Tor  0.4.7.0-alpha-dev
connection_or.c
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1 /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
2  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
3  * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
4  * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
5 /* See LICENSE for licensing information */
6 
7 /**
8  * \file connection_or.c
9  * \brief Functions to handle OR connections, TLS handshaking, and
10  * cells on the network.
11  *
12  * An or_connection_t is a subtype of connection_t (as implemented in
13  * connection.c) that uses a TLS connection to send and receive cells on the
14  * Tor network. (By sending and receiving cells connection_or.c, it cooperates
15  * with channeltls.c to implement a the channel interface of channel.c.)
16  *
17  * Every OR connection has an underlying tortls_t object (as implemented in
18  * tortls.c) which it uses as its TLS stream. It is responsible for
19  * sending and receiving cells over that TLS.
20  *
21  * This module also implements the client side of the v3 (and greater) Tor
22  * link handshake.
23  **/
24 #include "core/or/or.h"
25 #include "feature/client/bridges.h"
26 #include "lib/buf/buffers.h"
27 /*
28  * Define this so we get channel internal functions, since we're implementing
29  * part of a subclass (channel_tls_t).
30  */
31 #define CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE
32 #define CONNECTION_OR_PRIVATE
33 #define ORCONN_EVENT_PRIVATE
34 #include "core/or/channel.h"
35 #include "core/or/channeltls.h"
36 #include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
37 #include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
38 #include "core/or/circuitstats.h"
39 #include "core/or/command.h"
40 #include "app/config/config.h"
42 #include "core/or/connection_or.h"
48 #include "lib/geoip/geoip.h"
49 #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
50 #include "trunnel/netinfo.h"
54 #include "core/proto/proto_cell.h"
55 #include "core/or/reasons.h"
56 #include "core/or/relay.h"
58 #include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
59 #include "feature/relay/router.h"
65 #include "core/or/scheduler.h"
67 #include "core/or/channelpadding.h"
69 #include "feature/hs/hs_service.h"
70 
71 #include "core/or/cell_st.h"
72 #include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h"
76 #include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
78 #include "core/or/var_cell_st.h"
80 
81 #include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
82 
83 #include "core/or/orconn_event.h"
84 
89  int started_here,
90  char *digest_rcvd_out);
91 
92 static void connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn);
93 
94 static unsigned int
96 static void connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn);
97 
99  int started_here);
100 
101 /**************************************************************/
102 
103 /**
104  * Cast a `connection_t *` to an `or_connection_t *`.
105  *
106  * Exit with an assertion failure if the input is not an `or_connnection_t`.
107  **/
110 {
111  tor_assert(c->magic == OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
112  return DOWNCAST(or_connection_t, c);
113 }
114 
115 /**
116  * Cast a `const connection_t *` to a `const or_connection_t *`.
117  *
118  * Exit with an assertion failure if the input is not an `or_connnection_t`.
119  **/
120 const or_connection_t *
122 {
123  return TO_OR_CONN((connection_t *)c);
124 }
125 
126 /** Clear clear conn->identity_digest and update other data
127  * structures as appropriate.*/
128 void
130 {
131  tor_assert(conn);
132  memset(conn->identity_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
133 }
134 
135 /** Clear all identities in OR conns.*/
136 void
138 {
140  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn,
141  {
142  if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {
143  connection_or_clear_identity(TO_OR_CONN(conn));
144  }
145  });
146 }
147 
148 /** Change conn->identity_digest to digest, and add conn into
149  * the appropriate digest maps.
150  *
151  * NOTE that this function only allows two kinds of transitions: from
152  * unset identity to set identity, and from idempotent re-settings
153  * of the same identity. It's not allowed to clear an identity or to
154  * change an identity. Return 0 on success, and -1 if the transition
155  * is not allowed.
156  **/
157 static void
159  const char *rsa_digest,
160  const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
161 {
162  channel_t *chan = NULL;
163  tor_assert(conn);
164  tor_assert(rsa_digest);
165 
166  if (conn->chan)
167  chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
168 
169  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Set identity digest for %s at %p: %s %s.",
171  conn,
172  hex_str(rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
173  ed25519_fmt(ed_id));
174  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, " (Previously: %s %s)",
176  chan ? ed25519_fmt(&chan->ed25519_identity) : "<null>");
177 
178  const int rsa_id_was_set = ! tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest);
179  const int ed_id_was_set =
181  const int rsa_changed =
182  tor_memneq(conn->identity_digest, rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
183  const int ed_changed = ed_id_was_set &&
184  (!ed_id || !ed25519_pubkey_eq(ed_id, &chan->ed25519_identity));
185 
186  tor_assert(!rsa_changed || !rsa_id_was_set);
187  tor_assert(!ed_changed || !ed_id_was_set);
188 
189  if (!rsa_changed && !ed_changed)
190  return;
191 
192  /* If the identity was set previously, remove the old mapping. */
193  if (rsa_id_was_set) {
195  if (chan)
197  }
198 
199  memcpy(conn->identity_digest, rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
200 
201  /* If we're initializing the IDs to zero, don't add a mapping yet. */
202  if (tor_digest_is_zero(rsa_digest) &&
203  (!ed_id || ed25519_public_key_is_zero(ed_id)))
204  return;
205 
206  /* Deal with channels */
207  if (chan)
208  channel_set_identity_digest(chan, rsa_digest, ed_id);
209 }
210 
211 /**
212  * Return the Ed25519 identity of the peer for this connection (if any).
213  *
214  * Note that this ID may not be the _actual_ identity for the peer if
215  * authentication is not complete.
216  **/
217 const struct ed25519_public_key_t *
219 {
220  if (conn && conn->chan) {
221  const channel_t *chan = NULL;
222  chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
224  return &chan->ed25519_identity;
225  }
226  }
227 
228  return NULL;
229 }
230 
231 /**************************************************************/
232 
233 /** Map from a string describing what a non-open OR connection was doing when
234  * failed, to an intptr_t describing the count of connections that failed that
235  * way. Note that the count is stored _as_ the pointer.
236  */
237 static strmap_t *broken_connection_counts;
238 
239 /** If true, do not record information in <b>broken_connection_counts</b>. */
241 
242 /** Record that an OR connection failed in <b>state</b>. */
243 static void
244 note_broken_connection(const char *state)
245 {
246  void *ptr;
247  intptr_t val;
249  return;
250 
252  broken_connection_counts = strmap_new();
253 
254  ptr = strmap_get(broken_connection_counts, state);
255  val = (intptr_t)ptr;
256  val++;
257  ptr = (void*)val;
258  strmap_set(broken_connection_counts, state, ptr);
259 }
260 
261 /** Forget all recorded states for failed connections. If
262  * <b>stop_recording</b> is true, don't record any more. */
263 void
264 clear_broken_connection_map(int stop_recording)
265 {
267  strmap_free(broken_connection_counts, NULL);
269  if (stop_recording)
271 }
272 
273 /** Write a detailed description the state of <b>orconn</b> into the
274  * <b>buflen</b>-byte buffer at <b>buf</b>. This description includes not
275  * only the OR-conn level state but also the TLS state. It's useful for
276  * diagnosing broken handshakes. */
277 static void
279  char *buf, size_t buflen)
280 {
281  connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(orconn);
282  const char *conn_state;
283  char tls_state[256];
284 
285  tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR || conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR);
286 
287  conn_state = conn_state_to_string(conn->type, conn->state);
288  tor_tls_get_state_description(orconn->tls, tls_state, sizeof(tls_state));
289 
290  tor_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s with SSL state %s", conn_state, tls_state);
291 }
292 
293 /** Record the current state of <b>orconn</b> as the state of a broken
294  * connection. */
295 static void
297 {
298  char buf[256];
300  return;
301  connection_or_get_state_description(orconn, buf, sizeof(buf));
302  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Connection died in state '%s'", buf);
304 }
305 
306 /** Helper type used to sort connection states and find the most frequent. */
307 typedef struct broken_state_count_t {
308  intptr_t count;
309  const char *state;
311 
312 /** Helper function used to sort broken_state_count_t by frequency. */
313 static int
314 broken_state_count_compare(const void **a_ptr, const void **b_ptr)
315 {
316  const broken_state_count_t *a = *a_ptr, *b = *b_ptr;
317  if (b->count < a->count)
318  return -1;
319  else if (b->count == a->count)
320  return 0;
321  else
322  return 1;
323 }
324 
325 /** Upper limit on the number of different states to report for connection
326  * failure. */
327 #define MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT 10
328 
329 /** Report a list of the top states for failed OR connections at log level
330  * <b>severity</b>, in log domain <b>domain</b>. */
331 void
332 connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain)
333 {
334  int total = 0;
335  smartlist_t *items;
336 
338  return;
339 
340  items = smartlist_new();
341  STRMAP_FOREACH(broken_connection_counts, state, void *, countptr) {
342  broken_state_count_t *c = tor_malloc(sizeof(broken_state_count_t));
343  c->count = (intptr_t)countptr;
344  total += (int)c->count;
345  c->state = state;
346  smartlist_add(items, c);
347  } STRMAP_FOREACH_END;
348 
350 
351  tor_log(severity, domain, "%d connections have failed%s", total,
352  smartlist_len(items) > MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT ? ". Top reasons:" : ":");
353 
354  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(items, const broken_state_count_t *, c) {
355  if (c_sl_idx > MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT)
356  break;
357  tor_log(severity, domain,
358  " %d connections died in state %s", (int)c->count, c->state);
359  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(c);
360 
362  smartlist_free(items);
363 }
364 
365 /**
366  * Helper function to publish an OR connection status event
367  *
368  * Publishes a messages to subscribers of ORCONN messages, and sends
369  * the control event.
370  **/
371 void
373  int reason)
374 {
375  orconn_status_msg_t *msg = tor_malloc(sizeof(*msg));
376 
377  msg->gid = conn->base_.global_identifier;
378  msg->status = tp;
379  msg->reason = reason;
380  orconn_status_publish(msg);
381  control_event_or_conn_status(conn, tp, reason);
382 }
383 
384 /**
385  * Helper function to publish a state change message
386  *
387  * connection_or_change_state() calls this to notify subscribers about
388  * a change of an OR connection state.
389  **/
390 static void
391 connection_or_state_publish(const or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)
392 {
393  orconn_state_msg_t *msg = tor_malloc(sizeof(*msg));
394 
395  msg->gid = conn->base_.global_identifier;
396  if (conn->is_pt) {
397  /* Do extra decoding because conn->proxy_type indicates the proxy
398  * protocol that tor uses to talk with the transport plugin,
399  * instead of PROXY_PLUGGABLE. */
400  tor_assert_nonfatal(conn->proxy_type != PROXY_NONE);
401  msg->proxy_type = PROXY_PLUGGABLE;
402  } else {
403  msg->proxy_type = conn->proxy_type;
404  }
405  msg->state = state;
406  if (conn->chan) {
407  msg->chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->global_identifier;
408  } else {
409  msg->chan = 0;
410  }
411  orconn_state_publish(msg);
412 }
413 
414 /** Call this to change or_connection_t states, so the owning channel_tls_t can
415  * be notified.
416  */
417 
418 MOCK_IMPL(void,
420 {
421  tor_assert(conn);
422 
423  conn->base_.state = state;
424 
425  connection_or_state_publish(conn, state);
426  if (conn->chan)
428 }
429 
430 /** Return the number of circuits using an or_connection_t; this used to
431  * be an or_connection_t field, but it got moved to channel_t and we
432  * shouldn't maintain two copies. */
433 
434 MOCK_IMPL(int,
436 {
437  tor_assert(conn);
438 
439  if (conn->chan) {
440  return channel_num_circuits(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
441  } else return 0;
442 }
443 
444 /**************************************************************/
445 
446 /** Pack the cell_t host-order structure <b>src</b> into network-order
447  * in the buffer <b>dest</b>. See tor-spec.txt for details about the
448  * wire format.
449  *
450  * Note that this function doesn't touch <b>dst</b>->next: the caller
451  * should set it or clear it as appropriate.
452  */
453 void
454 cell_pack(packed_cell_t *dst, const cell_t *src, int wide_circ_ids)
455 {
456  char *dest = dst->body;
457  if (wide_circ_ids) {
458  set_uint32(dest, htonl(src->circ_id));
459  dest += 4;
460  } else {
461  /* Clear the last two bytes of dest, in case we can accidentally
462  * send them to the network somehow. */
463  memset(dest+CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE-2, 0, 2);
464  set_uint16(dest, htons(src->circ_id));
465  dest += 2;
466  }
467  set_uint8(dest, src->command);
468  memcpy(dest+1, src->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
469 }
470 
471 /** Unpack the network-order buffer <b>src</b> into a host-order
472  * cell_t structure <b>dest</b>.
473  */
474 static void
475 cell_unpack(cell_t *dest, const char *src, int wide_circ_ids)
476 {
477  if (wide_circ_ids) {
478  dest->circ_id = ntohl(get_uint32(src));
479  src += 4;
480  } else {
481  dest->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(src));
482  src += 2;
483  }
484  dest->command = get_uint8(src);
485  memcpy(dest->payload, src+1, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
486 }
487 
488 /** Write the header of <b>cell</b> into the first VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE
489  * bytes of <b>hdr_out</b>. Returns number of bytes used. */
490 int
491 var_cell_pack_header(const var_cell_t *cell, char *hdr_out, int wide_circ_ids)
492 {
493  int r;
494  if (wide_circ_ids) {
495  set_uint32(hdr_out, htonl(cell->circ_id));
496  hdr_out += 4;
498  } else {
499  set_uint16(hdr_out, htons(cell->circ_id));
500  hdr_out += 2;
501  r = VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE - 2;
502  }
503  set_uint8(hdr_out, cell->command);
504  set_uint16(hdr_out+1, htons(cell->payload_len));
505  return r;
506 }
507 
508 /** Allocate and return a new var_cell_t with <b>payload_len</b> bytes of
509  * payload space. */
510 var_cell_t *
511 var_cell_new(uint16_t payload_len)
512 {
513  size_t size = offsetof(var_cell_t, payload) + payload_len;
514  var_cell_t *cell = tor_malloc_zero(size);
515  cell->payload_len = payload_len;
516  cell->command = 0;
517  cell->circ_id = 0;
518  return cell;
519 }
520 
521 /**
522  * Copy a var_cell_t
523  */
524 
525 var_cell_t *
527 {
528  var_cell_t *copy = NULL;
529  size_t size = 0;
530 
531  if (src != NULL) {
532  size = offsetof(var_cell_t, payload) + src->payload_len;
533  copy = tor_malloc_zero(size);
534  copy->payload_len = src->payload_len;
535  copy->command = src->command;
536  copy->circ_id = src->circ_id;
537  memcpy(copy->payload, src->payload, copy->payload_len);
538  }
539 
540  return copy;
541 }
542 
543 /** Release all space held by <b>cell</b>. */
544 void
546 {
547  tor_free(cell);
548 }
549 
550 /** We've received an EOF from <b>conn</b>. Mark it for close and return. */
551 int
553 {
554  tor_assert(conn);
555 
556  log_info(LD_OR,"OR connection reached EOF. Closing.");
558 
559  return 0;
560 }
561 
562 /** Handle any new bytes that have come in on connection <b>conn</b>.
563  * If conn is in 'open' state, hand it to
564  * connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf()
565  * (else do nothing).
566  */
567 int
569 {
570  int ret = 0;
571  tor_assert(conn);
572 
573  switch (conn->base_.state) {
576 
577  /* start TLS after handshake completion, or deal with error */
578  if (ret == 1) {
579  tor_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->proxy_state == PROXY_CONNECTED);
580  if (buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf) != 0) {
581  log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Found leftover (%d bytes) "
582  "when transitioning from PROXY_HANDSHAKING state on %s: "
583  "closing.",
584  (int)buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf),
587  return -1;
588  }
589  if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0)
590  ret = -1;
591  /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
592  if (conn->chan)
593  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
594  }
595  if (ret < 0) {
597  }
598 
599  return ret;
601  case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
605  default:
606  break; /* don't do anything */
607  }
608 
609  /* This check makes sure that we don't have any data on the inbuf if we're
610  * doing our TLS handshake: if we did, they were probably put there by a
611  * SOCKS proxy trying to trick us into accepting unauthenticated data.
612  */
613  if (buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf) != 0) {
614  log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Accumulated data (%d bytes) "
615  "on non-open %s; closing.",
616  (int)buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf),
619  ret = -1;
620  }
621 
622  return ret;
623 }
624 
625 /** Called whenever we have flushed some data on an or_conn: add more data
626  * from active circuits. */
627 int
629 {
630  size_t datalen;
631 
632  /* Update the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
633  if (conn->chan)
634  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
635 
636  /* If we're under the low water mark, add cells until we're just over the
637  * high water mark. */
638  datalen = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
639  if (datalen < OR_CONN_LOWWATER) {
640  /* Let the scheduler know */
641  scheduler_channel_wants_writes(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
642  }
643 
644  return 0;
645 }
646 
647 /** This is for channeltls.c to ask how many cells we could accept if
648  * they were available. */
649 ssize_t
651 {
652  size_t datalen, cell_network_size;
653  ssize_t n = 0;
654 
655  tor_assert(conn);
656 
657  /*
658  * If we're under the high water mark, we're potentially
659  * writeable; note this is different from the calculation above
660  * used to trigger when to start writing after we've stopped.
661  */
662  datalen = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
663  if (datalen < OR_CONN_HIGHWATER) {
664  cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
665  n = CEIL_DIV(OR_CONN_HIGHWATER - datalen, cell_network_size);
666  }
667 
668  return n;
669 }
670 
671 /** Connection <b>conn</b> has finished writing and has no bytes left on
672  * its outbuf.
673  *
674  * Otherwise it's in state "open": stop writing and return.
675  *
676  * If <b>conn</b> is broken, mark it for close and return -1, else
677  * return 0.
678  */
679 int
681 {
682  tor_assert(conn);
683  assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn),0);
684 
685  switch (conn->base_.state) {
687  /* PROXY_HAPROXY gets connected by receiving an ack. */
688  if (conn->proxy_type == PROXY_HAPROXY) {
689  tor_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->proxy_state == PROXY_HAPROXY_WAIT_FOR_FLUSH);
690  IF_BUG_ONCE(buf_datalen(TO_CONN(conn)->inbuf) != 0) {
691  /* This should be impossible; we're not even reading. */
693  return -1;
694  }
695  TO_CONN(conn)->proxy_state = PROXY_CONNECTED;
696 
697  if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0) {
698  /* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
700  return -1;
701  }
702  break;
703  }
704  break;
705  case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
708  break;
709  default:
710  log_err(LD_BUG,"Called in unexpected state %d.", conn->base_.state);
712  return -1;
713  }
714 
715  /* Update the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
716  if (conn->chan)
717  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
718 
719  return 0;
720 }
721 
722 /** Connected handler for OR connections: begin the TLS handshake.
723  */
724 int
726 {
727  const int proxy_type = or_conn->proxy_type;
728  connection_t *conn;
729 
730  tor_assert(or_conn);
731  conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
733 
734  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"connect finished for %s",
735  connection_describe(conn));
736 
737  if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) {
738  /* start proxy handshake */
739  if (connection_proxy_connect(conn, proxy_type) < 0) {
740  connection_or_close_for_error(or_conn, 0);
741  return -1;
742  }
743 
746 
747  return 0;
748  }
749 
750  if (connection_tls_start_handshake(or_conn, 0) < 0) {
751  /* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
752  connection_or_close_for_error(or_conn, 0);
753  return -1;
754  }
755  return 0;
756 }
757 
758 /** Called when we're about to finally unlink and free an OR connection:
759  * perform necessary accounting and cleanup */
760 void
762 {
763  connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
764 
765  /* Tell the controlling channel we're closed */
766  if (or_conn->chan) {
767  channel_closed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
768  /*
769  * NULL this out because the channel might hang around a little
770  * longer before channel_run_cleanup() gets it.
771  */
772  or_conn->chan->conn = NULL;
773  or_conn->chan = NULL;
774  }
775 
776  /* Remember why we're closing this connection. */
777  if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
778  /* now mark things down as needed */
780  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
782  /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */
783  entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
784  if (conn->state >= OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) {
785  int reason = tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error);
786  connection_or_event_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
787  reason);
788  if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) {
789  const char *warning = NULL;
790  if (reason == END_OR_CONN_REASON_TLS_ERROR && or_conn->tls) {
791  warning = tor_tls_get_last_error_msg(or_conn->tls);
792  }
793  if (warning == NULL) {
794  warning = orconn_end_reason_to_control_string(reason);
795  }
796  control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(warning, reason, or_conn);
797  }
798  }
799  }
800  } else if (conn->hold_open_until_flushed) {
801  /* We only set hold_open_until_flushed when we're intentionally
802  * closing a connection. */
803  connection_or_event_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED,
805  } else if (!tor_digest_is_zero(or_conn->identity_digest)) {
806  connection_or_event_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED,
808  }
809 }
810 
811 /** Return 1 if identity digest <b>id_digest</b> is known to be a
812  * currently or recently running relay. Otherwise return 0. */
813 int
815 {
816  if (router_get_consensus_status_by_id(id_digest))
817  return 1; /* It's in the consensus: "yes" */
818  if (router_get_by_id_digest(id_digest))
819  return 1; /* Not in the consensus, but we have a descriptor for
820  * it. Probably it was in a recent consensus. "Yes". */
821  return 0;
822 }
823 
824 /** Set the per-conn read and write limits for <b>conn</b>. If it's a known
825  * relay, we will rely on the global read and write buckets, so give it
826  * per-conn limits that are big enough they'll never matter. But if it's
827  * not a known relay, first check if we set PerConnBwRate/Burst, then
828  * check if the consensus sets them, else default to 'big enough'.
829  *
830  * If <b>reset</b> is true, set the bucket to be full. Otherwise, just
831  * clip the bucket if it happens to be <em>too</em> full.
832  */
833 static void
835  const or_options_t *options)
836 {
837  int rate, burst; /* per-connection rate limiting params */
839  /* It's in the consensus, or we have a descriptor for it meaning it
840  * was probably in a recent consensus. It's a recognized relay:
841  * give it full bandwidth. */
842  rate = (int)options->BandwidthRate;
843  burst = (int)options->BandwidthBurst;
844  } else {
845  /* Not a recognized relay. Squeeze it down based on the suggested
846  * bandwidth parameters in the consensus, but allow local config
847  * options to override. */
848  rate = options->PerConnBWRate ? (int)options->PerConnBWRate :
849  networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "perconnbwrate",
850  (int)options->BandwidthRate, 1, INT32_MAX);
851  burst = options->PerConnBWBurst ? (int)options->PerConnBWBurst :
852  networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "perconnbwburst",
853  (int)options->BandwidthBurst, 1, INT32_MAX);
854  }
855 
856  token_bucket_rw_adjust(&conn->bucket, rate, burst);
857  if (reset) {
859  }
860 }
861 
862 /** Either our set of relays or our per-conn rate limits have changed.
863  * Go through all the OR connections and update their token buckets to make
864  * sure they don't exceed their maximum values. */
865 void
867  const or_options_t *options)
868 {
869  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn,
870  {
871  if (connection_speaks_cells(conn))
873  });
874 }
875 
876 /* Mark <b>or_conn</b> as canonical if <b>is_canonical</b> is set, and
877  * non-canonical otherwise. Adjust idle_timeout accordingly.
878  */
879 void
880 connection_or_set_canonical(or_connection_t *or_conn,
881  int is_canonical)
882 {
883  if (bool_eq(is_canonical, or_conn->is_canonical) &&
884  or_conn->idle_timeout != 0) {
885  /* Don't recalculate an existing idle_timeout unless the canonical
886  * status changed. */
887  return;
888  }
889 
890  or_conn->is_canonical = !! is_canonical; /* force to a 1-bit boolean */
892  TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan), is_canonical);
893 
894  log_info(LD_CIRC,
895  "Channel %"PRIu64 " chose an idle timeout of %d.",
896  or_conn->chan ?
897  (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan)->global_identifier):0,
898  or_conn->idle_timeout);
899 }
900 
901 /** If we don't necessarily know the router we're connecting to, but we
902  * have an addr/port/id_digest, then fill in as much as we can. Start
903  * by checking to see if this describes a router we know.
904  * <b>started_here</b> is 1 if we are the initiator of <b>conn</b> and
905  * 0 if it's an incoming connection. */
906 void
908  const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
909  const char *id_digest,
910  const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id,
911  int started_here)
912 {
913  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "init conn from address %s: %s, %s (%d)",
914  fmt_addr(addr),
915  hex_str((const char*)id_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
916  ed25519_fmt(ed_id),
917  started_here);
918 
919  connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn, id_digest, ed_id);
921 
922  conn->base_.port = port;
923  tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, addr);
924  if (! conn->base_.address) {
925  conn->base_.address = tor_strdup(fmt_addr(addr));
926  }
927 
928  connection_or_check_canonicity(conn, started_here);
929 }
930 
931 /** Check whether the identity of <b>conn</b> matches a known node. If it
932  * does, check whether the address of conn matches the expected address, and
933  * update the connection's is_canonical flag, nickname, and address fields as
934  * appropriate. */
935 static void
937 {
938  (void) started_here;
939 
940  const char *id_digest = conn->identity_digest;
941  const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id = NULL;
942  if (conn->chan)
943  ed_id = & TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->ed25519_identity;
944 
945  const node_t *r = node_get_by_id(id_digest);
946  if (r &&
948  ! node_ed25519_id_matches(r, ed_id)) {
949  /* If this node is capable of proving an ed25519 ID,
950  * we can't call this a canonical connection unless both IDs match. */
951  r = NULL;
952  }
953 
954  if (r) {
955  tor_addr_port_t node_ipv4_ap;
956  tor_addr_port_t node_ipv6_ap;
957  node_get_prim_orport(r, &node_ipv4_ap);
958  node_get_pref_ipv6_orport(r, &node_ipv6_ap);
959  if (tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ipv4_ap.addr) ||
960  tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ipv6_ap.addr)) {
961  connection_or_set_canonical(conn, 1);
962  }
963  /* Choose the correct canonical address and port. */
964  tor_addr_port_t *node_ap;
965  if (tor_addr_family(&conn->base_.addr) == AF_INET) {
966  node_ap = &node_ipv4_ap;
967  } else {
968  node_ap = &node_ipv6_ap;
969  }
970  /* Remember the canonical addr/port so our log messages will make
971  sense. */
972  tor_addr_port_copy(&conn->canonical_orport, node_ap);
973  tor_free(conn->nickname);
974  conn->nickname = tor_strdup(node_get_nickname(r));
975  } else {
976  tor_free(conn->nickname);
977  conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
978  conn->nickname[0] = '$';
980  conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
981  }
982 
983  /*
984  * We have to tell channeltls.c to update the channel marks (local, in
985  * particular), since we may have changed the address.
986  */
987 
988  if (conn->chan) {
990  }
991 }
992 
993 /** These just pass all the is_bad_for_new_circs manipulation on to
994  * channel_t */
995 
996 static unsigned int
998 {
999  tor_assert(or_conn);
1000 
1001  if (or_conn->chan)
1002  return channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
1003  else return 0;
1004 }
1005 
1006 static void
1007 connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn)
1008 {
1009  tor_assert(or_conn);
1010 
1011  if (or_conn->chan)
1012  channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
1013 }
1014 
1015 /** How old do we let a connection to an OR get before deciding it's
1016  * too old for new circuits? */
1017 #define TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD (60*60*24*7)
1018 
1019 /** Expire an or_connection if it is too old. Helper for
1020  * connection_or_group_set_badness_ and fast path for
1021  * channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness.
1022  *
1023  * Returns 1 if the connection was already expired, else 0.
1024  */
1025 int
1027  or_connection_t *or_conn,
1028  int force)
1029 {
1030  /* XXXX this function should also be about channels? */
1031  if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
1033  return 1;
1034 
1035  if (force ||
1037  < now) {
1038  log_info(LD_OR,
1039  "Marking %s as too old for new circuits "
1040  "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old).",
1041  connection_describe(TO_CONN(or_conn)),
1042  or_conn->base_.s,
1043  (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created));
1044  connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
1045  }
1046 
1047  return 0;
1048 }
1049 
1050 /** Given a list of all the or_connections with a given
1051  * identity, set elements of that list as is_bad_for_new_circs as
1052  * appropriate. Helper for connection_or_set_bad_connections().
1053  *
1054  * Specifically, we set the is_bad_for_new_circs flag on:
1055  * - all connections if <b>force</b> is true.
1056  * - all connections that are too old.
1057  * - all open non-canonical connections for which a canonical connection
1058  * exists to the same router.
1059  * - all open canonical connections for which a 'better' canonical
1060  * connection exists to the same router.
1061  * - all open non-canonical connections for which a 'better' non-canonical
1062  * connection exists to the same router at the same address.
1063  *
1064  * See channel_is_better() in channel.c for our idea of what makes one OR
1065  * connection better than another.
1066  */
1067 void
1069 {
1070  /* XXXX this function should be entirely about channels, not OR
1071  * XXXX connections. */
1072 
1073  or_connection_t *best = NULL;
1074  int n_old = 0, n_inprogress = 0, n_canonical = 0, n_other = 0;
1075  time_t now = time(NULL);
1076 
1077  /* Pass 1: expire everything that's old, and see what the status of
1078  * everything else is. */
1079  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
1080  if (connection_or_single_set_badness_(now, or_conn, force))
1081  continue;
1082 
1083  if (connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn)) {
1084  ++n_old;
1085  } else if (or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
1086  ++n_inprogress;
1087  } else if (or_conn->is_canonical) {
1088  ++n_canonical;
1089  } else {
1090  ++n_other;
1091  }
1092  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
1093 
1094  /* Pass 2: We know how about how good the best connection is.
1095  * expire everything that's worse, and find the very best if we can. */
1096  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
1097  if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
1099  continue; /* This one doesn't need to be marked bad. */
1100  if (or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
1101  continue; /* Don't mark anything bad until we have seen what happens
1102  * when the connection finishes. */
1103  if (n_canonical && !or_conn->is_canonical) {
1104  /* We have at least one open canonical connection to this router,
1105  * and this one is open but not canonical. Mark it bad. */
1106  log_info(LD_OR,
1107  "Marking %s unsuitable for new circuits: "
1108  "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). It is not "
1109  "canonical, and we have another connection to that OR that is.",
1110  connection_describe(TO_CONN(or_conn)),
1111  or_conn->base_.s,
1112  (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created));
1113  connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
1114  continue;
1115  }
1116 
1117  if (!best ||
1118  channel_is_better(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan),
1119  TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(best->chan))) {
1120  best = or_conn;
1121  }
1122  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
1123 
1124  if (!best)
1125  return;
1126 
1127  /* Pass 3: One connection to OR is best. If it's canonical, mark as bad
1128  * every other open connection. If it's non-canonical, mark as bad
1129  * every other open connection to the same address.
1130  *
1131  * XXXX This isn't optimal; if we have connections to an OR at multiple
1132  * addresses, we'd like to pick the best _for each address_, and mark as
1133  * bad every open connection that isn't best for its address. But this
1134  * can only occur in cases where the other OR is old (so we have no
1135  * canonical connection to it), or where all the connections to the OR are
1136  * at noncanonical addresses and we have no good direct connection (which
1137  * means we aren't at risk of attaching circuits to it anyway). As
1138  * 0.1.2.x dies out, the first case will go away, and the second one is
1139  * "mostly harmless", so a fix can wait until somebody is bored.
1140  */
1141  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
1142  if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
1144  or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
1145  continue;
1146  if (or_conn != best &&
1147  channel_is_better(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(best->chan),
1148  TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan))) {
1149  /* This isn't the best conn, _and_ the best conn is better than it */
1150  if (best->is_canonical) {
1151  log_info(LD_OR,
1152  "Marking %s as unsuitable for new circuits: "
1153  "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). "
1154  "We have a better canonical one "
1155  "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT"; %d secs old).",
1156  connection_describe(TO_CONN(or_conn)),
1157  or_conn->base_.s,
1158  (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
1159  best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
1160  connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
1161  } else if (tor_addr_eq(&TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr,
1162  &TO_CONN(best)->addr)) {
1163  log_info(LD_OR,
1164  "Marking %s unsuitable for new circuits: "
1165  "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). We have a better "
1166  "one with the "
1167  "same address (fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT"; %d secs old).",
1168  connection_describe(TO_CONN(or_conn)),
1169  or_conn->base_.s,
1170  (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
1171  best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
1172  connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
1173  }
1174  }
1175  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
1176 }
1177 
1178 /* Lifetime of a connection failure. After that, we'll retry. This is in
1179  * seconds. */
1180 #define OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_LIFETIME 60
1181 /* The interval to use with when to clean up the failure cache. */
1182 #define OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL 60
1183 
1184 /* When is the next time we have to cleanup the failure map. We keep this
1185  * because we clean it opportunistically. */
1186 static time_t or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts = 0;
1187 
1188 /* OR connection failure entry data structure. It is kept in the connection
1189  * failure map defined below and indexed by OR identity digest, address and
1190  * port.
1191  *
1192  * We need to identify a connection failure with these three values because we
1193  * want to avoid to wrongfully block a relay if someone is trying to
1194  * extend to a known identity digest but with the wrong IP/port. For instance,
1195  * it can happen if a relay changed its port but the client still has an old
1196  * descriptor with the old port. We want to stop connecting to that
1197  * IP/port/identity all together, not only the relay identity. */
1199  HT_ENTRY(or_connect_failure_entry_t) node;
1200  /* Identity digest of the connection where it is connecting to. */
1201  uint8_t identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
1202  /* This is the connection address from the base connection_t. After the
1203  * connection is checked for canonicity, the base address should represent
1204  * what we know instead of where we are connecting to. This is what we need
1205  * so we can correlate known relays within the consensus. */
1206  tor_addr_t addr;
1207  uint16_t port;
1208  /* Last time we were unable to connect. */
1209  time_t last_failed_connect_ts;
1211 
1212 /* Map where we keep connection failure entries. They are indexed by addr,
1213  * port and identity digest. */
1214 static HT_HEAD(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t)
1215  or_connect_failures_map = HT_INITIALIZER();
1216 
1217 /* Helper: Hashtable equal function. Return 1 if equal else 0. */
1218 static int
1219 or_connect_failure_ht_eq(const or_connect_failure_entry_t *a,
1220  const or_connect_failure_entry_t *b)
1221 {
1222  return fast_memeq(a->identity_digest, b->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) &&
1223  tor_addr_eq(&a->addr, &b->addr) &&
1224  a->port == b->port;
1225 }
1226 
1227 /* Helper: Return the hash for the hashtable of the given entry. For this
1228  * table, it is a combination of address, port and identity digest. */
1229 static unsigned int
1230 or_connect_failure_ht_hash(const or_connect_failure_entry_t *entry)
1231 {
1232  size_t offset = 0, addr_size;
1233  const void *addr_ptr;
1234  /* Largest size is IPv6 and IPv4 is smaller so it is fine. */
1235  uint8_t data[16 + sizeof(uint16_t) + DIGEST_LEN];
1236 
1237  /* Get the right address bytes depending on the family. */
1238  switch (tor_addr_family(&entry->addr)) {
1239  case AF_INET:
1240  addr_size = 4;
1241  addr_ptr = &entry->addr.addr.in_addr.s_addr;
1242  break;
1243  case AF_INET6:
1244  addr_size = 16;
1245  addr_ptr = &entry->addr.addr.in6_addr.s6_addr;
1246  break;
1247  default:
1249  return 0;
1250  }
1251 
1252  memcpy(data, addr_ptr, addr_size);
1253  offset += addr_size;
1254  memcpy(data + offset, entry->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
1255  offset += DIGEST_LEN;
1256  set_uint16(data + offset, entry->port);
1257  offset += sizeof(uint16_t);
1258 
1259  return (unsigned int) siphash24g(data, offset);
1260 }
1261 
1262 HT_PROTOTYPE(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t, node,
1263  or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq);
1264 
1265 HT_GENERATE2(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t, node,
1266  or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq,
1268 
1269 /* Initialize a given connect failure entry with the given identity_digest,
1270  * addr and port. All field are optional except ocf. */
1271 static void
1272 or_connect_failure_init(const char *identity_digest, const tor_addr_t *addr,
1273  uint16_t port, or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf)
1274 {
1275  tor_assert(ocf);
1276  if (identity_digest) {
1277  memcpy(ocf->identity_digest, identity_digest,
1278  sizeof(ocf->identity_digest));
1279  }
1280  if (addr) {
1281  tor_addr_copy(&ocf->addr, addr);
1282  }
1283  ocf->port = port;
1284 }
1285 
1286 /* Return a newly allocated connection failure entry. It is initialized with
1287  * the given or_conn data. This can't fail. */
1289 or_connect_failure_new(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
1290 {
1291  or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ocf));
1292  or_connect_failure_init(or_conn->identity_digest, &TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr,
1293  TO_CONN(or_conn)->port, ocf);
1294  return ocf;
1295 }
1296 
1297 /* Return a connection failure entry matching the given or_conn. NULL is
1298  * returned if not found. */
1300 or_connect_failure_find(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
1301 {
1303  tor_assert(or_conn);
1304  or_connect_failure_init(or_conn->identity_digest, &TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr,
1305  TO_CONN(or_conn)->port, &lookup);
1306  return HT_FIND(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, &lookup);
1307 }
1308 
1309 /* Note down in the connection failure cache that a failure occurred on the
1310  * given or_conn. */
1311 STATIC void
1312 note_or_connect_failed(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
1313 {
1314  or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf = NULL;
1315 
1316  tor_assert(or_conn);
1317 
1318  ocf = or_connect_failure_find(or_conn);
1319  if (ocf == NULL) {
1320  ocf = or_connect_failure_new(or_conn);
1321  HT_INSERT(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ocf);
1322  }
1323  ocf->last_failed_connect_ts = approx_time();
1324 }
1325 
1326 /* Cleanup the connection failure cache and remove all entries below the
1327  * given cutoff. */
1328 static void
1329 or_connect_failure_map_cleanup(time_t cutoff)
1330 {
1331  or_connect_failure_entry_t **ptr, **next, *entry;
1332 
1333  for (ptr = HT_START(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map);
1334  ptr != NULL; ptr = next) {
1335  entry = *ptr;
1336  if (entry->last_failed_connect_ts <= cutoff) {
1337  next = HT_NEXT_RMV(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ptr);
1338  tor_free(entry);
1339  } else {
1340  next = HT_NEXT(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ptr);
1341  }
1342  }
1343 }
1344 
1345 /* Return true iff the given OR connection can connect to its destination that
1346  * is the triplet identity_digest, address and port.
1347  *
1348  * The or_conn MUST have gone through connection_or_check_canonicity() so the
1349  * base address is properly set to what we know or doesn't know. */
1350 STATIC int
1351 should_connect_to_relay(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
1352 {
1353  time_t now, cutoff;
1354  time_t connect_failed_since_ts = 0;
1356 
1357  tor_assert(or_conn);
1358 
1359  now = approx_time();
1360  cutoff = now - OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_LIFETIME;
1361 
1362  /* Opportunistically try to cleanup the failure cache. We do that at regular
1363  * interval so it doesn't grow too big. */
1364  if (or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts <= now) {
1365  or_connect_failure_map_cleanup(cutoff);
1366  or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts =
1367  now + OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL;
1368  }
1369 
1370  /* Look if we have failed previously to the same destination as this
1371  * OR connection. */
1372  ocf = or_connect_failure_find(or_conn);
1373  if (ocf) {
1374  connect_failed_since_ts = ocf->last_failed_connect_ts;
1375  }
1376  /* If we do have an unable to connect timestamp and it is below cutoff, we
1377  * can connect. Or we have never failed before so let it connect. */
1378  if (connect_failed_since_ts > cutoff) {
1379  goto no_connect;
1380  }
1381 
1382  /* Ok we can connect! */
1383  return 1;
1384  no_connect:
1385  return 0;
1386 }
1387 
1388 /** <b>conn</b> is in the 'connecting' state, and it failed to complete
1389  * a TCP connection. Send notifications appropriately.
1390  *
1391  * <b>reason</b> specifies the or_conn_end_reason for the failure;
1392  * <b>msg</b> specifies the strerror-style error message.
1393  */
1394 void
1396  int reason, const char *msg)
1397 {
1398  connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, reason);
1400  control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(msg, reason, conn);
1401  note_or_connect_failed(conn);
1402 }
1403 
1404 /** <b>conn</b> got an error in connection_handle_read_impl() or
1405  * connection_handle_write_impl() and is going to die soon.
1406  *
1407  * <b>reason</b> specifies the or_conn_end_reason for the failure;
1408  * <b>msg</b> specifies the strerror-style error message.
1409  */
1410 void
1412  int reason, const char *msg)
1413 {
1414  channel_t *chan;
1415 
1416  tor_assert(conn);
1417 
1418  /* If we're connecting, call connect_failed() too */
1419  if (TO_CONN(conn)->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING)
1420  connection_or_connect_failed(conn, reason, msg);
1421 
1422  /* Tell the controlling channel if we have one */
1423  if (conn->chan) {
1424  chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
1425  /* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
1426  if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
1428  }
1429  }
1430 
1431  /* No need to mark for error because connection.c is about to do that */
1432 }
1433 
1434 /** Launch a new OR connection to <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> and expect to
1435  * handshake with an OR with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>. Optionally,
1436  * pass in a pointer to a channel using this connection.
1437  *
1438  * If <b>id_digest</b> is me, do nothing. If we're already connected to it,
1439  * return that connection. If the connect() is in progress, set the
1440  * new conn's state to 'connecting' and return it. If connect() succeeds,
1441  * call connection_tls_start_handshake() on it.
1442  *
1443  * This function is called from router_retry_connections(), for
1444  * ORs connecting to ORs, and circuit_establish_circuit(), for
1445  * OPs connecting to ORs.
1446  *
1447  * Return the launched conn, or NULL if it failed.
1448  */
1449 
1451 connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port,
1452  const char *id_digest,
1453  const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id,
1454  channel_tls_t *chan))
1455 {
1456  or_connection_t *conn;
1457  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
1458  int socket_error = 0;
1459  tor_addr_t addr;
1460 
1461  int r;
1462  tor_addr_t proxy_addr;
1463  uint16_t proxy_port;
1464  int proxy_type, is_pt = 0;
1465 
1466  tor_assert(_addr);
1467  tor_assert(id_digest);
1468  tor_addr_copy(&addr, _addr);
1469 
1470  if (server_mode(options) && router_digest_is_me(id_digest)) {
1471  log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself. Refusing.");
1472  return NULL;
1473  }
1474  if (server_mode(options) && router_ed25519_id_is_me(ed_id)) {
1475  log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself by Ed25519 "
1476  "identity. Refusing.");
1477  return NULL;
1478  }
1479 
1481 
1482  /*
1483  * Set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember for channels
1484  *
1485  * This stuff needs to happen before connection_or_init_conn_from_address()
1486  * so connection_or_set_identity_digest() and such know where to look to
1487  * keep the channel up to date.
1488  */
1489  conn->chan = chan;
1490  chan->conn = conn;
1491  connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &addr, port, id_digest, ed_id, 1);
1492 
1493  /* We have a proper OR connection setup, now check if we can connect to it
1494  * that is we haven't had a failure earlier. This is to avoid to try to
1495  * constantly connect to relays that we think are not reachable. */
1496  if (!should_connect_to_relay(conn)) {
1497  log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Can't connect to %s because we "
1498  "failed earlier. Refusing.",
1500  connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
1501  return NULL;
1502  }
1503 
1504  conn->is_outgoing = 1;
1505 
1506  /* If we are using a proxy server, find it and use it. */
1507  r = get_proxy_addrport(&proxy_addr, &proxy_port, &proxy_type, &is_pt,
1508  TO_CONN(conn));
1509  if (r == 0) {
1510  conn->proxy_type = proxy_type;
1511  if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) {
1512  tor_addr_copy(&addr, &proxy_addr);
1513  port = proxy_port;
1514  conn->base_.proxy_state = PROXY_INFANT;
1515  conn->is_pt = is_pt;
1516  }
1518  connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0);
1519  } else {
1520  /* This duplication of state change calls is necessary in case we
1521  * run into an error condition below */
1523  connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0);
1524 
1525  /* get_proxy_addrport() might fail if we have a Bridge line that
1526  references a transport, but no ClientTransportPlugin lines
1527  defining its transport proxy. If this is the case, let's try to
1528  output a useful log message to the user. */
1529  const char *transport_name =
1531  TO_CONN(conn)->port);
1532 
1533  if (transport_name) {
1534  log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We were supposed to connect to bridge '%s' "
1535  "using pluggable transport '%s', but we can't find a pluggable "
1536  "transport proxy supporting '%s'. This can happen if you "
1537  "haven't provided a ClientTransportPlugin line, or if "
1538  "your pluggable transport proxy stopped running.",
1540  transport_name, transport_name);
1541 
1543  "Can't connect to bridge",
1544  END_OR_CONN_REASON_PT_MISSING,
1545  conn);
1546 
1547  } else {
1548  log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Tried to connect to %s through a proxy, but "
1549  "the proxy address could not be found.",
1551  }
1552 
1553  connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
1554  return NULL;
1555  }
1556 
1557  switch (connection_connect(TO_CONN(conn), conn->base_.address,
1558  &addr, port, &socket_error)) {
1559  case -1:
1560  /* We failed to establish a connection probably because of a local
1561  * error. No need to blame the guard in this case. Notify the networking
1562  * system of this failure. */
1564  errno_to_orconn_end_reason(socket_error),
1565  tor_socket_strerror(socket_error));
1566  connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
1567  return NULL;
1568  case 0:
1570  /* writable indicates finish, readable indicates broken link,
1571  error indicates broken link on windows */
1572  return conn;
1573  /* case 1: fall through */
1574  }
1575 
1576  if (connection_or_finished_connecting(conn) < 0) {
1577  /* already marked for close */
1578  return NULL;
1579  }
1580  return conn;
1581 }
1582 
1583 /** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to
1584  * the closing state.
1585  *
1586  * It's safe to call this and connection_or_close_for_error() any time, and
1587  * channel layer will treat it as a connection closing for reasons outside
1588  * its control, like the remote end closing it. It can also be a local
1589  * reason that's specific to connection_t/or_connection_t rather than
1590  * the channel mechanism, such as expiration of old connections in
1591  * run_connection_housekeeping(). If you want to close a channel_t
1592  * from somewhere that logically works in terms of generic channels
1593  * rather than connections, use channel_mark_for_close(); see also
1594  * the comment on that function in channel.c.
1595  */
1596 
1597 void
1599 {
1600  channel_t *chan = NULL;
1601 
1602  tor_assert(orconn);
1603  if (flush) connection_mark_and_flush_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
1604  else connection_mark_for_close_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
1605  if (orconn->chan) {
1606  chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(orconn->chan);
1607  /* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
1608  if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
1610  }
1611  }
1612 }
1613 
1614 /** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to
1615  * the error state.
1616  */
1617 
1618 MOCK_IMPL(void,
1620 {
1621  channel_t *chan = NULL;
1622 
1623  tor_assert(orconn);
1624  if (flush) connection_mark_and_flush_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
1625  else connection_mark_for_close_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
1626  if (orconn->chan) {
1627  chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(orconn->chan);
1628  /* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
1629  if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
1631  }
1632  }
1633 }
1634 
1635 /** Begin the tls handshake with <b>conn</b>. <b>receiving</b> is 0 if
1636  * we initiated the connection, else it's 1.
1637  *
1638  * Assign a new tls object to conn->tls, begin reading on <b>conn</b>, and
1639  * pass <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_continue_handshake().
1640  *
1641  * Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
1642  */
1643 MOCK_IMPL(int,
1645 {
1646  channel_listener_t *chan_listener;
1647  channel_t *chan;
1648 
1649  /* Incoming connections will need a new channel passed to the
1650  * channel_tls_listener */
1651  if (receiving) {
1652  /* It shouldn't already be set */
1653  tor_assert(!(conn->chan));
1654  chan_listener = channel_tls_get_listener();
1655  if (!chan_listener) {
1656  chan_listener = channel_tls_start_listener();
1657  command_setup_listener(chan_listener);
1658  }
1659  chan = channel_tls_handle_incoming(conn);
1660  channel_listener_queue_incoming(chan_listener, chan);
1661  }
1662 
1664  tor_assert(!conn->tls);
1665  conn->tls = tor_tls_new(conn->base_.s, receiving);
1666  if (!conn->tls) {
1667  log_warn(LD_BUG,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing.");
1668  return -1;
1669  }
1672 
1674  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"starting TLS handshake on fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT,
1675  conn->base_.s);
1676 
1677  if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(conn) < 0)
1678  return -1;
1679 
1680  return 0;
1681 }
1682 
1683 /** Block all future attempts to renegotiate on 'conn' */
1684 void
1686 {
1687  tor_tls_t *tls = conn->tls;
1688  if (!tls)
1689  return;
1690  tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, NULL, NULL);
1692 }
1693 
1694 /** Invoked on the server side from inside tor_tls_read() when the server
1695  * gets a successful TLS renegotiation from the client. */
1696 static void
1698 {
1699  or_connection_t *conn = _conn;
1700  (void)tls;
1701 
1702  /* Don't invoke this again. */
1704 
1705  if (connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn) < 0) {
1706  /* XXXX_TLS double-check that it's ok to do this from inside read. */
1707  /* XXXX_TLS double-check that this verifies certificates. */
1709  }
1710 }
1711 
1712 /** Move forward with the tls handshake. If it finishes, hand
1713  * <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_finish_handshake().
1714  *
1715  * Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
1716  */
1717 int
1719 {
1720  int result;
1721  check_no_tls_errors();
1722 
1724  // log_notice(LD_OR, "Continue handshake with %p", conn->tls);
1725  result = tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls);
1726  // log_notice(LD_OR, "Result: %d", result);
1727 
1728  switch (result) {
1730  conn->tls_error = result;
1731  log_info(LD_OR,"tls error [%s]. breaking connection.",
1732  tor_tls_err_to_string(result));
1733  return -1;
1734  case TOR_TLS_DONE:
1735  if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
1736  if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) {
1739  } else {
1740  /* v2/v3 handshake, but we are not a client. */
1741  log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (server-side). "
1742  "Expecting renegotiation or VERSIONS cell");
1745  conn);
1750  return 0;
1751  }
1752  }
1754  return connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn);
1755  case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE:
1757  log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted write");
1758  return 0;
1759  case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: /* handshaking conns are *always* reading */
1760  log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted read");
1761  return 0;
1762  case TOR_TLS_CLOSE:
1763  conn->tls_error = result;
1764  log_info(LD_OR,"tls closed. breaking connection.");
1765  return -1;
1766  }
1767  return 0;
1768 }
1769 
1770 /** Return 1 if we initiated this connection, or 0 if it started
1771  * out as an incoming connection.
1772  */
1773 int
1775 {
1776  tor_assert(conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_OR ||
1777  conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR);
1778  if (!conn->tls)
1779  return 1; /* it's still in proxy states or something */
1780  if (conn->handshake_state)
1781  return conn->handshake_state->started_here;
1782  return !tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls);
1783 }
1784 
1785 /** <b>Conn</b> just completed its handshake. Return 0 if all is well, and
1786  * return -1 if they are lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong.
1787  *
1788  * If we initiated this connection (<b>started_here</b> is true), make sure
1789  * the other side sent a correctly formed certificate. If I initiated the
1790  * connection, make sure it's the right relay by checking the certificate.
1791  *
1792  * Otherwise (if we _didn't_ initiate this connection), it's okay for
1793  * the certificate to be weird or absent.
1794  *
1795  * If we return 0, and the certificate is as expected, write a hash of the
1796  * identity key into <b>digest_rcvd_out</b>, which must have DIGEST_LEN
1797  * space in it.
1798  * If the certificate is invalid or missing on an incoming connection,
1799  * we return 0 and set <b>digest_rcvd_out</b> to DIGEST_LEN NUL bytes.
1800  * (If we return -1, the contents of this buffer are undefined.)
1801  *
1802  * As side effects,
1803  * 1) Set conn->circ_id_type according to tor-spec.txt.
1804  * 2) If we're an authdirserver and we initiated the connection: drop all
1805  * descriptors that claim to be on that IP/port but that aren't
1806  * this relay; and note that this relay is reachable.
1807  * 3) If this is a bridge and we didn't configure its identity
1808  * fingerprint, remember the keyid we just learned.
1809  */
1810 static int
1812  int started_here,
1813  char *digest_rcvd_out)
1814 {
1815  crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
1816  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
1817  int severity = server_mode(options) ? LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN : LOG_WARN;
1818  const char *conn_type = started_here ? "outgoing" : "incoming";
1819  int has_cert = 0;
1820 
1821  check_no_tls_errors();
1822  has_cert = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn->tls);
1823  if (started_here && !has_cert) {
1824  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s, but it didn't "
1825  "send a cert! Closing.",
1827  return -1;
1828  } else if (!has_cert) {
1829  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Got incoming connection with no certificate. "
1830  "That's ok.");
1831  }
1832  check_no_tls_errors();
1833 
1834  if (has_cert) {
1835  int v = tor_tls_verify(started_here?severity:LOG_INFO,
1836  conn->tls, &identity_rcvd);
1837  if (started_here && v<0) {
1838  log_fn(severity,LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s: It"
1839  " has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
1841  return -1;
1842  } else if (v<0) {
1843  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Incoming connection gave us an invalid cert "
1844  "chain; ignoring.");
1845  } else {
1846  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,
1847  "The certificate seems to be valid on %s connection "
1848  "with %s", conn_type,
1850  }
1851  check_no_tls_errors();
1852  }
1853 
1854  if (identity_rcvd) {
1855  if (crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd_out) < 0) {
1856  crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
1857  return -1;
1858  }
1859  } else {
1860  memset(digest_rcvd_out, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
1861  }
1862 
1863  tor_assert(conn->chan);
1864  channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan), identity_rcvd, 1);
1865 
1866  crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
1867 
1868  if (started_here) {
1869  /* A TLS handshake can't teach us an Ed25519 ID, so we set it to NULL
1870  * here. */
1871  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Calling client_learned_peer_id from "
1872  "check_valid_tls_handshake");
1874  (const uint8_t*)digest_rcvd_out,
1875  NULL);
1876  }
1877 
1878  return 0;
1879 }
1880 
1881 /** Called when we (as a connection initiator) have definitively,
1882  * authenticatedly, learned that ID of the Tor instance on the other
1883  * side of <b>conn</b> is <b>rsa_peer_id</b> and optionally <b>ed_peer_id</b>.
1884  * For v1 and v2 handshakes,
1885  * this is right after we get a certificate chain in a TLS handshake
1886  * or renegotiation. For v3+ handshakes, this is right after we get a
1887  * certificate chain in a CERTS cell.
1888  *
1889  * If we did not know the ID before, record the one we got.
1890  *
1891  * If we wanted an ID, but we didn't get the one we expected, log a message
1892  * and return -1.
1893  * On relays:
1894  * - log a protocol warning whenever the fingerprints don't match;
1895  * On clients:
1896  * - if a relay's fingerprint doesn't match, log a warning;
1897  * - if we don't have updated relay fingerprints from a recent consensus, and
1898  * a fallback directory mirror's hard-coded fingerprint has changed, log an
1899  * info explaining that we will try another fallback.
1900  *
1901  * If we're testing reachability, remember what we learned.
1902  *
1903  * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
1904  */
1905 int
1907  const uint8_t *rsa_peer_id,
1908  const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_peer_id)
1909 {
1910  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
1911  channel_tls_t *chan_tls = conn->chan;
1912  channel_t *chan = channel_tls_to_base(chan_tls);
1913  int changed_identity = 0;
1914  tor_assert(chan);
1915 
1916  const int expected_rsa_key =
1918  const int expected_ed_key =
1920 
1921  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "learned peer id for %s at %p: %s, %s",
1923  conn,
1924  hex_str((const char*)rsa_peer_id, DIGEST_LEN),
1925  ed25519_fmt(ed_peer_id));
1926 
1927  if (! expected_rsa_key && ! expected_ed_key) {
1928  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "(we had no ID in mind when we made this "
1929  "connection.");
1931  (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
1932  tor_free(conn->nickname);
1933  conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
1934  conn->nickname[0] = '$';
1936  conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
1937  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Connected to router at %s without knowing "
1938  "its key. Hoping for the best.",
1940  /* if it's a bridge and we didn't know its identity fingerprint, now
1941  * we do -- remember it for future attempts. */
1942  learned_router_identity(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port,
1943  (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
1944  changed_identity = 1;
1945  }
1946 
1947  const int rsa_mismatch = expected_rsa_key &&
1948  tor_memneq(rsa_peer_id, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
1949  /* It only counts as an ed25519 mismatch if we wanted an ed25519 identity
1950  * and didn't get it. It's okay if we get one that we didn't ask for. */
1951  const int ed25519_mismatch =
1952  expected_ed_key &&
1953  (ed_peer_id == NULL ||
1954  ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&chan->ed25519_identity, ed_peer_id));
1955 
1956  if (rsa_mismatch || ed25519_mismatch) {
1957  /* I was aiming for a particular digest. I didn't get it! */
1958  char seen_rsa[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
1959  char expected_rsa[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
1960  char seen_ed[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
1961  char expected_ed[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
1962  base16_encode(seen_rsa, sizeof(seen_rsa),
1963  (const char*)rsa_peer_id, DIGEST_LEN);
1964  base16_encode(expected_rsa, sizeof(expected_rsa), conn->identity_digest,
1965  DIGEST_LEN);
1966  if (ed_peer_id) {
1967  ed25519_public_to_base64(seen_ed, ed_peer_id);
1968  } else {
1969  strlcpy(seen_ed, "no ed25519 key", sizeof(seen_ed));
1970  }
1972  ed25519_public_to_base64(expected_ed, &chan->ed25519_identity);
1973  } else {
1974  strlcpy(expected_ed, "no ed25519 key", sizeof(expected_ed));
1975  }
1976  const int using_hardcoded_fingerprints =
1979  const int is_fallback_fingerprint = router_digest_is_fallback_dir(
1980  conn->identity_digest);
1981  const int is_authority_fingerprint = router_digest_is_trusted_dir(
1982  conn->identity_digest);
1983  const int non_anonymous_mode =
1984  hs_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options);
1985  int severity;
1986  const char *extra_log = "";
1987 
1988  /* Relays and Single Onion Services make direct connections using
1989  * untrusted authentication keys. */
1990  if (server_mode(options) || non_anonymous_mode) {
1991  severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN;
1992  } else {
1993  if (using_hardcoded_fingerprints) {
1994  /* We need to do the checks in this order, because the list of
1995  * fallbacks includes the list of authorities */
1996  if (is_authority_fingerprint) {
1997  severity = LOG_WARN;
1998  } else if (is_fallback_fingerprint) {
1999  /* we expect a small number of fallbacks to change from their
2000  * hard-coded fingerprints over the life of a release */
2001  severity = LOG_INFO;
2002  extra_log = " Tor will try a different fallback.";
2003  } else {
2004  /* it's a bridge, it's either a misconfiguration, or unexpected */
2005  severity = LOG_WARN;
2006  }
2007  } else {
2008  /* a relay has changed its fingerprint from the one in the consensus */
2009  severity = LOG_WARN;
2010  }
2011  }
2012 
2013  log_fn(severity, LD_HANDSHAKE,
2014  "Tried connecting to router at %s, but RSA + ed25519 identity "
2015  "keys were not as expected: wanted %s + %s but got %s + %s.%s",
2017  expected_rsa, expected_ed, seen_rsa, seen_ed, extra_log);
2018 
2019  /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */
2020  entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2021  connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
2022  END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY);
2023  if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options))
2025  "Unexpected identity in router certificate",
2026  END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY,
2027  conn);
2028  return -1;
2029  }
2030 
2031  if (!expected_ed_key && ed_peer_id) {
2032  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "(We had no Ed25519 ID in mind when we made this "
2033  "connection.)");
2035  (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
2036  changed_identity = 1;
2037  }
2038 
2039  if (changed_identity) {
2040  /* If we learned an identity for this connection, then we might have
2041  * just discovered it to be canonical. */
2043  if (conn->tls)
2046  }
2047 
2048  if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) {
2049  // We don't want to use canonical_orport here -- we want the address
2050  // that we really used.
2051  dirserv_orconn_tls_done(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port,
2052  (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
2053  }
2054 
2055  return 0;
2056 }
2057 
2058 /** Return when we last used this channel for client activity (origin
2059  * circuits). This is called from connection.c, since client_used is now one
2060  * of the timestamps in channel_t */
2061 
2062 time_t
2064 {
2065  tor_assert(conn);
2066 
2067  if (conn->chan) {
2068  return channel_when_last_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2069  } else return 0;
2070 }
2071 
2072 /** The v1/v2 TLS handshake is finished.
2073  *
2074  * Make sure we are happy with the peer we just handshaked with.
2075  *
2076  * If they initiated the connection, make sure they're not already connected,
2077  * then initialize conn from the information in router.
2078  *
2079  * If all is successful, call circuit_n_conn_done() to handle events
2080  * that have been pending on the <tls handshake completion. Also set the
2081  * directory to be dirty (only matters if I'm an authdirserver).
2082  *
2083  * If this is a v2 TLS handshake, send a versions cell.
2084  */
2085 static int
2087 {
2088  char digest_rcvd[DIGEST_LEN];
2089  int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn);
2090 
2091  tor_assert(!started_here);
2092 
2093  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"%s tls handshake on %s done, using "
2094  "ciphersuite %s. verifying.",
2095  started_here?"outgoing":"incoming",
2097  tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(conn->tls));
2098 
2099  if (connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(conn, started_here,
2100  digest_rcvd) < 0)
2101  return -1;
2102 
2104 
2105  if (tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
2106  conn->link_proto = 1;
2107  connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &conn->base_.addr,
2108  conn->base_.port, digest_rcvd,
2109  NULL, 0);
2111  rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto(1, started_here);
2112  return connection_or_set_state_open(conn);
2113  } else {
2115  if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, started_here) < 0)
2116  return -1;
2117  connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &conn->base_.addr,
2118  conn->base_.port, digest_rcvd,
2119  NULL, 0);
2120  return connection_or_send_versions(conn, 0);
2121  }
2122 }
2123 
2124 /**
2125  * Called as client when initial TLS handshake is done, and we notice
2126  * that we got a v3-handshake signalling certificate from the server.
2127  * Set up structures, do bookkeeping, and send the versions cell.
2128  * Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
2129  */
2130 static int
2132 {
2134 
2136 
2138  if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, 1) < 0)
2139  return -1;
2140 
2141  return connection_or_send_versions(conn, 1);
2142 }
2143 
2144 /** Allocate a new connection handshake state for the connection
2145  * <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
2146 int
2148 {
2150  if (conn->handshake_state) {
2151  log_warn(LD_BUG, "Duplicate call to connection_init_or_handshake_state!");
2152  return 0;
2153  }
2154  s = conn->handshake_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
2155  s->started_here = started_here ? 1 : 0;
2156  s->digest_sent_data = 1;
2157  s->digest_received_data = 1;
2158  if (! started_here && get_current_link_cert_cert()) {
2159  s->own_link_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_current_link_cert_cert());
2160  }
2162  s->certs->started_here = s->started_here;
2163  return 0;
2164 }
2165 
2166 /** Free all storage held by <b>state</b>. */
2167 void
2169 {
2170  if (!state)
2171  return;
2173  crypto_digest_free(state->digest_received);
2174  or_handshake_certs_free(state->certs);
2175  tor_cert_free(state->own_link_cert);
2176  memwipe(state, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
2177  tor_free(state);
2178 }
2179 
2180 /**
2181  * Remember that <b>cell</b> has been transmitted (if <b>incoming</b> is
2182  * false) or received (if <b>incoming</b> is true) during a V3 handshake using
2183  * <b>state</b>.
2184  *
2185  * (We don't record the cell, but we keep a digest of everything sent or
2186  * received during the v3 handshake, and the client signs it in an
2187  * authenticate cell.)
2188  */
2189 void
2191  or_handshake_state_t *state,
2192  const cell_t *cell,
2193  int incoming)
2194 {
2195  size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
2196  crypto_digest_t *d, **dptr;
2197  packed_cell_t packed;
2198  if (incoming) {
2199  if (!state->digest_received_data)
2200  return;
2201  } else {
2202  if (!state->digest_sent_data)
2203  return;
2204  }
2205  if (!incoming) {
2206  log_warn(LD_BUG, "We shouldn't be sending any non-variable-length cells "
2207  "while making a handshake digest. But we think we are sending "
2208  "one with type %d.", (int)cell->command);
2209  }
2210  dptr = incoming ? &state->digest_received : &state->digest_sent;
2211  if (! *dptr)
2212  *dptr = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
2213 
2214  d = *dptr;
2215  /* Re-packing like this is a little inefficient, but we don't have to do
2216  this very often at all. */
2217  cell_pack(&packed, cell, conn->wide_circ_ids);
2218  crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, packed.body, cell_network_size);
2219  memwipe(&packed, 0, sizeof(packed));
2220 }
2221 
2222 /** Remember that a variable-length <b>cell</b> has been transmitted (if
2223  * <b>incoming</b> is false) or received (if <b>incoming</b> is true) during a
2224  * V3 handshake using <b>state</b>.
2225  *
2226  * (We don't record the cell, but we keep a digest of everything sent or
2227  * received during the v3 handshake, and the client signs it in an
2228  * authenticate cell.)
2229  */
2230 void
2232  or_handshake_state_t *state,
2233  const var_cell_t *cell,
2234  int incoming)
2235 {
2236  crypto_digest_t *d, **dptr;
2237  int n;
2238  char buf[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
2239  if (incoming) {
2240  if (!state->digest_received_data)
2241  return;
2242  } else {
2243  if (!state->digest_sent_data)
2244  return;
2245  }
2246  dptr = incoming ? &state->digest_received : &state->digest_sent;
2247  if (! *dptr)
2248  *dptr = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
2249 
2250  d = *dptr;
2251 
2252  n = var_cell_pack_header(cell, buf, conn->wide_circ_ids);
2253  crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, buf, n);
2254  crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, (const char *)cell->payload, cell->payload_len);
2255 
2256  memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
2257 }
2258 
2259 /** Set <b>conn</b>'s state to OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN, and tell other subsystems
2260  * as appropriate. Called when we are done with all TLS and OR handshaking.
2261  */
2262 int
2264 {
2266  connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED, 0);
2267 
2268  /* Link protocol 3 appeared in Tor 0.2.3.6-alpha, so any connection
2269  * that uses an earlier link protocol should not be treated as a relay. */
2270  if (conn->link_proto < 3) {
2271  channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2272  }
2273 
2274  or_handshake_state_free(conn->handshake_state);
2275  conn->handshake_state = NULL;
2277 
2278  return 0;
2279 }
2280 
2281 /** Pack <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto <b>conn</b>'s outbuf.
2282  * For cells that use or affect a circuit, this should only be called by
2283  * connection_or_flush_from_first_active_circuit().
2284  */
2285 void
2287 {
2288  packed_cell_t networkcell;
2289  size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
2290 
2291  tor_assert(cell);
2292  tor_assert(conn);
2293 
2294  cell_pack(&networkcell, cell, conn->wide_circ_ids);
2295 
2296  /* We need to count padding cells from this non-packed code path
2297  * since they are sent via chan->write_cell() (which is not packed) */
2299  if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING)
2301 
2302  connection_buf_add(networkcell.body, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn));
2303 
2304  /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
2305  if (conn->chan) {
2306  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2307 
2308  if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->padding_enabled) {
2310  if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING)
2312  }
2313  }
2314 
2315  if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
2316  or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 0);
2317 }
2318 
2319 /** Pack a variable-length <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto
2320  * <b>conn</b>'s outbuf. Right now, this <em>DOES NOT</em> support cells that
2321  * affect a circuit.
2322  */
2323 MOCK_IMPL(void,
2326 {
2327  int n;
2328  char hdr[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
2329  tor_assert(cell);
2330  tor_assert(conn);
2331  n = var_cell_pack_header(cell, hdr, conn->wide_circ_ids);
2332  connection_buf_add(hdr, n, TO_CONN(conn));
2333  connection_buf_add((char*)cell->payload,
2334  cell->payload_len, TO_CONN(conn));
2335  if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
2337 
2339  /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
2340  if (conn->chan)
2341  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2342 }
2343 
2344 /** See whether there's a variable-length cell waiting on <b>or_conn</b>'s
2345  * inbuf. Return values as for fetch_var_cell_from_buf(). */
2346 static int
2348 {
2349  connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
2350  return fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn->inbuf, out, or_conn->link_proto);
2351 }
2352 
2353 /** Process cells from <b>conn</b>'s inbuf.
2354  *
2355  * Loop: while inbuf contains a cell, pull it off the inbuf, unpack it,
2356  * and hand it to command_process_cell().
2357  *
2358  * Always return 0.
2359  */
2360 static int
2362 {
2363  var_cell_t *var_cell;
2364 
2365  /*
2366  * Note on memory management for incoming cells: below the channel layer,
2367  * we shouldn't need to consider its internal queueing/copying logic. It
2368  * is safe to pass cells to it on the stack or on the heap, but in the
2369  * latter case we must be sure we free them later.
2370  *
2371  * The incoming cell queue code in channel.c will (in the common case)
2372  * decide it can pass them to the upper layer immediately, in which case
2373  * those functions may run directly on the cell pointers we pass here, or
2374  * it may decide to queue them, in which case it will allocate its own
2375  * buffer and copy the cell.
2376  */
2377 
2378  while (1) {
2379  log_debug(LD_OR,
2380  TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT": starting, inbuf_datalen %d "
2381  "(%d pending in tls object).",
2382  conn->base_.s,(int)connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn)),
2384  if (connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn, &var_cell)) {
2385  if (!var_cell)
2386  return 0; /* not yet. */
2387 
2388  /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
2389  if (conn->chan)
2390  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2391 
2393  channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell, conn);
2394  var_cell_free(var_cell);
2395  } else {
2396  const int wide_circ_ids = conn->wide_circ_ids;
2397  size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
2398  char buf[CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE];
2399  cell_t cell;
2400  if (connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn))
2401  < cell_network_size) /* whole response available? */
2402  return 0; /* not yet */
2403 
2404  /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
2405  if (conn->chan)
2406  channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
2407 
2409  connection_buf_get_bytes(buf, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn));
2410 
2411  /* retrieve cell info from buf (create the host-order struct from the
2412  * network-order string) */
2413  cell_unpack(&cell, buf, wide_circ_ids);
2414 
2415  channel_tls_handle_cell(&cell, conn);
2416  }
2417  }
2418 }
2419 
2420 /** Array of recognized link protocol versions. */
2421 static const uint16_t or_protocol_versions[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 };
2422 /** Number of versions in <b>or_protocol_versions</b>. */
2423 static const int n_or_protocol_versions =
2424  (int)( sizeof(or_protocol_versions)/sizeof(uint16_t) );
2425 
2426 /** Return true iff <b>v</b> is a link protocol version that this Tor
2427  * implementation believes it can support. */
2428 int
2430 {
2431  int i;
2432  for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
2433  if (or_protocol_versions[i] == v)
2434  return 1;
2435  }
2436  return 0;
2437 }
2438 
2439 /** Send a VERSIONS cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other host about the
2440  * link protocol versions that this Tor can support.
2441  *
2442  * If <b>v3_plus</b>, this is part of a V3 protocol handshake, so only
2443  * allow protocol version v3 or later. If not <b>v3_plus</b>, this is
2444  * not part of a v3 protocol handshake, so don't allow protocol v3 or
2445  * later.
2446  **/
2447 int
2449 {
2450  var_cell_t *cell;
2451  int i;
2452  int n_versions = 0;
2453  const int min_version = v3_plus ? 3 : 0;
2454  const int max_version = v3_plus ? UINT16_MAX : 2;
2455  tor_assert(conn->handshake_state &&
2458  cell->command = CELL_VERSIONS;
2459  for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
2460  uint16_t v = or_protocol_versions[i];
2461  if (v < min_version || v > max_version)
2462  continue;
2463  set_uint16(cell->payload+(2*n_versions), htons(v));
2464  ++n_versions;
2465  }
2466  cell->payload_len = n_versions * 2;
2467 
2469  conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at = time(NULL);
2470 
2471  var_cell_free(cell);
2472  return 0;
2473 }
2474 
2475 static netinfo_addr_t *
2476 netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(const tor_addr_t *tor_addr)
2477 {
2478  sa_family_t addr_family = tor_addr_family(tor_addr);
2479 
2480  if (BUG(addr_family != AF_INET && addr_family != AF_INET6))
2481  return NULL;
2482 
2483  netinfo_addr_t *netinfo_addr = netinfo_addr_new();
2484 
2485  if (addr_family == AF_INET) {
2486  netinfo_addr_set_addr_type(netinfo_addr, NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV4);
2487  netinfo_addr_set_len(netinfo_addr, 4);
2488  netinfo_addr_set_addr_ipv4(netinfo_addr, tor_addr_to_ipv4h(tor_addr));
2489  } else if (addr_family == AF_INET6) {
2490  netinfo_addr_set_addr_type(netinfo_addr, NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV6);
2491  netinfo_addr_set_len(netinfo_addr, 16);
2492  uint8_t *ipv6_buf = netinfo_addr_getarray_addr_ipv6(netinfo_addr);
2493  const uint8_t *in6_addr = tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(tor_addr);
2494  memcpy(ipv6_buf, in6_addr, 16);
2495  }
2496 
2497  return netinfo_addr;
2498 }
2499 
2500 /** Send a NETINFO cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other server what we know
2501  * about their address, our address, and the current time. */
2502 MOCK_IMPL(int,
2504 {
2505  cell_t cell;
2506  time_t now = time(NULL);
2507  const routerinfo_t *me;
2508  int r = -1;
2509 
2510  tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
2511 
2512  if (conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) {
2513  log_warn(LD_BUG, "Attempted to send an extra netinfo cell on a connection "
2514  "where we already sent one.");
2515  return 0;
2516  }
2517 
2518  memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
2519  cell.command = CELL_NETINFO;
2520 
2521  netinfo_cell_t *netinfo_cell = netinfo_cell_new();
2522 
2523  /* Timestamp, if we're a relay. */
2524  if (public_server_mode(get_options()) || ! conn->is_outgoing)
2525  netinfo_cell_set_timestamp(netinfo_cell, (uint32_t)now);
2526 
2527  /* Their address. */
2528  const tor_addr_t *remote_tor_addr = &TO_CONN(conn)->addr;
2529  /* We can safely use TO_CONN(conn)->addr here, since we no longer replace
2530  * it with a canonical address. */
2531  netinfo_addr_t *their_addr = netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(remote_tor_addr);
2532 
2533  netinfo_cell_set_other_addr(netinfo_cell, their_addr);
2534 
2535  /* My address -- only include it if I'm a public relay, or if I'm a
2536  * bridge and this is an incoming connection. If I'm a bridge and this
2537  * is an outgoing connection, act like a normal client and omit it. */
2538  if ((public_server_mode(get_options()) || !conn->is_outgoing) &&
2539  (me = router_get_my_routerinfo())) {
2540  uint8_t n_my_addrs = 1 + !tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr);
2541  netinfo_cell_set_n_my_addrs(netinfo_cell, n_my_addrs);
2542 
2543  netinfo_cell_add_my_addrs(netinfo_cell,
2544  netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(&me->ipv4_addr));
2545 
2546  if (!tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr)) {
2547  netinfo_cell_add_my_addrs(netinfo_cell,
2548  netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(&me->ipv6_addr));
2549  }
2550  }
2551 
2552  const char *errmsg = NULL;
2553  if ((errmsg = netinfo_cell_check(netinfo_cell))) {
2554  log_warn(LD_OR, "Failed to validate NETINFO cell with error: %s",
2555  errmsg);
2556  goto cleanup;
2557  }
2558 
2559  if (netinfo_cell_encode(cell.payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
2560  netinfo_cell) < 0) {
2561  log_warn(LD_OR, "Failed generating NETINFO cell");
2562  goto cleanup;
2563  }
2564 
2565  conn->handshake_state->digest_sent_data = 0;
2566  conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo = 1;
2567  connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn);
2568 
2569  r = 0;
2570  cleanup:
2571  netinfo_cell_free(netinfo_cell);
2572 
2573  return r;
2574 }
log_fn
#define log_fn(severity, domain, args,...)
Definition: log.h:283
connection_or_client_used
time_t connection_or_client_used(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2063
CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE
#define CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE
Definition: or.h:460
DOWNCAST
#define DOWNCAST(to, ptr)
Definition: or.h:109
or_connection_t::bucket
token_bucket_rw_t bucket
Definition: or_connection_st.h:103
routermode.h
Header file for routermode.c.
CONST_TO_OR_CONN
const or_connection_t * CONST_TO_OR_CONN(const connection_t *c)
Definition: connection_or.c:121
tor_free
#define tor_free(p)
Definition: malloc.h:52
get_circuit_build_times_mutable
circuit_build_times_t * get_circuit_build_times_mutable(void)
Definition: circuitstats.c:85
routerinfo_t
Definition: routerinfo_st.h:20
connection_stop_writing
void connection_stop_writing(connection_t *conn)
Definition: mainloop.c:664
hs_service.h
Header file containing service data for the HS subsystem.
connection_or_send_netinfo
int connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2503
fetch_var_cell_from_buf
int fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto)
Definition: proto_cell.c:57
channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn
void channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan, or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)
Definition: channeltls.c:963
orconn_status_msg_t::status
int status
Definition: orconn_event.h:92
tor_free_
void tor_free_(void *mem)
Definition: malloc.c:227
connection_or_finished_connecting
int connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *or_conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:725
tor_addr_family
static sa_family_t tor_addr_family(const tor_addr_t *a)
Definition: address.h:187
hex_str
const char * hex_str(const char *from, size_t fromlen)
Definition: binascii.c:34
or_handshake_state_t::digest_sent
crypto_digest_t * digest_sent
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:72
connection_or_send_versions
int connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus)
Definition: connection_or.c:2448
or_options_t::BandwidthRate
uint64_t BandwidthRate
Definition: or_options_st.h:416
OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING
#define OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING
Definition: orconn_event.h:31
or_handshake_state_free_
void or_handshake_state_free_(or_handshake_state_t *state)
Definition: connection_or.c:2168
or_connection_t::handshake_state
or_handshake_state_t * handshake_state
Definition: or_connection_st.h:98
memwipe
void memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz)
Definition: crypto_util.c:55
tor_tls_get_pending_bytes
int tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:657
OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING
#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING
Definition: orconn_event.h:43
channel_timestamp_active
void channel_timestamp_active(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:3122
tor_addr_t
Definition: address.h:69
ED25519_BASE64_LEN
#define ED25519_BASE64_LEN
Definition: x25519_sizes.h:43
orconn_state_msg_t::gid
uint64_t gid
Definition: orconn_event.h:76
approx_time
time_t approx_time(void)
Definition: approx_time.c:32
connection_t::address
char * address
Definition: connection_st.h:166
MOCK_IMPL
#define MOCK_IMPL(rv, funcname, arglist)
Definition: testsupport.h:133
connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake
static int connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here, char *digest_rcvd_out)
Definition: connection_or.c:1811
var_cell_pack_header
int var_cell_pack_header(const var_cell_t *cell, char *hdr_out, int wide_circ_ids)
Definition: connection_or.c:491
tor_tls_get_state_description
void tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:346
channel_tls_handle_cell
void channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: channeltls.c:1066
connection_or_reached_eof
int connection_or_reached_eof(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:552
channel_mark_client
void channel_mark_client(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:2906
tor_assert
#define tor_assert(expr)
Definition: util_bug.h:102
routerkeys.h
Header for routerkeys.c.
microdesc.h
Header file for microdesc.c.
LD_BUG
#define LD_BUG
Definition: log.h:86
ed25519_pubkey_eq
int ed25519_pubkey_eq(const ed25519_public_key_t *key1, const ed25519_public_key_t *key2)
Definition: crypto_ed25519.c:642
router.h
Header file for router.c.
CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR
#define CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR
Definition: connection.h:71
connection_or_change_state
void connection_or_change_state(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)
Definition: connection_or.c:419
connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb
static void connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:1697
command_setup_listener
void command_setup_listener(channel_listener_t *listener)
Definition: command.c:703
connection_or_state_publish
static void connection_or_state_publish(const or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)
Definition: connection_or.c:391
router_digest_is_me
int router_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
Definition: router.c:1739
channel.h
Header file for channel.c.
control_event_or_conn_status
int control_event_or_conn_status(or_connection_t *conn, or_conn_status_event_t tp, int reason)
Definition: control_events.c:922
or_handshake_state_t::started_here
unsigned int started_here
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:23
LD_GENERAL
#define LD_GENERAL
Definition: log.h:62
clear_broken_connection_map
void clear_broken_connection_map(int stop_recording)
Definition: connection_or.c:264
PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL
@ PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL
Definition: rephist.h:131
connection_or_clear_identity
void connection_or_clear_identity(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:129
CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY
#define CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY
Definition: tortls.h:62
base16_encode
void base16_encode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen)
Definition: binascii.c:478
conn_state_to_string
const char * conn_state_to_string(int type, int state)
Definition: connection.c:302
tor_fragile_assert
#define tor_fragile_assert()
Definition: util_bug.h:270
channel_is_better
int channel_is_better(channel_t *a, channel_t *b)
Definition: channel.c:2337
connection_init_or_handshake_state
int connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
Definition: connection_or.c:2147
learned_router_identity
void learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
Definition: bridges.c:403
channel_when_last_client
time_t channel_when_last_client(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:3242
router_get_my_routerinfo
const routerinfo_t * router_get_my_routerinfo(void)
Definition: router.c:1801
set_uint8
static void set_uint8(void *cp, uint8_t v)
Definition: bytes.h:31
channel_tls_get_listener
channel_listener_t * channel_tls_get_listener(void)
Definition: channeltls.c:254
cell_unpack
static void cell_unpack(cell_t *dest, const char *src, int wide_circ_ids)
Definition: connection_or.c:475
OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING
#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING
Definition: orconn_event.h:36
reachability.h
Header file for reachability.c.
tor_reallocarray_
void * tor_reallocarray_(void *ptr, size_t sz1, size_t sz2)
Definition: malloc.c:146
or_connection_t::is_canonical
unsigned int is_canonical
Definition: or_connection_st.h:71
connection_or_client_learned_peer_id
int connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn, const uint8_t *rsa_peer_id, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_peer_id)
Definition: connection_or.c:1906
channel_close_from_lower_layer
void channel_close_from_lower_layer(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:1216
is_or_protocol_version_known
int is_or_protocol_version_known(uint16_t v)
Definition: connection_or.c:2429
node_get_by_id
const node_t * node_get_by_id(const char *identity_digest)
Definition: nodelist.c:226
smartlist_add
void smartlist_add(smartlist_t *sl, void *element)
Definition: smartlist_core.c:117
tor_addr_port_copy
void tor_addr_port_copy(tor_addr_port_t *dest, const tor_addr_port_t *source)
Definition: address.c:2121
router_digest_is_fallback_dir
int router_digest_is_fallback_dir(const char *digest)
Definition: dirlist.c:192
tor_tls_get_last_error_msg
const char * tor_tls_get_last_error_msg(const tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:397
channel_tls_update_marks
void channel_tls_update_marks(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: channeltls.c:1356
tor_cert_dup
tor_cert_t * tor_cert_dup(const tor_cert_t *cert)
Definition: torcert.c:294
ed25519_public_key_is_zero
int ed25519_public_key_is_zero(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
Definition: crypto_ed25519.c:227
channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs
void channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:2878
or_handshake_state_record_cell
void or_handshake_state_record_cell(or_connection_t *conn, or_handshake_state_t *state, const cell_t *cell, int incoming)
Definition: connection_or.c:2190
connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs
static unsigned int connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:997
READ_EVENT
@ READ_EVENT
Definition: mainloop.h:37
tor_tls_peer_has_cert
int tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:532
connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper
static void connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(or_connection_t *conn, int reset, const or_options_t *options)
Definition: connection_or.c:834
connection_or_get_alleged_ed25519_id
const struct ed25519_public_key_t * connection_or_get_alleged_ed25519_id(const or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:218
or_options_t::PerConnBWRate
uint64_t PerConnBWRate
Definition: or_options_st.h:426
var_cell_copy
var_cell_t * var_cell_copy(const var_cell_t *src)
Definition: connection_or.c:526
connection_or_finished_flushing
int connection_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:680
tor_tls_used_v1_handshake
int tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:720
connection_or_process_inbuf
int connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:568
or_connection_t::is_pt
unsigned int is_pt
Definition: or_connection_st.h:90
crypto_digest_add_bytes
void crypto_digest_add_bytes(crypto_digest_t *digest, const char *data, size_t len)
Definition: crypto_digest_nss.c:308
connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf
void connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(const var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2325
orconn_status_msg_t::reason
int reason
Definition: orconn_event.h:93
var_cell_free_
void var_cell_free_(var_cell_t *cell)
Definition: connection_or.c:545
smartlist_new
smartlist_t * smartlist_new(void)
Definition: smartlist_core.c:26
reasons.h
Header file for reasons.c.
or_connection_t::link_proto
uint16_t link_proto
Definition: or_connection_st.h:92
note_broken_connection
static void note_broken_connection(const char *state)
Definition: connection_or.c:244
crypto_digest_t
Definition: crypto_digest_nss.c:166
or_connection_t
Definition: or_connection_st.h:22
tor_snprintf
int tor_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format,...)
Definition: printf.c:27
routerinfo_t::ipv6_addr
tor_addr_t ipv6_addr
Definition: routerinfo_st.h:30
connection_t::port
uint16_t port
Definition: connection_st.h:146
connection_start_reading
void connection_start_reading(connection_t *conn)
Definition: mainloop.c:631
CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE
#define CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE
Definition: or.h:457
connection_proxy_connect
int connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type)
Definition: connection.c:2750
ed25519_public_to_base64
void ed25519_public_to_base64(char *output, const ed25519_public_key_t *pkey)
Definition: crypto_format.c:227
SMARTLIST_FOREACH
#define SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, type, var, cmd)
Definition: smartlist_foreach.h:112
networkstatus.h
Header file for networkstatus.c.
rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto
void rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto(unsigned link_proto, int started_here)
Definition: rephist.c:2181
scheduler.h
Header file for scheduler*.c.
orconn_status_msg_t
Definition: orconn_event.h:90
connection_or_flushed_some
int connection_or_flushed_some(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:628
cell_t
Definition: cell_st.h:17
router_get_by_id_digest
const routerinfo_t * router_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest)
Definition: routerlist.c:776
node_ed25519_id_matches
int node_ed25519_id_matches(const node_t *node, const ed25519_public_key_t *id)
Definition: nodelist.c:1195
or_connection_t::chan
channel_tls_t * chan
Definition: or_connection_st.h:50
ed25519_fmt
const char * ed25519_fmt(const ed25519_public_key_t *pkey)
Definition: crypto_format.c:193
in6_addr
Definition: inaddr_st.h:51
dirlist.h
Header file for dirlist.c.
crypto_util.h
Common functions for cryptographic routines.
connection_or_clear_identity_map
void connection_or_clear_identity_map(void)
Definition: connection_or.c:137
LD_CIRC
#define LD_CIRC
Definition: log.h:82
buf_datalen
size_t buf_datalen(const buf_t *buf)
Definition: buffers.c:394
or_handshake_state_t::digest_sent_data
unsigned int digest_sent_data
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:56
connection_tls_continue_handshake
int connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:1718
circuitlist.h
Header file for circuitlist.c.
mainloop.h
Header file for mainloop.c.
tor_tls_t
Definition: tortls_st.h:41
DIGEST_LEN
#define DIGEST_LEN
Definition: digest_sizes.h:20
orconn_state_msg_t::state
uint8_t state
Definition: orconn_event.h:79
MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT
#define MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT
Definition: connection_or.c:327
OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN
#define OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN
Definition: orconn_event.h:53
connection_or_event_status
void connection_or_event_status(or_connection_t *conn, or_conn_status_event_t tp, int reason)
Definition: connection_or.c:372
errno_to_orconn_end_reason
int errno_to_orconn_end_reason(int e)
Definition: reasons.c:291
crypto_format.h
Header for crypto_format.c.
packed_cell_t
Definition: cell_queue_st.h:18
bridges.h
Header file for circuitbuild.c.
or_connection_new
or_connection_t * or_connection_new(int type, int socket_family)
Definition: connection.c:576
PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL
@ PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL
Definition: rephist.h:129
geoip.h
Header file for geoip.c.
command.h
Header file for command.c.
or_connection_t::idle_timeout
uint16_t idle_timeout
Definition: or_connection_st.h:94
connection_t::hold_open_until_flushed
unsigned int hold_open_until_flushed
Definition: connection_st.h:61
routerinfo_t::ipv4_addr
tor_addr_t ipv4_addr
Definition: routerinfo_st.h:25
connection_or_block_renegotiation
void connection_or_block_renegotiation(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:1685
tortls.h
Headers for tortls.c.
tor_addr_port_t
Definition: address.h:81
tor_memneq
#define tor_memneq(a, b, sz)
Definition: di_ops.h:21
tor_addr_to_ipv4h
static uint32_t tor_addr_to_ipv4h(const tor_addr_t *a)
Definition: address.h:160
entrynodes.h
Header file for circuitbuild.c.
TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD
#define TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD
Definition: connection_or.c:1017
tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached
#define tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached()
Definition: util_bug.h:176
node_t
Definition: node_st.h:34
LD_OR
#define LD_OR
Definition: log.h:92
connection_describe_peer
const char * connection_describe_peer(const connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection.c:528
channelpadding_get_channel_idle_timeout
unsigned int channelpadding_get_channel_idle_timeout(const channel_t *chan, int is_canonical)
Definition: channelpadding.c:595
circuit_build_times_network_is_live
void circuit_build_times_network_is_live(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
Definition: circuitstats.c:1356
torcert.h
Header for torcert.c.
CONN_TYPE_OR
#define CONN_TYPE_OR
Definition: connection.h:44
crypto_pk_get_digest
int crypto_pk_get_digest(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char *digest_out)
Definition: crypto_rsa.c:356
VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE
#define VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE
Definition: or.h:463
find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport
const char * find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port)
Definition: bridges.c:597
tor_digest_is_zero
int tor_digest_is_zero(const char *digest)
Definition: util_string.c:96
ed25519_public_key_t
Definition: crypto_ed25519.h:23
broken_state_count_compare
static int broken_state_count_compare(const void **a_ptr, const void **b_ptr)
Definition: connection_or.c:314
networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus
networkstatus_t * networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(time_t now, int flavor)
Definition: networkstatus.c:1477
or_handshake_state_t::sent_versions_at
time_t sent_versions_at
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:21
usable_consensus_flavor
int usable_consensus_flavor(void)
Definition: microdesc.c:1086
connection_t::inbuf
struct buf_t * inbuf
Definition: connection_st.h:101
orconn_state_msg_t::proxy_type
int proxy_type
Definition: orconn_event.h:78
OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING
#define OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING
Definition: orconn_event.h:33
authmode.h
Header file for directory authority mode.
get_connection_array
smartlist_t * get_connection_array(void)
Definition: mainloop.c:451
tor_tls_err_to_string
const char * tor_tls_err_to_string(int err)
Definition: tortls.c:155
or_connection_t::is_outgoing
unsigned int is_outgoing
Definition: or_connection_st.h:74
or_handshake_certs_t::started_here
int started_here
Definition: or_handshake_certs_st.h:21
connection_or_single_set_badness_
int connection_or_single_set_badness_(time_t now, or_connection_t *or_conn, int force)
Definition: connection_or.c:1026
connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here
int connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:1774
or_connection_t::tls_error
int tls_error
Definition: or_connection_st.h:45
connection_t::marked_for_close
uint16_t marked_for_close
Definition: connection_st.h:149
connection_or_num_cells_writeable
ssize_t connection_or_num_cells_writeable(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:650
connection_tls_start_handshake
int connection_tls_start_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving)
Definition: connection_or.c:1644
nodelist.h
Header file for nodelist.c.
broken_state_count_t
Definition: connection_or.c:307
connection_or_set_state_open
int connection_or_set_state_open(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2263
routerlist.h
Header file for routerlist.c.
var_cell_t::payload_len
uint16_t payload_len
Definition: var_cell_st.h:22
relay_handshake.h
Header for feature/relay/relay_handshake.c.
or_handshake_certs_new
or_handshake_certs_t * or_handshake_certs_new(void)
Definition: torcert.c:471
router_get_consensus_status_by_id
const routerstatus_t * router_get_consensus_status_by_id(const char *digest)
Definition: networkstatus.c:843
assert_connection_ok
void assert_connection_ok(connection_t *conn, time_t now)
Definition: connection.c:5570
channel_listener_queue_incoming
void channel_listener_queue_incoming(channel_listener_t *listener, channel_t *incoming)
Definition: channel.c:1925
connection_t::addr
tor_addr_t addr
Definition: connection_st.h:145
routerinfo_st.h
Router descriptor structure.
circuitstats.h
Header file for circuitstats.c.
token_bucket_rw_reset
void token_bucket_rw_reset(token_bucket_rw_t *bucket, uint32_t now_ts)
Definition: token_bucket.c:167
connection_start_writing
void connection_start_writing(connection_t *conn)
Definition: mainloop.c:687
buffers.h
Header file for buffers.c.
connection_or_notify_error
void connection_or_notify_error(or_connection_t *conn, int reason, const char *msg)
Definition: connection_or.c:1411
cell_t::command
uint8_t command
Definition: cell_st.h:19
cell_t::payload
uint8_t payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE]
Definition: cell_st.h:21
channel_t
Definition: channel.h:181
PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL
@ PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL
Definition: rephist.h:127
HT_HEAD
typedef HT_HEAD(hs_service_ht, hs_service_t) hs_service_ht
tor_tls_is_server
int tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls.c:379
OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2
#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2
Definition: orconn_event.h:47
connection_tls_finish_handshake
static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2086
channel_tls_start_listener
channel_listener_t * channel_tls_start_listener(void)
Definition: channeltls.c:266
channel_t::ed25519_identity
struct ed25519_public_key_t ed25519_identity
Definition: channel.h:388
crypto_digest256_new
crypto_digest_t * crypto_digest256_new(digest_algorithm_t algorithm)
Definition: crypto_digest_nss.c:272
connection_t
Definition: connection_st.h:45
connection_t::type
unsigned int type
Definition: connection_st.h:50
rep_hist_padding_count_write
void rep_hist_padding_count_write(padding_type_t type)
Definition: rephist.c:2211
connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake
static int connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2131
or_handshake_certs_st.h
OR handshake certs structure.
packed_cell_t::body
char body[CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE]
Definition: cell_queue_st.h:21
ext_orport.h
Header for ext_orport.c.
LOG_INFO
#define LOG_INFO
Definition: log.h:45
dirserv_orconn_tls_done
void dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t or_port, const char *digest_rcvd, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id_rcvd)
Definition: reachability.c:40
fmt_addr
#define fmt_addr(a)
Definition: address.h:239
connection_free_
void connection_free_(connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection.c:960
node_get_pref_ipv6_orport
void node_get_pref_ipv6_orport(const node_t *node, tor_addr_port_t *ap_out)
Definition: nodelist.c:1857
connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf
static int connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(or_connection_t *or_conn, var_cell_t **out)
Definition: connection_or.c:2347
control_events.h
Header file for control_events.c.
get_options
const or_options_t * get_options(void)
Definition: config.c:919
bool_eq
#define bool_eq(a, b)
Definition: logic.h:16
or_state_st.h
The or_state_t structure, which represents Tor's state file.
n_or_protocol_versions
static const int n_or_protocol_versions
Definition: connection_or.c:2423
or_options_t::PerConnBWBurst
uint64_t PerConnBWBurst
Definition: or_options_st.h:427
var_cell_st.h
Variable-length cell structure.
circuitbuild.h
Header file for circuitbuild.c.
connection_watch_events
void connection_watch_events(connection_t *conn, watchable_events_t events)
Definition: mainloop.c:493
tor_tls_set_logged_address
void tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address)
Definition: tortls.c:369
connection_or_note_state_when_broken
static void connection_or_note_state_when_broken(or_connection_t *orconn)
Definition: connection_or.c:296
get_uint32
static uint32_t get_uint32(const void *cp)
Definition: bytes.h:54
OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3
#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3
Definition: orconn_event.h:51
crypto_digest_free
#define crypto_digest_free(d)
Definition: crypto_digest.h:130
connection_or_close_for_error
void connection_or_close_for_error(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush)
Definition: connection_or.c:1619
scheduler_channel_wants_writes
void scheduler_channel_wants_writes(channel_t *chan)
Definition: scheduler.c:673
connection_connect
int connection_connect(connection_t *conn, const char *address, const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, int *socket_error)
Definition: connection.c:2396
get_proxy_addrport
int get_proxy_addrport(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t *port, int *proxy_type, int *is_pt_out, const connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection.c:5715
connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf
static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2361
channel_clear_identity_digest
void channel_clear_identity_digest(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:1302
set_uint32
static void set_uint32(void *cp, uint32_t v)
Definition: bytes.h:87
or_connection_t::proxy_type
unsigned int proxy_type
Definition: or_connection_st.h:75
IF_BUG_ONCE
#define IF_BUG_ONCE(cond)
Definition: util_bug.h:246
channel_tls_handle_incoming
channel_t * channel_tls_handle_incoming(or_connection_t *orconn)
Definition: channeltls.c:329
or_connect_failure_entry_t
Definition: connection_or.c:1198
OR_CONN_HIGHWATER
#define OR_CONN_HIGHWATER
Definition: or.h:601
connection_describe
const char * connection_describe(const connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection.c:543
connection_or_check_canonicity
static void connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
Definition: connection_or.c:936
relay.h
Header file for relay.c.
channel_is_bad_for_new_circs
int channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:2865
connection.h
Header file for connection.c.
connection_buf_get_bytes
int connection_buf_get_bytes(char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection.c:4232
channeltls.h
Header file for channeltls.c.
connection_read_proxy_handshake
int connection_read_proxy_handshake(connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection.c:2903
connection_or_write_cell_to_buf
void connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:2286
connection_or_report_broken_states
void connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain)
Definition: connection_or.c:332
node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication
bool node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(const node_t *node, bool compatible_with_us)
Definition: nodelist.c:1235
connection_or_about_to_close
void connection_or_about_to_close(or_connection_t *or_conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:761
monotime_coarse_get_stamp
uint32_t monotime_coarse_get_stamp(void)
Definition: compat_time.c:844
OR_CONN_LOWWATER
#define OR_CONN_LOWWATER
Definition: or.h:605
or_handshake_state_t
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:18
server_mode
int server_mode(const or_options_t *options)
Definition: routermode.c:34
LD_HANDSHAKE
#define LD_HANDSHAKE
Definition: log.h:101
connection_or_init_conn_from_address
void connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn, const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *id_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, int started_here)
Definition: connection_or.c:907
tor_addr_is_null
int tor_addr_is_null(const tor_addr_t *addr)
Definition: address.c:780
or_handshake_state_t::certs
or_handshake_certs_t * certs
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:79
connection_or_update_token_buckets
void connection_or_update_token_buckets(smartlist_t *conns, const or_options_t *options)
Definition: connection_or.c:866
var_cell_t::circ_id
circid_t circ_id
Definition: var_cell_st.h:20
channel_listener_t
Definition: channel.h:461
or_connection_st.h
OR connection structure.
or_connection_t::canonical_orport
tor_addr_port_t canonical_orport
Definition: or_connection_st.h:64
tor_tls_new
tor_tls_t * tor_tls_new(tor_socket_t sock, int is_server)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:409
token_bucket_rw_adjust
void token_bucket_rw_adjust(token_bucket_rw_t *bucket, uint32_t rate, uint32_t burst)
Definition: token_bucket.c:152
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN
#define SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(sl, type, var)
Definition: smartlist_foreach.h:78
node_get_nickname
const char * node_get_nickname(const node_t *node)
Definition: nodelist.c:1450
crypto_pk_t
Definition: crypto_rsa_nss.c:37
node_get_prim_orport
void node_get_prim_orport(const node_t *node, tor_addr_port_t *ap_out)
Definition: nodelist.c:1821
public_server_mode
int public_server_mode(const or_options_t *options)
Definition: routermode.c:43
HEX_DIGEST_LEN
#define HEX_DIGEST_LEN
Definition: crypto_digest.h:35
LOG_WARN
#define LOG_WARN
Definition: log.h:53
connection_or_get_state_description
static void connection_or_get_state_description(or_connection_t *orconn, char *buf, size_t buflen)
Definition: connection_or.c:278
orconn_event.h
Header file for orconn_event.c.
or_handshake_state_t::own_link_cert
struct tor_cert_st * own_link_cert
Definition: or_handshake_state_st.h:45
or_conn_status_event_t
or_conn_status_event_t
Definition: orconn_event.h:59
tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason
int tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(int e)
Definition: reasons.c:263
tor_tls_verify
int tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity)
Definition: tortls.c:416
get_uint8
static uint8_t get_uint8(const void *cp)
Definition: bytes.h:23
cell_st.h
Fixed-size cell structure.
channel_tls_handle_var_cell
void channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell_t *var_cell, or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: channeltls.c:1182
var_cell_new
var_cell_t * var_cell_new(uint16_t payload_len)
Definition: connection_or.c:511
connection_t::magic
uint32_t magic
Definition: connection_st.h:46
connection_or_digest_is_known_relay
int connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(const char *id_digest)
Definition: connection_or.c:814
cell_pack
void cell_pack(packed_cell_t *dst, const cell_t *src, int wide_circ_ids)
Definition: connection_or.c:454
HT_PROTOTYPE
HT_PROTOTYPE(hs_circuitmap_ht, circuit_t, hs_circuitmap_node, hs_circuit_hash_token, hs_circuits_have_same_token)
router_ed25519_id_is_me
int router_ed25519_id_is_me(const ed25519_public_key_t *id)
Definition: routerkeys.c:631
tor_tls_handshake
int tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:609
config.h
Header file for config.c.
orconn_state_msg_t
Definition: orconn_event.h:75
connection_t::s
tor_socket_t s
Definition: connection_st.h:96
get_uint16
static uint16_t get_uint16(const void *cp)
Definition: bytes.h:42
authdir_mode_tests_reachability
int authdir_mode_tests_reachability(const or_options_t *options)
Definition: authmode.c:68
or_handshake_state_record_var_cell
void or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(or_connection_t *conn, or_handshake_state_t *state, const var_cell_t *cell, int incoming)
Definition: connection_or.c:2231
connection_t::timestamp_created
time_t timestamp_created
Definition: connection_st.h:109
control_event_bootstrap_prob_or
void control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(const char *warn, int reason, or_connection_t *or_conn)
Definition: control_bootstrap.c:347
LD_NET
#define LD_NET
Definition: log.h:66
tor_tls_block_renegotiation
void tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:643
channel_set_circid_type
void channel_set_circid_type(channel_t *chan, crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd, int consider_identity)
Definition: channel.c:3333
tor_log
void tor_log(int severity, log_domain_mask_t domain, const char *format,...)
Definition: log.c:590
connection_t::state
uint8_t state
Definition: connection_st.h:49
sa_family_t
uint16_t sa_family_t
Definition: inaddr_st.h:77
or_options_t
Definition: or_options_st.h:64
orconn_state_msg_t::chan
uint64_t chan
Definition: orconn_event.h:77
connection_or_close_normally
void connection_or_close_normally(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush)
Definition: connection_or.c:1598
TO_CONN
#define TO_CONN(c)
Definition: or.h:616
set_uint16
static void set_uint16(void *cp, uint16_t v)
Definition: bytes.h:78
var_cell_t::payload
uint8_t payload[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER]
Definition: var_cell_st.h:24
or_handshake_state_st.h
OR handshake state structure.
STATIC
#define STATIC
Definition: testsupport.h:32
cell_queue_st.h
Cell queue structures.
tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback
void tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls, void(*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg), void *arg)
Definition: tortls_nss.c:468
orconn_end_reason_to_control_string
const char * orconn_end_reason_to_control_string(int r)
Definition: reasons.c:225
var_cell_t::command
uint8_t command
Definition: var_cell_st.h:18
channel_num_circuits
unsigned int channel_num_circuits(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:3316
entry_guard_chan_failed
void entry_guard_chan_failed(channel_t *chan)
Definition: entrynodes.c:2554
broken_connection_counts
static strmap_t * broken_connection_counts
Definition: connection_or.c:237
networkstatus_get_param
int32_t networkstatus_get_param(const networkstatus_t *ns, const char *param_name, int32_t default_val, int32_t min_val, int32_t max_val)
Definition: networkstatus.c:2500
or_options_t::BandwidthBurst
uint64_t BandwidthBurst
Definition: or_options_st.h:418
connection_or_connect
or_connection_t * connection_or_connect(const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port, const char *id_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, channel_tls_t *chan)
Definition: connection_or.c:1454
var_cell_t
Definition: var_cell_st.h:16
connection_or_group_set_badness_
void connection_or_group_set_badness_(smartlist_t *group, int force)
Definition: connection_or.c:1068
WRITE_EVENT
@ WRITE_EVENT
Definition: mainloop.h:38
channel_tls_to_base
channel_t * channel_tls_to_base(channel_tls_t *tlschan)
Definition: channeltls.c:396
proto_cell.h
Header for proto_cell.c.
smartlist_sort
void smartlist_sort(smartlist_t *sl, int(*compare)(const void **a, const void **b))
Definition: smartlist.c:334
cell_t::circ_id
circid_t circ_id
Definition: cell_st.h:18
or_connection_t::tls
struct tor_tls_t * tls
Definition: or_connection_st.h:44
orconn_status_msg_t::gid
uint64_t gid
Definition: orconn_event.h:91
tor_addr_to_in6_addr8
#define tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(x)
Definition: address.h:135
or_protocol_versions
static const uint16_t or_protocol_versions[]
Definition: connection_or.c:2421
PADDING_TYPE_CELL
@ PADDING_TYPE_CELL
Definition: rephist.h:125
or_connection_t::identity_digest
char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]
Definition: or_connection_st.h:27
smartlist_t
Definition: smartlist_core.h:26
TO_OR_CONN
or_connection_t * TO_OR_CONN(connection_t *c)
Definition: connection_or.c:109
fast_memeq
#define fast_memeq(a, b, c)
Definition: di_ops.h:35
channel_set_identity_digest
void channel_set_identity_digest(channel_t *chan, const char *identity_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_identity)
Definition: channel.c:1331
tor_addr_eq
#define tor_addr_eq(a, b)
Definition: address.h:280
connection_t::proxy_state
unsigned int proxy_state
Definition: connection_st.h:92
rendcommon.h
Header file for rendcommon.c.
rephist.h
Header file for rephist.c.
connection_or_set_identity_digest
static void connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn, const char *rsa_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
Definition: connection_or.c:158
connection_or.h
Header file for connection_or.c.
disable_broken_connection_counts
static int disable_broken_connection_counts
Definition: connection_or.c:240
tor_addr_copy
void tor_addr_copy(tor_addr_t *dest, const tor_addr_t *src)
Definition: address.c:933
channel_close_for_error
void channel_close_for_error(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:1244
or_connection_t::nickname
char * nickname
Definition: or_connection_st.h:42
or.h
Master header file for Tor-specific functionality.
connection_t::global_identifier
uint64_t global_identifier
Definition: connection_st.h:171
channel_closed
void channel_closed(channel_t *chan)
Definition: channel.c:1271
connection_or_get_num_circuits
int connection_or_get_num_circuits(or_connection_t *conn)
Definition: connection_or.c:435
connection_or_connect_failed
void connection_or_connect_failed(or_connection_t *conn, int reason, const char *msg)
Definition: connection_or.c:1395
LD_PROTOCOL
#define LD_PROTOCOL
Definition: log.h:72