor_socket_t sock, int is_server)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:409
token_bucket_rw_adjust
void token_bucket_rw_adjust(token_bucket_rw_t *bucket, uint32_t rate, uint32_t burst)
Definition: token_bucket.c:152
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN
#define SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(sl, type, var)
Definition: smartlist_foreach.h:78
node_get_nickname
const char * node_get_nickname(const node_t *node)
Definition: nodelist.c:1370
crypto_pk_t
Definition: crypto_rsa_nss.c:37
node_get_prim_orport
void node_get_prim_orport(const node_t *node, tor_addr_port_t *ap_out)
Definition: nodelist.c:1741
public_server_mode
int public_server_mode(const or_options_t *options)
Definition: routermode.c:43
HEX_DIGEST_LEN
#define HEX_DIGEST_LEN
Definition: crypto_digest.h:35
LOG_WARN
#define LOG_WARN
Definition: log.h:53
connection_or_get_state_description
static void connection_or_get_state_description(or_connection_t *orconn, char *buf, size_t buflen)
Definition: connection_or.c:277
orconn_event.h
Header file for orconn_event.c.
or_handshake_state_t::own_link_cert
struct tor_cert_st * own_link_cert
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:45
or_conn_status_event_t
or_conn_status_event_t
Definition: orconn_event.h:59
tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason
int tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(int e)
Definition: reasons.c:263
tor_tls_verify
int tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity)
Definition: tortls.c:416
get_uint8
static uint8_t get_uint8(const void *cp)
Definition: bytes.h:23
cell_st.h
Fixed-size cell structure.
channel_tls_handle_var_cell
void channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell_t *var_cell, or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: channeltls.c:1182
var_cell_new
var_cell_t * var_cell_new(uint16_t payload_len)
Definition: connection_or.c:510
connection_t::magic
uint32_t magic
Definition: connection_st.h:46
connection_or_digest_is_known_relay
int connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(const char *id_digest)
Definition: connection_or.c:813
cell_pack
void cell_pack(packed_cell_t *dst, const cell_t *src, int wide_circ_ids)
Definition: connection_or.c:453
HT_PROTOTYPE
HT_PROTOTYPE(hs_circuitmap_ht, circuit_t, hs_circuitmap_node, hs_circuit_hash_token, hs_circuits_have_same_token)
router_ed25519_id_is_me
int router_ed25519_id_is_me(const ed25519_public_key_t *id)
Definition: routerkeys.c:631
tor_tls_handshake
int tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:609
config.h
Header file for config.c.
orconn_state_msg_t
Definition: orconn_event.h:75
connection_t::s
tor_socket_t s
Definition: connection_st.h:96
get_uint16
static uint16_t get_uint16(const void *cp)
Definition: bytes.h:42
authdir_mode_tests_reachability
int authdir_mode_tests_reachability(const or_options_t *options)
Definition: authmode.c:68
or_handshake_state_record_var_cell
void or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(or_connection_t *conn, or_handshake_state_t *state, const var_cell_t *cell, int incoming)
Definition: connection_or.c:2229
connection_t::timestamp_created
time_t timestamp_created
Definition: connection_st.h:109
control_event_bootstrap_prob_or
void control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(const char *warn, int reason, or_connection_t *or_conn)
Definition: control_bootstrap.c:347
LD_NET
#define LD_NET
Definition: log.h:66
tor_tls_block_renegotiation
void tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:643
channel_set_circid_type
void channel_set_circid_type(channel_t *chan, crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd, int consider_identity)
Definition: channel.c:3333
tor_log
void tor_log(int severity, log_domain_mask_t domain, const char *format,...)
Definition: log.c:590
connection_t::state
uint8_t state
Definition: connection_st.h:49
sa_family_t
uint16_t sa_family_t
Definition: inaddr_st.h:77
or_options_t
Definition: or_options_st.h:64
orconn_state_msg_t::chan
uint64_t chan
Definition: orconn_event.h:77
connection_or_close_normally
void connection_or_close_normally(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush)
Definition: connection_or.c:1597
TO_CONN
#define TO_CONN(c)
Definition: or.h:736
set_uint16
static void set_uint16(void *cp, uint16_t v)
Definition: bytes.h:78
var_cell_t::payload
uint8_t payload[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER]
Definition: var_cell_st.h:24
or_handshake_state_st.h
OR handshake state structure.
STATIC
#define STATIC
Definition: testsupport.h:32
cell_queue_st.h
Cell queue structures.
tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback
void tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls, void(*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg), void *arg)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:468
orconn_end_reason_to_control_string
const char * orconn_end_reason_to_control_string(int r)
Definition: reasons.c:225
var_cell_t::command
uint8_t command
Definition: var_cell_st.h:18
channel_num_circuits
unsigned int channel_num_circuits(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:3316
entry_guard_chan_failed
void entry_guard_chan_failed(channel_t *chan)
Definition: entrynodes.c:2557
broken_connection_counts
static strmap_t * broken_connection_counts
Definition: connection_or.c:236
networkstatus_get_param
int32_t networkstatus_get_param(const networkstatus_t *ns, const char *param_name, int32_t default_val, int32_t min_val, int32_t max_val)
Definition: networkstatus.c:2500
or_options_t::BandwidthBurst
uint64_t BandwidthBurst
Definition: or_options_st.h:418
connection_or_connect
or_connection_t * connection_or_connect(const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port, const char *id_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, channel_tls_t *chan)
Definition: connection_or.c:1453
var_cell_t
Definition: var_cell_st.h:16
connection_or_group_set_badness_
void connection_or_group_set_badness_(smartlist_t *group, int force)
Definition: connection_or.c:1067
WRITE_EVENT
@ WRITE_EVENT
Definition: mainloop.h:38
channel_tls_to_base
channel_t * channel_tls_to_base(channel_tls_t *tlschan)
Definition: channeltls.c:396
proto_cell.h
Header for proto_cell.c.
smartlist_sort
void smartlist_sort(smartlist_t *sl, int(*compare)(const void **a, const void **b))
Definition: smartlist.c:334
cell_t::circ_id
circid_t circ_id
Definition: cell_st.h:18
or_connection_t::tls
struct tor_tls_t * tls
Definition: or_connection_st.h:44
orconn_status_msg_t::gid
uint64_t gid
Definition: orconn_event.h:91
tor_addr_to_in6_addr8
#define tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(x)
Definition: address.h:135
or_protocol_versions
static const uint16_t or_protocol_versions[]
Definition: connection_or.c:2419
PADDING_TYPE_CELL
@ PADDING_TYPE_CELL
Definition: rephist.h:131
or_connection_t::identity_digest
char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]
Definition: or_connection_st.h:27
smartlist_t
Definition: smartlist_core.h:26
TO_OR_CONN
or_connection_t * TO_OR_CONN(connection_t *c)
Definition: connection_or.c:108
fast_memeq
#define fast_memeq(a, b, c)
Definition: di_ops.h:35
channel_set_identity_digest
void channel_set_identity_digest(channel_t *chan, const char *identity_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_identity)
Definition: channel.c:1331
tor_addr_eq
#define tor_addr_eq(a, b)
Definition: address.h:280
connection_t::proxy_state
unsigned int proxy_state
Definition: connection_st.h:92
rendcommon.h
Header file for rendcommon.c.
rephist.h
Header file for rephist.c.
connection_or_set_identity_digest
static void connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn, const char *rsa_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
Definition: connection_or.c:157
connection_or.h
Header file for connection_or.c.
disable_broken_connection_counts
static int disable_broken_connection_counts
Definition: connection_or.c:239
tor_addr_copy
void tor_addr_copy(tor_addr_t *dest, const tor_addr_t *src)
Definition: address.c:933
channel_close_for_error
void channel_close_for_error(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:1244
or_connection_t::nickname
char * nickname
Definition: or_connection_st.h:42
or.h
Master header file for Tor-specific functionality.
connection_t::global_identifier
uint64_t global_identifier
Definition: connection_st.h:171
channel_closed
void channel_closed(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:1271
connection_or_get_num_circuits
int connection_or_get_num_circuits(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:434
connection_or_connect_failed
void connection_or_connect_failed(or_connection_t *conn, int reason, const char *msg)
Definition: connection_or.c:1394
LD_PROTOCOL
#define LD_PROTOCOL
Definition: log.h:72